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The main topic of this thesis is consumption, saving, and investment decisions
over the life cycle. The ﬁrst chapter, “Life-Cycle Asset Allocation with Am-
biguity Aversion and Learning” explores the impact of ambiguity about the
equity premium on stock allocations. In most life-cycle models it is assumed
that agents know all the parameters needed to make optimal decisions. How-
ever, it is difﬁcult to get a precise estimate of the equity premium and for that
reason I assume that agents are ambiguous about the equity premium. I ﬁnd
that if agents are ambiguous about the equity premium and are averse with
respect to ambiguity, this can explain the low stock allocations over the life
cycle. More particularly, it can simultaneously explain the low participation
levels in the stock market as well as the low fraction of ﬁnancial wealth in-
vested in stocks, conditional on participation.
The other three chapters in this thesis focus on a different puzzle in house-
hold ﬁnance; the annuity puzzle. Namely, theoretical models predict that re-
tirees should annuitize their entire wealth, while in reality agents rarely an-
nuitize on a voluntary basis. The ﬁnal three chapter of this thesis focus on
different potential explanations for this puzzle. The paper “How Much Do
Means-Tested Beneﬁts Reduce the Demand for Annuities” focusses on the im-
pact of means-tested beneﬁts on annuity demand. This paper is coauthored
with Monika Bütler and Stefan Staubli. In Switzerland, at retirement agents
are given the choice whether to annuitize (a part) of their pension wealth or
take it as a lump sum. Agents can receive generous means-tested beneﬁts if
they have wealth and income below a certain level, which can potentially re-
duceannuity demand. Weﬁnd that means-tested beneﬁts inducesagents with
a low pension wealth to take the lump sum, draw it down, and subsequently
applyfor means-tested beneﬁts. For retirees with higherpension wealth levels
thebeneﬁtsfrom annuitization, insuranceagainstlongevity riskandaﬂatcon-
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sumption pattern, outweighs the beneﬁts from receiving “free” wealth in the
form of means-tested beneﬁts. We can match empirical annuitization choices
in Switzerland with our life-cycle model that includes means-tested beneﬁts.
The third chapter “The annuity Puzzle Remains a Puzzle”, which is coau-
thored with Theo Nijman and Bas Werker, explores the impact of incomplete
annuity markets on annuity demand. In many countries, only nominal an-
nuities are offered by insurers instead of real annuities or variable annuities.
However, many agents would prefer annuities that provide inﬂation protec-
tion, real annuities, or annuities that provide exposure to the equity market,
variable annuities. We ﬁnd that incomplete annuity markets cannot solve the
annuity puzzle. In addition, we show that bequest motives and default risk of
the insurer does not lower annuity demand substantially.
The ﬁnal chapter “Health Cost Risk and Optimal Retirement Provision”,
which is coauthored with Theo Nijman and Bas Werker, examines another
potential reason for the annuity puzzle; health cost risk. In the U.S. many
elderly face large out-of-pocket medical expenses. These expenses raise liq-
uidity needs, while annuities could potentially impair the possibility to get
liquidity. We ﬁnd that the timing of health cost risk is particularly important
for annuity demand. Namely, if health cost risk is low early in retirement,
agents can optimally annuitize all wealth and save out of their annuity in-
come to build a buffer against out-of-pocket expenses later in life. However,
if health cost risk is already high early in retirement, agents do not have suf-
ﬁcient time to save enough to be able to smooth health cost shocks. Further-
more, we present data conﬁrming high health cost risk early in retirement and
ﬁnd that this high health cost risk can explain the annuity puzzle.
All three chapters on the annuity puzzle explore potential and separate ex-
planations of low annuity demand. Every country has a different institutional
setting and not all potential explanations are applicable to all countries. While
retirees in the U.S. pay a large part of health costs (mainly long term care
costs) out-of-pocket, this is not the case for most retirees in Europe. These pa-
pers can be viewed as separate chapters that explore which assumptions on,
for instance health cost risk, means-tested beneﬁts, and incomplete annuity
markets, provide an explanation for the low observed annuity demand.
Naturally, these results hold under certain model assumptions. Most im-
portantly, all papers assume a unitary framework for utility; the analysis is
done for a single person household. In many instances the results will not
change if we assume a household utility function, but for some particular ap-
plications it would be interesting to instead explore the annuity puzzle usingSUMMARY ix
a household utility function. Another assumption made in the three papers
on annuity demand is that agents can annuitize once at retirement. While
in many countries it is obligatory to choose between a lump sum or annuity
around the retirement date, such as in Switzerland, it would be interesting to
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LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY
AVERSION AND LEARNING
Abstract
I show that ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) and learning about the equity
premium can explain the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks over the life
cycle and the stock market participation puzzle. I assume that individuals are
ambiguous about the equity premium and are averse with respect to this ambiguity,
which results in a lower optimal allocation to stocks over the life cycle. As agents get
older, they learn about the equity premium and increase their allocation to stocks.
Cohort effects can be identiﬁed via learning, since each cohort has different stock
market experiences and thus differ in their beliefs. Time effects are identiﬁed via
decreasing fees over time. Two ways to include ambiguity aversion in the model are
examined: recursive smooth preferences and maximin utility preferences. I ﬁnd that
if agents have maximin preferences, the empirically observed allocation to stocks can
be matched. However, the stylized facts cannot be replicated when agents have
smooth recursive preferences with only moderate risk aversion.
1.1 Introduction
The key inputs of a life-cycle model, such as the equity risk premium, variance
of stock returns, and labor income risk, are generally assumed to be known by
the agent. Optimal portfolio allocations, consumption, and savings are calcu-
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lated as if the agent takes these parameters as given, and the resulting optimal
policies are subsequently compared to the empirically observed life-cycle pat-
terns. However, the predictions of most life-cycle models do not match well
with some of the empirical ﬁndings. For instance, the shape of participation
in the stock market over the life cycle and, more generally, the overall low par-
ticipation rates are ill understood. Furthermore, the hump-shaped allocation
to stocks, conditional on participation in the stock market, appears difﬁcult to
align with the predictions from life-cycle models. I propose a standard life-
cycle model, taking into account that agents are ambiguous about the equity
risk premium and are averse to this ambiguity (in contrast to the ambiguity
neutral approach). During their lifetime individuals learn about the equity
premium. With this parsimonious adjustment to the standard framework I
can explain both the life-cycle pattern of participation in the stock market and
the conditional allocation to equity. Furthermore, with this structural model I
can separately identify, age, cohort, and time effects in the allocation to stocks
over the life cycle.
In this paper I assume that agents not only face risk, but are uncertain about
the true parameters describing this risk (Knight (1921)).1 A common way to
deal with parameter uncertainty is the ambiguity-neutral approach, where the
decision maker treats the unknown parameters as random variables and com-
bines his prior belief about the parameter with observed signals, which forms
the predictive distribution. He evaluates his expected utility with respect to
this predictive distribution. In this case the agent is ambiguous but is not am-
biguity averse. However, there is substantial evidence that agents are not neu-
tral with respect to this parameter uncertainty (see for instance the classical
work on the Ellsberg paradox which demonstrates ambiguity aversion with
an urn experiment, Ellsberg (1961)). In this paper agents are not ambiguity
neutral, but are ambiguity averse. I assume ambiguity about the equity risk
premium, but I do not assume a certain origin for this ambiguity. Ambiguity
about the equity premium can arise from, for instance, a lack of statistical evi-
dence, a lack of theoretical evidence, unsophistication of investors, and so on.
Focussing on statistical ambiguity, even when every agent possesses all the
historical stock return data over the past 100 years and uses these to estimate
the equity premium, the conﬁdence interval will still be sizeable: for example
1The difference between risk and uncertainty is that when agents face risk they can attach
probabilitiesto random events, while when facing uncertainty they do not know the probabil-
ities. In the context of this paper, the agent faces risk becausethe return on stocks is stochastic,
but the agent is also uncertain because he does not know the expected stock return.CHAPTER 1 3
[4% − 2 ∗ 20%/
√
100 : 4% + 2 ∗ 20%/
√
100] = [+0% : +8%]. A short note
on terminology is in order. As Guidolin and Rinaldi (2010) point out, in the
literature ambiguity and uncertainty are not always distinguished, nor clearly
deﬁned. Throughout the paper I use the terms uncertainty and ambiguity in-
terchangeably, and I deﬁne ambiguity/uncertainty as a random event where
the probabilities are not given (as opposed to a coin toss), but agents have a
distribution of priors over the uncertain parameter.2
I explore two preference models to include ambiguity aversion; (1) max-
imin preferences and (2) smooth recursive preferences. Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) propose that agents have maximin preferences in a multiple priors
framework, which entails that agents evaluate policies by maximizing utility
according to the worst case belief. This atemporal framework is generalized
by Epstein and Schneider (2003) to a dynamic setup. Klibanoff, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2005) introduce a smooth ambiguity model, which allows a sep-
aration between ambiguity (the level of uncertainty) and ambiguity aversion
(taste with respect to ambiguity). I present the two models of ambiguity as
being separate, but, as shown in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), the
maximin preference model is a limiting case of the smooth recursive prefer-
ences when the degree of ambiguity tends to inﬁnity. There is no consensus in
the literature on whether agents behave according to smooth recursive prefer-
ence (with moderate ambiguity aversion) or maximin preferences (i.e., there
is no consensus on the degree of ambiguity aversion) and, as I will show, both
have widely varying implications for optimal portfolio allocation, with min-
imax better matching the data. I do not assume that agents learn about the
equity risk premium in a rational manner; agents weigh realizations of stock
returns during life with a prior belief about the equity risk premium, putting
no weight on returns before age 20. Malmendier and Nagel (2010) ﬁnd that
agents’ “experienced return” has a larger inﬂuence on beliefs about the eq-
uity risk premium than stock return realizations before birth. I assume agents
learn independently of stock market participation and I employ Bayes’ rule as
the updating rule for the beliefs about the equity risk premium.
Intheirseminalworks, Merton (1969)andSamuelson(1969)ﬁndthatagents
should hold a constant fraction in risky assets over the life cycle in the absence
of labor income and complete markets. More recent work by Benzoni, Collin-
2In this paper, I assume a set of priors about the equity risk premium, and I restrict the
set to be normally distributed. As I will show later, when using smooth recursive ambiguity
preferences, it is necessary to have a probability measure over the set of priors. When using
maximin preferences it is not necessary to attach probabilities to the set of priors.4 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007), Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), Heaton
and Lucas (2000), Polkovnichenko (2007), and Viceira (2001) examines the ef-
fect of (risky) labor income on the optimal portfolio choice. If human capital is
riskless, young agents have a substantial investment in this “bond-like” asset
and, as a result, invest a large fraction of their liquid wealth in risky assets.
This is in contrast to the empirically observed low allocation to stocks, espe-
cially early in the life cycle. Others, such as Cocco (2005) and Yao and Zhang
(2005), include housing in a dynamic framework and examine the portfolio
choice implications. However, the empirical life-cycle patterns of low stock
market participation and low equity holdings are hard to match with these
models.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, I ﬁnd that ambiguity
with respect to equity premium can have a substantial effect on the optimal
stock allocation. This paper is the ﬁrst, to my knowledge, that examines the
impact of ambiguity aversion and learning on optimal portfolio allocation in a
life-cycle model, comparing both maximin preferences and smooth recursive
preferences. When modeled via smooth recursive preferences with moderate
ambiguity aversion, I ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of ambiguity aversion and learn-
ingis small. In contrast, if agents have maximin preferences and are thus more
ambiguity averse, ambiguity aversion does have a sizeable impact on optimal
portfolio choices. The stock market participation decreases substantially as
well as the conditional allocation to equity. Both effects decrease with age due
to learning about the equity premium, since learning results in young agents
being more ambiguous about the equity premium compared to older agents.
Second, this structural model with ambiguity aversion and learning allows
identiﬁcation of age, cohort, and time effects. In a reduced form model age
patterns of stock allocation cannot be identiﬁed separately, from cohort ef-
fects and time effects, since time, age, and cohort do not vary independently.3
There are several rationales for why agents should optimally change their al-
location to risky assets with age; for instance human capital, which is exam-
ined in Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) and Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005). Furthermore ambiguity aversion and learning about
the expected stock return induces age effects, which is the focus of this paper.
Cohort effects relate to individuals’ experiences during life, common to those
growing up at the same time, which may inﬂuence behavior and beliefs. For
3The identiﬁcation problem arises because age equals time minus cohort (birth year).
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and Poterba and Samwick (1997) try to uncover speciﬁc age pat-
terns, but reach inconclusive results.CHAPTER 1 5
instance high stock returns can lead to upward revisions in expectations about
future stock returns (see Malmendier and Nagel (2010)). Cohort effects in the
model are generated due to learning about the expected stock return. This
results in differences between cohorts in their optimal allocation to stocks; for
instance a 25-year old in 2007 has a different mean belief about the equity pre-
mium compared to a 25-year old in 1989 due to a difference in the realized
stock returns in the preceding years. Time effects can arise for a variety of
reasons, for instance due to decreasing fees or lower costs of obtaining infor-
mation over time. In the model, time effects are generated due to a decrease
in transaction fees over time.
Third, when I compare the optimal fraction allocated to stocks to the em-
pirical levels, I ﬁnd a very close match when assuming that cohort effects are
zero, and a lesser match when cohort effects are added. If cohort effects are
excluded, the predicted fraction to stocks deviates not more than 25% from
the empirical levels at all ages, in the examined years 2007, 1998, and 1989.
A comparable good match is found when examining the participation in the
stock market. Hence by extending the often used life-cycle model calibrated
by Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) with ambiguity aversion and learn-
ing, I can explain the observed stock allocations.
In contrast to other papers, I do not need to include several additional fea-
tures in the model to be able to explain low stock allocations, such as partici-
pation costs (Paiella (2001) and Vissing-Jorgenson (2002)), Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences, bequests, housing, cointegration between labor income and dividends,
and so forth, and the intuitive modiﬁcation with ambiguity aversion can ex-
plain the empirical evidence very closely. Similar to this paper, Gomes and
Michaelides (2005) try to match the empirically observed allocation to stocks
by assuming a bequest motive, ﬁxed entry costs of 2.5% of income, preference
heterogeneity, and Epstein-Zin preferences. The participation levels match
closely, except after retirement, however the predictions about the conditional
allocation to equity differ about 40% from the empirically observed levels at
younger ages. I can match the allocation to equity conditional on participa-
tion in the stock market very well, especially at young ages. Benzoni, Collin-
Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) assume cointegration between stock and labor
markets and ﬁnd a hump-shaped allocation to equity, however the absolute
differences with empirical levels are substantially larger than the ﬁndings in
this paper.
Two other papers include ambiguity and learning about the parameters in
a life-cycle framework and address similar questions as in this paper. Cam-6 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
panale (2009) assumes agents have maximin preferences, are uncertain about
theprobability ofa high stock return, andface ﬁxed stock market participation
costs. The return on stocks can take on two values, high or low. Learning oc-
curs when agents invest in the stock market, and only with a percentage lower
than 100% if they do not participate. Hence participation in the stock market
isencouraged, since it generates information about the expected stock returns.
The learning process differs from this paper, where both non-participants and
participants receive the same information about the stock market. Campanale
(2009) ﬁnds that ambiguity aversion about the expected stock return can ra-
tionalize lower stock market participation. Linnainmaa (2007) examines the
inﬂuence of ambiguity in a life-cycle framework, but maximizes over ﬁnan-
cial wealth and stock prices follow a binomial tree. In contrast to both papers
I identify age, cohort, and time effects, which are then compared to the data.
Hence I do not make the identifying assumption that cohort and time effects
are zero. Campanale (2009) points out the potential of a life-cycle model with
ambiguity aversion and learning to calculate cohort effects, but leaves this for
further research.
Two closely related strands of literature look at the implications of ambigu-
ity on (1) portfolio choice, and (2) asset pricing, from a non life-cycle perspec-
tive. Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) ﬁnd that model uncertainty can help ex-
plain the limited participation, and Dow, Ribeiro, and Werlang (1992) come to
similar conclusions. Related to both papers, Easley and O’Hara (2009) model
ambiguity about expected stock returns and show how regulation of the mar-
ket moderates the effect of ambiguity. The inﬂuence of ambiguity on portfo-
lio holdings are furthermore examined in for instance Bossaerts, Ghirardato,
Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010), and Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang(2007).4 This
paperdiffers in two important aspects. Namely, I examine ambiguity aversion
4Other papers relating stock allocations and ambiguity are Epstein and Schneider (2008),
Illeditsch (2010), and Williams (2009) who look at ambiguous information. Illeditsch (2010)
shows that ambiguous information can give rise to portfolio inertia. Faria, Correira-Da-Silva,
and Ribeiro (2009) model ambiguity about the volatility of stock returns, while Gagliardini,
Porchia, and Trojani (2009) model ambiguity averse agents and examine the implications
for the term structure of interest rates. Easley and O’Hara (2010) ﬁnd that illiquidity arises
due to uncertainty, and at certain prices there are no trades. Furthermore, Cvitanic, Lazrak,
Martellini, and Zapatero (2006) conclude that uncertain agents have an incentive to trade in-
duced by learning about the expected return on stocks. Related to this Mele and Sangiorgi
(2009)examine costly information acquisition to reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, a “ﬂight to
familiar assets” can arise if agents are less uncertain about some assets compared to others,
which is exploredin Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal,and Wang (2009). Other papersrelatingportfolio
choice and ambiguity are Miao (2009) and Liu (2010).CHAPTER 1 7
and learningin the context of a life-cycle model, so I not only explain the mean
of stock market participation and conditional allocation to equity aggregated
over all ages, but at all ages. In addition, I compare the implications of the
two most employed ways to incorporate ambiguity aversion, smooth recur-
sive preferences and maximin preferences. The second strand of literature ex-
amines the asset pricing implications of ambiguity and learning and explore
whether this can explain the equity premium puzzle (Ju and Miao (2010) and
Leippold, Trojani, and Vanini (2008)).5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the life-cycle model, in which I include ambiguity aversion and learning. In
Section 1.3 I show the impact of ambiguity about the equity risk premium on
optimal portfolio choices and compares the results from the life-cycle model
with the empirical evidence. Section 1.4 presents the results for smooth recur-
sive preferences. Robustness tests are subsequently performed in Section 1.5.
Section 4.6 concludes.
1.2 The model
I extend the standard life-cycle framework by including ambiguity aversion
and learning. Two often used ways to do this are (1) maximin preferences and
(2) smooth recursive preferences.6 Essentially, the smooth recursive frame-
work with inﬁnite ambiguity aversion equals the maximin preferences frame-
work. However, in the literature they are often presented as a separate frame-
work instead of the maximin preferences being a special case of the smooth
preferences model. In compliance with the literature, I explore the implica-
tions of ambiguity aversion and learning on equity allocation via both frame-
works, because there is considerable debate on whether agents exhibit smooth
5Similarly, Hayashi and Wada (2010) examine the asset pricing implications using a recur-
sive smooth ambiguity preferences model. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) determine the option
pricing implications for agents who face model uncertainty, while Chen and Epstein (2002)
model ambiguity in a continuous time setting and explore the inﬂuence on the equity pre-
mium. The references in this paragraph are far from comprehensive, since the ambiguity
literature is large and growing fast and hence cannot be summarized in one section. Some
excellent and recent reviews on this literature are Epstein and Schneider (2010) and Guidolin
and Rinaldi (2010).
6An alternative way to include uncertainty stems from the robust control literature
(Hansen and Sargent (2001)). The idea is that the decision rules also work well (are robust)
if there is some model misspeciﬁcation. Related to this paper, Maenhout (2004) explores the
impact of uncertainty on asset prices and portfolio allocation in a robust control framework.8 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
preferences or kinked preferences (maximin preferences). 7
1.2.1 The individuals preferences
I consider a life-cycle investor of age t = 1,...,T, where t is the adult age, T is
the maximum age possible, and K is the retirement age. Individuals maximize
utility over consumption and preferences are represented by a time-separable
utility function over consumption (Ct). The agent’s decision variables at time
t are consumption Ct and stock weight wt.
Maximin preferences
For comparison, in the standard life-cycle model without ambiguity, the indi-
viduals preferences are deﬁned as
Vt = max
wt,Ct
u(Ct) + βpt+1Et{Vt+1(Wt+1)}, (1.1)
where β is the time preference discount factor, u is the utility function, and Ct
is the amount of wealth consumed at the beginning of period t. The optimal
fraction allocated to stocks is denoted by wt, which is implicit in Wt+1. The
probability of surviving to age t + 1, conditional on having lived to period t,
is indicated by pt+1.
I assume investors preferences are described by maximin expected utility,
which essentially means that agents maximize expected utility according to
the belief which generates the lowest utility. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
axiomatize this behavior in a static setting and Epstein and Schneider (2003)
in a dynamic framework. I assume that the agent is uncertain about the equity
premium and updates his beliefs according to realized stock market returns,
which can be either actively or passively observed. The updates of the beliefs
about the equity risk premium follow from Bayes’ rule, which is described in
Section 1.2.5. The mean belief about the equity risk premium is denoted by λB
t
and the standard deviation by σB
t . λB
t and σB
t describe the set of priors, which
are normally distributed. The domain of equity premiums that the agents




t ]. Garlappi, Uppal,
7Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2010) explicitly compare via a portfolio choice experiment
the maximin preferences and smooth preferences to explore which describes actual behavior
best and ﬁnd evidence in favor of a kinked speciﬁcation (maximin preferences). Other pa-
pers that examine (the amount of) uncertainty or effects of uncertainty on portfolio choice
via experiments are Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2010), Bossaerts, Ghirardato,
Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010), and Hayashi and Wada (2010).CHAPTER 1 9
and Wang (2007) make a related assumption when incorporating ambiguity
bystating thattheexpectedreturn ofanassetlieswithin aspeciﬁedconﬁdence
interval of its estimated value, and the agent behaves as if the worst case belief
in the conﬁdence interval is the true belief. Hence the mean of the belief about
the equity premium, λB
t , is not the only possible value of the equity premium.
But the true mean is expected to lie within a 95% conﬁdence interval of beliefs
about the equity premium.
As described above, the agent is uncertain about the equity premium and


















t is the expectation calculated as if λ is the true equity premium. I
assume a CRRA utility function, u, and γ is the risk aversion coefﬁcient. In
effect, the agent maximizes expected utility as if λB
t − 2σB
t is the equity pre-
mium. Note that I assume that the agent limits his beliefs to a range of pos-
sible equity premiums, a conﬁdence interval. An interval of beliefs instead
of the entire distribution is not only intuitive but also necessary, because the
beliefs are normally distributed and hence the worst belief is inﬁnitely neg-
ative. Furthermore, for the maximin preferences to be a limiting case of the
recursive smooth preferences the worst case prior must be the same in both
frameworks.
Recursive smooth preferences
In addition to examining the effect of ambiguity about the equity risk pre-
mium and learning on the allocation to risky assets via maximin preferences, I
alsoemploysmooth preferences. IassumepreferencesasspeciﬁedinKlibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), which include an ambiguity function φ and to-
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where φ is the constant relative ambiguity aversion function (CRAA) and α
is the ambiguity aversion coefﬁcient. This power-exponential speciﬁcation is
employed in Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2009), Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci, andMukerji (2009), andKlibanoff, Marinacci, andMukerji (2005). Think
of each prior λt ∈ Λt as describing a possible scenario (a possible equity risk
premium) and pt(λ) as the probabilistic belief over the different scenarios.
This utility function can be interpreted as being solved in two stages. First, the
expected utility for all the priors in Λt are calculated, to get a set of expected
utilities. Maximin would then take the minimum of these expected utilities,
while smooth preferences takes an expectation over the distorted probabili-
ties. The ambiguity aversion function φ distorts the probabilities, giving a
higher weight to lower expected utilities, reﬂecting ambiguity aversion. Re-
cursive smooth preferences allow a separation between ambiguity, i.e., the
subjective beliefs of the individuals, and ambiguity aversion, which reﬂects
the decisions makers’ tastes with respect to the ambiguity. This separation be-
tween ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is not possible with maximin pref-
erences.
1.2.2 The individuals constraints
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and invest-
ment decisions. First, I assume that the agent faces borrowing and short-sales
constraints
wt ≥ 0 and ι′wt ≤ 1. (1.8)
Second, I impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt +Yt, (1.9)
which implies that the individual cannot borrow against future income to in-
crease consumption today. Wt denotes ﬁnancial wealth and Yt is income. The
intertemporal budget constraint equals:
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct +Yt)(1 + Rf + wt(Rt+1 − Rf)). (1.10)
The portfolio return is given as
RP
t+1 = 1+ Rf + (Rt+1 − Rf − c)wt. (1.11)
where c is the proportional fee for investing in stocks. Each period agents pay
a fee and c is a ﬁxed percentage of the stock investment.
Furthermore I denote the wealth level after income and consumption as:
At = Wt + Yt − Ct. (1.12)CHAPTER 1 11
1.2.3 Financial market
I consider a simple ﬁnancial market with a constant interest rate Rf and stocks
with i.i.d. returns Rt+1. The stock returns, Rt+1, are normally distributed with
an annual mean equity return Rf + λR and a standard deviation σR, where λR
is the assumed “correct” equity risk premium. The agent is uncertain about
the value of the equity premium. At time t, the agent merely has a distribution
over the equity premium, λt. This distribution changes over time because of
learning about the equity risk premium. The distribution of the equity risk
premium, given the information at time t, is itself characterized by a state-
variable, containing the learned mean λB
t , and its variance (σB
t )2. Agents pay
a proportional transaction fee, c, which differs per year. These fees generate
time effects in stock allocation and allow the matching of the predictions from
the model to the data. The parameters used are described in Section 1.2.6.
1.2.4 Labor income process
I assume that labor income is uncertain and given by
Yt = exp(ft + vt + ǫt) for t < K, (1.13)
where
vt = vt−1 + ut. (1.14)
After the retirement age K income is riskless and equals a fraction of the la-
bor income at age 65 (the replacement rate). Labor income exhibits a hump-
shaped proﬁle over the life cycle which is accommodated by ft, where ft is a
deterministic function of age. The error term consist of a transitory compo-
nent and a permanent component. ǫt is a transitory shock and is distributed
as N(0,σ2
ǫ). ut presents a permanent shock, where ut ∼ N(0,σ2
u). This rep-
resentation follows Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and I calibrate the
labor income process according to their estimates. The function ft is modeled
by a third order polynomial in age,
ft = α0 + α1t + α2t2/10 + α3t3/100. (1.15)
1.2.5 Learning and updating of beliefs
Agents learn about the equity risk premium during their lifetime and become
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not make assumptions about the cause of ambiguity about the equity risk pre-
mium. Uncertainty could stem from lack of statistical evidence, since stock
market returns are so volatile that it is hard to measure the expected return.
But uncertainty about the equity premium could also result from inconsis-
tency is theoretical evidence or unsophistication of investors. As agents get
older they update their beliefs on the equity risk premium conditional on the
signals, i.e., realized returns. I assume agents update their beliefs irrespective
of stock market participation, e.g., since everyone receives similar information
via newspapers, television, and so on. Furthermore, the updating process for
the set of priors follows from Bayes’ rule.8
The agent is uncertain about the equity risk premium, λR. I model this
as follows. Before observing any signals, the set of priors are normally dis-
tributed with mean λB
1 and variance (σB
1 )2. An individual of age t has received
t − 1 independent signals about λR, Rt = Rf + λR + ǫt, where ǫt is normally
distributed with mean zero and a known variance σ2
R. These signals, the re-
alized excess returns, are observed annually. The updated priors about λR is
normally distributed with mean λB
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The posterior mean λB
t is a precision weighted average of the prior mean and
the average signal. At time t = 1, representing age 20, the agent has not yet
observed stock market returns. Unlike λB
t , the posterior variance (σB
t )2 does
not depend on the realizations of the signals. This variance, which measures
the uncertainty/ambiguity about λR, decreases as the number of signals t in-
creases (learning reduces uncertainty), hence (σB
t )2 < (σB
t−1)2.
Note that I do not assume that agents learn in a rational manner. People
start with prior beliefs about the equity risk premium at age 20 and update
those beliefs according to the realized returns from age 20 onwards. Hence
agents put no weight on stock returns before age 20 and only take into account
realizations during lifetime. Malmendier and Nagel (2010) ﬁnd that stock re-
turns experienced receive a much larger weight when forming beliefs about
8Other updating rules for beliefs are explored in Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni (2010), Ep-
stein and Schneider (2007), and Hanany and Klibanoff (2009).CHAPTER 1 13
expected stock market returns compared to stock returns during childhood or
before birth. The priors at age 20 could be thought of as containing to some
extent the realized stock returns before age 20, but I do not assume that prior
beliefs at age 20 are equal to the conﬁdence interval from the stock return data
available.
Cohort effects can be identiﬁed by learning about the equity risk premium.
For instance, a 25 year old in 2007 has faced 5 realized stock returns, and the
mean of these excess returns (Rt − Rf) induces higher or lower beliefs com-
pared to the prior mean belief about the equity premium, λB
1. If the updated
belief, λB
6, has increased due to high realized stock returns, this can result in
higher allocations to stocks. I calculate the pattern of stock allocations over
the life cycle taking into account these cohort effects.
Two assumption are made: (1) the amount of ambiguity, σB
1 , is the same
for every 20-year old, independently of birth year and (2) the mean of the pri-
ors about the equity risk premium, λB
1, at age 20 is independent of birth year
and hence independent of stock return realizations before age 20. In regard to
assumption (1), the reason why I assume that the amount of ambiguity (stan-
dard deviation of belief) about the equity risk premium is the same in 1970
and 2000, is that data going back more than for instance 70 years may, accord-
ing to the agent, not be that relevant for estimating the equity premium today,
dueto, forinstance, structural changes(PastorandVeronesi (2009)). Structural
changes, induced by for example technologic innovations, might permanently
change the equity risk premium. Hence the amount of uncertainty does not
reduce over time and isthus irrespective ofthe yearin which the agentisborn.
Regarding assumption (2), the mean of the belief is the same for every 20-
year old and does not depend on birth year. Different priors at age 20 could
generate additional cohort effects, however I assume that the prior is indepen-
dent of birth year, because agents incorporate realized stock returns during
adult life more heavily into beliefs than returns during childhood or before
birth, see Malmendier and Nagel (2010).
1.2.6 Benchmark parameters for the life-cycle model
I set the risk aversion coefﬁcient (γ) equal to 5, which is the same as used in
Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides
(2005). The ambiguity aversion parameter is assumed to be 10.9 Time ranges
9The literature on smooth recursive preferences is relatively new and requires as an input
the ambiguity aversion parameter. As of yet only a few papers try to estimate this parameter14 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
from t = 1totime T, which corresponds toage20and100respectively. Agents
retire at time K = 45, corresponding to age 65. The survival probabilities are
the current male survival probabilities in the US which are obtained from the
Human Mortality Database.10 I assume a certain death at age 100.
The correct equity premium λR is assumed to be normally distributed with
a annual mean of 4% and an annual standard deviation σR of 16%, which is
in accordance with historical stock returns. The risk free rate is 2%, hence the
expected stock return is 6%. The mean of the priors about the equity premium
at time t = 1 (age 20) is equal to the correct equity premium; λB
1 = 4%. The
standard deviation of the beliefs at time t = 1, σB
1 , is 2%.
I take the parameters for the labor income process estimated in Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). The deterministic hump-shaped proﬁle of in-
come is generated by the parameters, α1 = 0.1682, α2 = −0.0323, and α3 =
0.002. I choose the constant, α0 to accommodate different income levels at
time t=1. The benchmark income level at age 20 is $15,000. The variance of
the transitory shock to labor income, σ2
u, is 7.38% and the variance of the per-
manent shock, σ2
ǫ, is 1.06%. The replacement rate of the labor income at age 65
is 68% of the wage at age 65. The income during retirement is riskless. These
numbers are for a high school graduate which are estimated in Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005) and used as the benchmark parameters in their analysis.
1.2.7 The individuals optimization problem and numerical
method
The timing, during one year, is as follows, ﬁrst an individual receives his labor
or retirement income after which he consumes. Subsequently the remaining
wealth is invested. I assume the investor is liquidity constraint and impose
standard borrowing and short-sales constraints.
The optimization problem is solved via dynamic programming and I pro-
ceed backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In
the last period the individual consumes all his remaining wealth, hence his
utility from terminal wealth is known.
and arrive at varying numbers. Chen, Ju, and Miao (2009) ﬁnd values between 60 and 100,
while Ju and Miao (2010) use a calibrated ambiguity parameter of 8.8.
10I refer for further information to the website, www.mortality.org.CHAPTER 1 15
Solving maximin preferences
Due to the richness and complexity of this model it cannot be solved analyti-
cally, so I employ numerical techniques following Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara,
and Stroud (2005) and Carroll (2006) with several extensions by Koijen, Nij-
man, and Werker (2010). Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) adopt
a simulation-based method which can deal with many exogenous state vari-
ables. In this model, the mean of the priors about the equity premium, λB
t ,
and income, Yt, are the relevant exogenous state variables. Wealth acts as an
endogenous state variable. For this reason, following Carroll (2006), I specify
a grid for wealth after income and consumption. As a result, I do not need
numerical rootﬁnding to obtain the optimal consumption decision.
In each period I ﬁnd the optimal asset weights by setting the ﬁrst order






t+1 (Rt+1 − Rf)) = 0, (1.18)
where λmin
t is the lowest equity premium in Λt. C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal














Thenumerical method I use to solve the life-cycle problem with maximin pref-
erences is described in Appendix 1.A.
Solving recursive smooth preferences
In each period I ﬁnd the optimal asset weights by setting the ﬁrst order condi-





























t is the expectation, conditional on the values of the state variables at
time t. I take the weighted mean over the distorted expected utilities. Because
the optimization problem is solved via backwards recursion, I know C∗
t+1 at
time t + 1. Furthermore, I simulate the exogenous state variables for N trajec-
tories and T time periods to calculate the realizations of the Euler condition16 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
(1.20). I regress these realizations on a polynomial expansion in the state vari-
ables to obtain an approximation of the conditional expectation of the Euler
condition.






























1.3 Effect of ambiguity aversion and learning on
optimal allocations with maximin preferences
1.3.1 Age effect of ambiguity aversion on optimal portfolio
choice
In the benchmark life-cycle model, age effects are generated by ambiguity
aversion, learning, and labor income and in this section I focus only on these
age effects. Furthermore, in this section fees are excluded from the analy-
sis. The optimal fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation in
the stock market is graphed in Figure 1.1a. The slight non-smoothness of the
curves in the ﬁgures are due to simulation inaccuracy. Comparing the case
with ambiguity (solid line) to no ambiguity (dashed line), shows that the allo-
cation to stocks when agents are ambiguity averse is much lower. The impact
of ambiguity aversion is substantial at young ages, but this effect declines at
later ages. This is intuitive, since the ambiguity about the equity risk premium
decreases over time as agents learn.
Focussing on the no-ambiguity case, ifagentsare fullycertain aboutthe val-
ues of all the parameters in the model, they allocate 100% of ﬁnancial wealth
to stocks before age 40. Similar results are found in Cocco, Gomes, and Maen-
hout (2005). The reason for this high fraction is that young agents have only a
small amount of ﬁnancial wealth compared to a high level of human capital.
Since human capital is like an implicit investment in a riskless asset, an agent
allocates optimally his entire ﬁnancial wealth to equity. Between age 40 and
65 the conditional allocation to the risky asset decreases. At those ages retire-
ment savings are very high while at the same time the net present value of
labor income decreases, hence the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth to human capi-
tal increases. This results in a decline of the relative allocation to the riskless
asset “human capital” and, as a consequence, the optimal fraction of ﬁnancialCHAPTER 1 17

























































(a) Fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation


















































(b) Stock market participation
Figure 1.1 – Optimal fraction allocated to stocks and optimal participation in
the stock market.
I display the optimal conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and
optimal participation in the stock market for agents who are (1) ambiguous about the
equity risk premium and learn about this parameter and who are (2) not ambiguous
about the equity premium. The upper panel shows the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allo-
cated to stocks, conditional on stock market participation. The lower panel shows the
optimal participation level, which is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth,
and thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial
wealth level(below $100),the optimal participation is assumed to bezero. Agents learn
about the equity risk premium. Maximin preferences are used and the parameters are
as in the benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.18 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
wealth invested in stocks decreases to maintain a similar risk-proﬁle. After
retirement the allocation to stocks increases slightly, as in Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout (2005). At that time the agent depletes his ﬁnancial wealth more
rapidly due to the additional implicit discount factor, survival probabilities,
and hence the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth to human capital decreases, which
induces a higher fraction of ﬁnancial wealth invested in stocks. If agents are
ambiguous about the equity risk premium, they allocate less ﬁnancial wealth
to stocks. At all ages the fraction allocated to stocks is approximately 50%,
which is much closer to the empirical ﬁndings.
Figure 1.1b displays the effect of ambiguity about the equity risk premium,
and aversion with respect to this ambiguity, on optimal participation levels
in the stock market. The effect is substantial, the participation level before
retirement drops by about 25% on average. When agents are not ambigu-
ous about the equity premium, the participation levels in the stock market
are high. Since labor income is not correlated with returns on the stock mar-
ket, it is optimal for all agents, even with low ﬁnancial wealth, to allocate at
least a small fraction of ﬁnancial wealth to stocks.11 The reason that not 100%
participates is that I assume that agents with ﬁnancial wealth below $100 do
not invest in stocks. If I would take these agents with near zero wealth into
account it would distort the comparison of the model predictions to the data
since in reality people with less than $100 would not invest, due to partici-
pation costs and minimum balance requirements.12The impact of ambiguity
aversion decreases with age since the ambiguity about the equity risk pre-
mium declines, as agents learn by observing the realized stock returns. Cao,
Wang, and Zhang (2005) and Easley and O’Hara (2009) ﬁnd that ambiguity
aversion can limit the participation levels, both in a non-life-cycle framework.
Whether agents participate in the stock market depends only on the worst
case belief about the equity risk premium. If the worst case belief is zero or
negative, the agent does not participate in the stock market, while if the worst
case equity risk premium is positive, the agent participates. Even if the agent
has not that much wealth, if the worst case belief is positive, the agent opti-
11I abstract from hedging demand. The investment opportunities improve slightly after a
high realizedstock return, which could induce a negative hedging demand. But since the size
of the update of the mean belief about the equity risk premium is very small, the hedging
demand will be neglible. So I set the stock market participation equal to zero if the worst case
belief is zero or negative.
12In addition, the simulation inaccuracy of optimal stock allocations is higher for these low
wealth levels, since the difference in utility of the agent when he invest 100% or 0% in stocks
is negligible.CHAPTER 1 19
mally invests a positive fraction of his wealth to stocks. The reason why no
ambiguity averse agent participates at age 20 is that the worst case belief is
exactly zero. At age 20 all agents have a mean belief about the equity risk
premium of 4% and a standard deviation of 2%. The 95% conﬁdence interval,
which is the range of beliefs that the agent considers, is [0%,8%].13 Hence the
worst case belief is 0%, which results in zero participation in the stock market.
The worst case beliefs are presented in Figure 1.2. At age 21 the agent has
experienced a stock return realization at age 20, and updates his belief. In the
ﬁgure it can be seen that the 50% quantile is higher than 0%, hence more than
50% of agents participates in the stocks market.


































Figure 1.2 – The worst case prior about the equity risk premium; mean, 5th and
95th percentile.
In this ﬁgure I display the worst case beliefs about the equity risk premium. The agent
maximizes his utility as if the worst case belief is the correct parameter. The worst case
belief at age 20 is 0% (4%-2*2%). When people age, they update the beliefs (mean and
standarddeviation) according to the realizedstock returns, hence the worst case beliefs
are different per trajectory. The parameters are as in the benchmark case, unless stated
otherwise.
Vissing-Jorgenson (2002)andPaiella(2001)examinethe implicationsofﬁxed
participation costs on optimal participation levels and ﬁnd that it can explain
why less wealthy household do not participate, but not the low participation
levels of the wealthy. I ﬁnd that ambiguity about the equity risk premium
can provide an explanation for the lower participation levels of wealthy in-
dividuals. The benchmark model with ambiguity aversion and learning does
howeverpredictsome extreme participation levelsifItake intoaccount cohort
effects induced by learning. If, for instance, the worst case belief of all 30-year
13I do not take the exact 95% conﬁdence interval, which would be [4% − 1.96 ∗ 2%,4% +
1.96∗ 2%].20 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
olds in 2007 is positive, this results in 100% participation of all 30-year olds in
2007. However, this hinges on the assumption that the ambiguity about the
equity risk premium, i.e., the mean and the standard deviation of the beliefs,
is exactly the same for all 30-year olds in 2007. Assuming heterogeneity of
beliefs at age 20, would change this result.
In the previous paragraphs, the optimal allocation is explored for agents
who are ambiguous and are averse to this ambiguity. In contrast, in the more
standard ambiguity neutral framework agents are only uncertain about the
parameters, but not averse with respect to this uncertainty. When this is the
case, the optimal allocation will almost not change. In the benchmark model,
the agents’ beliefs about the equity risk premium are normally distributed
with a mean of 4% and a standard deviation equal to 2%. If agents are am-
biguity neutral, their behavior is induced by the so called predictive distribu-
tion. The standard deviation for the compound distribution of the volatility
of the return on equity, σR and the volatility of the belief, σB
t , can be reduced




t )2. For the benchmark parameters this
results in a standard deviation of 16.1% (note that σR is 16%). Hence uncer-
tainty about the equity risk premium will have (almost) no effect on optimal
portfolio choices when assuming uncertainty neutrality. I do not graph these
results here, but the optimal fraction allocated to stocks and optimal partici-
pation levels are almost indistinguishable from the dashed-lines in Figure 1.1,
the no-ambiguity case.
1.3.2 Comparing the optimal stock allocations to the empiri-
cal evidence
In this section I compare the predictions from my benchmark life-cycle model
with the data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The Survey of Con-
sumer Finances is the most comprehensive dataset on households assets and
liabilities in the United States. The survey is conducted every three years since
1983. From 1983 to 1989 it is partly a panel dataset, while after 1989 the data
consists of repeated cross sections. High income household are over-sampled
to obtain a sufﬁcient number of wealthy households in the study. I employ a
measure for ﬁnancial wealth and stock investment according to the method
suggested by the survey of consumer ﬁnances. The same measures are used
in Gomes and Michaelides (2005). Financial wealth consists of both retirement
and non-retirement wealth and stock investment is calculated as the sum of
direct investment in stock and stock mutual funds as well as stock investmentCHAPTER 1 21
of pension wealth. More details on the data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances can be found in Appendix 1.B.
Agents behave according to maximin preferences and face ambiguity about
the equity risk premium. Previously I only examined the age effects of ambi-
guity aversion and learning, while in this section time and cohort effects are
included. First, I will compare the model predictions to the data, where the
modelpredictionsincludeageandtime effects, butexcludecohort effect. Thus
assuming that cohort effects are zero. Time effects are induced by introducing
decreasing proportional fees over time. Subsequently, I will include cohort
effects to explore which model speciﬁcation ﬁts the data best.
Panel (a), (c), and (e) in Figure 1.3 shows the effect of ambiguity aversion
on the optimal fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on stock market par-
ticipation, and compares the model predictions with the empirical levels. As
before, ambiguity about the equity risk premium has a substantial impact on
the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks. The average fraction allo-
cated to stocks over the life cycle when agents are not ambiguous is approx-
imately 85%, while if ambiguity aversion is included, the average fraction to
stocks equals 50%. When comparing the predictions from the life cycle model
with ambiguity aversion and learning to the data, the match is much better.
To compare, Gomes and Michaelides (2005) ﬁnd optimal allocation levels of
almost 100% at young ages, while the model with ambiguity predicts optimal
levels of about 55%. Note, that the model predictions for the conditional frac-
tion allocated to stocks is almost the same in 2007, 1998, and 1989. The reason
is that, conditional on the worst case belief being is positive (i.e., conditional
on participation), the average of the worst case beliefs for all the trajectories
at a certain age are approximately the same. However, the fraction of agents
that have positive worst case beliefs (the participation levels) depends highly
on the size of the fees. This can be seen in panel (b), (d), and (f); the participa-
tion levels are much higher in 2007 compared to 1989. Due to fees, the worst
case beliefs about the equity risk premium are lowered with this exact per-
centage and hence the optimal participation levels shift down. The inclusion
of time effects, which I assume arise (mostly) due to fees, allows the matching
of the participation levels in 2007, 1998, and 1989, since in 1989 the empirical
participation levels are substantially lower. In sum, the model with ambigu-
ity about the equity risk premium matches more closely to the data than the
model without ambiguity aversion.
It is difﬁcult empirically to separate the effects of age, cohort, and time on
portfolio choice. The intrinsic identiﬁcation problem prevents inclusion of un-22 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING


























































model prediction − age + time effect
model prediction − no ambiguity
(a) Conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 2007












































model prediction − age + time effect
model prediction − no ambiguity
(b) Stock market participation in 2007














































model predictions − age + time effect
model prediction − no ambiguity
(c) Conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 1998













































model prediction − age + time effect
model prediction − no ambiguity
(d) Stock market participation in 1998














































model predictions − age + time effect
model prediction − no ambiguity
(e) Conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 1989












































model predictions − age + time effect
model prediction − no ambiguity
(f) Stock market participation in 1989
Figure 1.3 – Comparing the empirical data to the model predictions on stock
allocations; age and time effects included.
I display the conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and the opti-
mal stock market participation both for the data and the optimal levels. The fraction
of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks is conditional on stock market participation. The
optimal participation level is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth, and
thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial wealth
level (below $100), the optimal participation assumed to be zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. The fees in 2007, 1998, and 1989 are 50, 100, and 150 basis-
points respectively. The data are repeated cross sections from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, and I take averages over the fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on par-
ticipation. Maximin preferences are used and the parameters are as in the benchmark
case, unless stated otherwise.CHAPTER 1 23



























































Figure 1.4 – Beliefs about the equity risk premium in the years 2007, 1998, and
1989.
The graph reports the beliefs for different ages in the years 2007, 1998, 1989. The mean
ofthepriorsaboutthe equity riskpremium, λB isdisplayed,not theworst caseprior. To
obtain these ﬁgures I used the realized stock returns downloaded from Robert Shillers’
website (http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm), which contains US stock mar-
ket data from 1871 onwards. To calculate the belief for a 25 year old in 2007 I combine
the prior belief with the average of returns in 2003 to 2006. The mean of the belief for
age 25-29 is the average of the beliefs for a 25 year old agent, 26-year old, and so on.
restricted age, time, and cohort effects. However, under certain assumptions,
the structural model in this paper does allow the identiﬁcation of all three ef-
fects. In previous sections, the age and time effects on portfolio choice are
presented, which are generated by ambiguity about the equity premium and
learning as well as labor income. These results are unconditional on the his-
tory of stock returns. However, realizations of past stock returns, which differ
among cohorts, can potentially induce cohort effects in the data. Malmendier
and Nagel (2010) ﬁnd that stock market return experiences during life inﬂu-
ence the beliefs about expected stock returns. The beliefs about the equity
premium for varying ages in the years 2007, 1998, and 1989 are presented in
Figure 1.4. The beliefs of an agent are determined in part by the mean of the
priors at age 20 and in part by the realizations of stock returns. Figure 1.4
shows that the mean of the belief for a 25-29 year old is about 4.5% in 1998
and 3.7% in 2007. The difference stems from the fact that the 25-29 year old in
1998 experienced some very good returns in the early and mid 90’s, while the
agent born later experienced low returns in the early 21st century. The devia-
tions of the mean belief about the equity risk premium from 4% generates and
allows the identiﬁcation of cohort effects.
Figure 1.5 compares the predictions from the model with (1) age and time24 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING














































model prediction − age + time effect
model prediction − age + time + cohort effect
(a) Conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 2007












































model prediction − age + time effect
model prediction − age + time + cohort effect
(b) Stock market participation in 2007















































model predictions − age + time effect
model predictions − age + time + cohort effect
(c) Conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 1998













































model prediction − age + time effect 
model prediction − age + time + cohort effect
(d) Stock market participation in 1998














































model predictions − age + time effect
model predictions − age + time + cohort effect
(e) Conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 1989












































model predictions − age + time effect
model predictions − age + time + cohort effect
(f) Stock market participation in 1989
Figure 1.5 – Comparing the empirical data to the model predictions on stock
allocations; age, time, and cohort effects included.
I display the conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and the opti-
mal stock market participation both for the data and the optimal levels. The fraction
of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks is conditional on stock market participation. The
optimal participation level is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth, and
thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial wealth
level (below $100), the optimal participation assumed to be zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. Cohort effects are included and the fees in 2007, 1998, and
1989 are 50, 100, and 150 basispoints respectively. The data are repeated cross sections
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, and I take averages over the fraction allocated
to stocks, conditional on participation. Maximin preferences are used and the parame-
ters are as in the benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.CHAPTER 1 25
effects and (2) age, time, and cohort effects to the data. First of all, the match
is better when cohort effects are assumed to be zero. When examining the
optimal participation levels in 1989, panel (f), the model predictions when in-
cluding cohort effects are zero participation at all ages. The reason is that at
all ages, the worst case belief (mean belief minus fees minus two times the
standard deviation of beliefs) is always negative, which induces zero partici-
pation. Furthermore, the conditional fraction allocated tostocks islowerwhen
cohort effects are included, compared to excluding cohort effects. This is not
per deﬁnition the case, but the reason is that the average worst case beliefs
over all the trajectories (so excluding cohort effects), conditional on positive
beliefs, is higher than the worst case beliefs at all ages in 2007, 1998, and 1989.
Table 1.1 – Quantiles for the optimal and empirical conditional fraction of ﬁ-
nancial wealth allocated to stocks; age and time effects included.
The conditional fraction allocated to stocks in 2007 are calculated via the Survey of
Consumer Finances. The optimal fraction is calculated including, age and time effects.
Fees of 50 basispoints are included. Both the optimal and the empirical fraction are
conditional on stock market participation.
Data 10% quantile 25% quantile 50% quantile 75% quantile 90% quantile
age 25-74 10 23 45 69 88
age 25-34 7 17 36 65 87
age 35-44 10 23 45 72 88
age 45-54 14 26 47 68 88
age 55-64 11 26 47 68 90
age 65-74 6 18 37 70 88
Model 10% quantile 25% quantile 50% quantile 75% quantile 90% quantile
age 25-74 7 20 43 82 100
age 25-34 10 27 60 99 100
age 35-44 10 23 51 94 100
age 45-54 8 19 40 78 100
age 55-64 5 14 33 72 100
age 65-74 6 14 30 67 100
In the previous graphs, I focussed on matching the means of the partic-
ipation levels and the conditional allocation to stocks, not examining other
moments. Table 1.1 displays the stock allocations predicted by the model and
empirical estimates for different quantiles, assuming that cohort effects are
zero. The 10% quantile of the fraction allocated to stocks for all ages is 10% in
the data and 7% according to the model. The median matches very well, 45%
of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks in the data compared to 43% according
to the model. When splitting the fraction invested in stocks up for different26 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
ages, the quantiles in the data differ slightly more from the model predicted
quantiles. Note that it is not insightful to present the quantiles for the partic-
ipation levels, since this is a 0/1 variable and all the information is already
contained in Figure 1.5, where the mean participation levels are displayed.
1.3.3 Effect of ambiguity aversion on optimal consumption
and savings
The optimal consumption and wealth decisions are plotted in Figure 1.6. The
difference between the consumption levels when agents are ambiguous about
the equity risk premium is substantial: the consumption of agents who are
ambiguity averse is 5-10% lower from age 30 onwards. The reason is that
agents who are ambiguous about the equity risk premium, invest less in eq-
uity and, as is displayed in Figure 1.6b, have less wealth (savings plus invest-
ment return) accumulated. Furthermore, note that the consumption pattern
is smooth over time, while the real income drops substantially at retirement
because the replacement rate is 0.68, in line with Cocco, Gomes, and Maen-
hout (2005). The agent saves to obtain a smooth consumption pattern over
life, which can be seen in Figure 1.6b. Agents who face ambiguity about the
equity risk premium have a lower amount of wealth accumulated at age 65,
$225,000 compared to $250,000, since on average less agents participate in the
stock market and the agents that participate invest a smaller fraction of their
ﬁnancial wealth in stocks. The savings levels are comparable to the ﬁndings
in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
1.4 The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion and Learn-
ing on Optimal Portfolio Choice with Smooth
Preferences
In the previous section I show that when agents have maximin preferences,
ambiguity aversion has a large effect on optimal portfolio choices. However,
there is considerable debate on whether agents exhibit smooth preferences or
maximin preferences hence in this section I examine the inﬂuence of ambigu-
ity aversion when agents behave according to smooth recursive preferences
with moderate ambiguity aversion. Note that smooth ambiguity preferences
with inﬁnite ambiguity aversion equals maximin preferences.CHAPTER 1 27




































































Figure 1.6 – Optimal consumption and wealth.
I display the average optimal consumption and optimal wealth for agents who are (1)
ambiguous about the equity risk premium and who are (2) not ambiguous. Further-
more the average income is presented, which is independent of whether agents are
ambiguous. Maximin preferencesare used and the parameters are as in the benchmark
case, unless stated otherwise.
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) express that one of the advantages
of smooth recursive preferences is that ambiguity, the amount of uncertainty
about the parameter, can be distinguished from the aversion to this ambiguity.28 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING











































































(a) Fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation


















































(b) Stock market participation
Figure 1.7 – Conditional fraction allocated to stocks and stock market partici-
pation
I display the optimal conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and
optimal participation in the stock market for agents who are (1) ambiguous about the
equity risk premium and learn about the parameters and who are (2) not ambiguous
about the equity premium. The upper panel shows the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allo-
cated to stocks, conditional on stock market participation. The lower panel shows the
optimal participation level, which is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth,
and thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial
wealth level (below $100), the optimal participation is set to zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. Smooth recursive preferences are used and the parameters
are as in the benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.CHAPTER 1 29
Figure 1.7a shows the optimal fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks,
conditional on participation in the case that (1)the parameters are not ambigu-
ous and (2) the parameters are moderately ambiguous and the agent is averse
to this ambiguity. There is a small decrease in the allocation to stocks. When
comparing the curves in Figure 1.7b, I ﬁnd that the participation levels do not
vary much with the level of ambiguity. Independent of whether the agent is
uncertain, the participation levels are high. Overall, for the benchmark pa-
rameters the effect of ambiguity aversion on the optimal portfolio allocation
is negligible.
The ﬁnding that ambiguity aversion has (almost) no effect on optimal port-
folio choice for the benchmark parameters and smooth recursive preferences
with moderate ambiguity aversion (α = 10), is conﬁrmed by the analytical op-
timal portfolio choice solution found in Gollier (2009). He derives the optimal
solution in a static model for an exponential speciﬁcation for the risk aver-
sion function and a power speciﬁcation for the ambiguity aversion function.
In contrast, I use a power-exponential speciﬁcation and no analytical solution




R + (1 + α)(σB
t )2)
, (1.22)
and when I plug in the benchmark parameters at t = 1 the equation equals:
w∗ =
0.04
γ(0.0256 + (1 + α)0.0004)
. (1.23)
Theoptimalallocation toequity, w∗, dependsonlylittle on theambiguity aver-
sion parameter, α, which is comparable to the ﬁndings in this paper. Similarly,
Chen, Ju, and Miao (2009) explore the impact of model uncertainty about re-
turn predictability on asset allocation, and ﬁnd that the risk aversion parame-
ter has a larger effect on optimal portfolio choice than ambiguity aversion. In
contrast, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) illustrate the possible effect
of ambiguity on portfolio choice in a static example and ﬁnd a sizeable effect.
However the amount of uncertainty is higher compared to the benchmark
case in this paper.
The optimal stock allocation for an ambiguity aversion parameter between
10 and inﬁnity is not yet calculated. In the limit when ambiguity aversion
goes to inﬁnity the effect of ambiguity about the equity risk premium is size-
able and can help explain the empirically observed low allocation to stocks.
However, for which ambiguity aversion coefﬁcient in the smooth preferences
framework this similar result is achieved is not yet examined. Consistent with30 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
the ﬁndings in this paper, experimental evidence suggests that agents behave
more according to kinked (maximin) preferences than smooth ambiguity pref-
erences (see Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2010)).
1.5 Importanceof income, risk aversion, and initial
ambiguity with minimax preferences
In this section the importance of several assumptions for the main results are
tested; assumptions on (1) the level of initial ambiguity about the equity pre-
mium, (2) the level of risk aversion, and (3) labor income. Since the effect
of ambiguity aversion if agents have smooth preference with moderate risk
aversion is limited, I will focus the robustness tests on maximin preferences.
In Section 1.5.4, I explore whether increasing risk aversion can substitute for
ambiguity aversion, and change the optimal stock allocation in a similar way.
1.5.1 Initial ambiguity about the equity risk premium
The amount of ambiguity, the standard deviation of the belief about the equity
risk premium, is chosen somewhat arbitrarily. There is no direct evidence on
which to base the level of uncertainty, so I perform sensitivity analysis with
respect to this parameter. Intuitively, a standard deviation of 2% seems rea-
sonable, since this ensures that the 95% conﬁdence interval of the equity risk
premium that the agent beliefs is possible is between 0% and 8% at age 20.
Compelling evidence that this is not overstating the degree of ambiguity can
be derived from the ﬁnancial literacy literature. When answering questions
to establish ﬁnancial literacy levels, Rooij van, Lusardi, and Alessie (2007)
ﬁnd that 22% of survey respondents answer that they do not know whether
"considering a long time period, stocks, bonds, or savings accounts give the
highest return". Furthermore 30% gives the wrong answer and less than half
give the correct answer. This at least indicates that it is a valid assumptions
that a large fraction of agents is ambiguous about the equity premium, and in
general about ﬁnancial market parameters. Furthermore, even assuming that
agentslook upall previousstock marketreturns, the conﬁdence interval about
the equity premium would still be large. But since I have no means to deter-
mine the range of equity risk premium that agents deem possible, this section
examines the inﬂuence of the initial ambiguity level on the results. The results
from this section can also be viewed in light of that agents are different in theirCHAPTER 1 31








































































standard deviation belief 2% (benchmark)
standard deviation belief 1%
standard devation belief 3%
(a) Fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation
















































standard deviation belief 2% (benchmark)
standard deviation belief 1%
standard devation belief 3%
(b) Stock market participation
Figure 1.8 – Stock market participation and conditional allocation to stocks for
varying levels of initial ambiguity
I display the optimal conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and
optimal participation in the stock market for agents who are (1) ambiguous about the
equity risk premium and learn about the parameters and who are (2) not ambiguous
about the equity premium. The upper panel shows the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allo-
cated to stocks, conditional on stock market participation. The lower panel shows the
optimal participation level, which is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth,
and thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial
wealth level (below $100), the optimal participation is set to zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. Maximin preferences are used and the parameters are as in
the benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.
amount of ambiguity and how this inﬂuence the optimal fraction allocated to
stocks and optimal participation levels.
Figure 1.8 displays the conditional allocation to equity and the participa-32 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
tion in the stock market for varying levels of initial ambiguity. The optimal
fraction allocated to stocks is approximately the same if the standard devia-
tion of beliefs is 3% or 2%. The reason is that only if agents have a worst case
belief higher than zero, they participate in the stock market. Hence at age 20,
no one participates. At age 21, agents have experienced stock return realiza-
tions the year before and update their beliefs. But the agent with a standard
deviation of 3% needs a much larger positive update to have a worst case be-
lief higher than 0% and participate, compared to an agent with a 2% standard
deviation. So the participation levels are much lower, see Fig 1.8b, but once
over the 0% hurdle (so conditional on participation), the fraction allocated is
the same. The fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks if agents have a
standard deviation of beliefs of 1% is much higher at young ages, because the
average worst case belief, conditional on having a positive worst case belief,
is higher.
1.5.2 Risk aversion
In the benchmark case the risk aversion coefﬁcient equals 5 and I will explore
the effect of this assumption on the main ﬁndings, for which the results are
presented in Figure 1.9. For the same reason as before, the optimal partici-
pation levels are only inﬂuenced by the risk aversion coefﬁcient via the effect
that risk aversion has on precautionary savings. So risk aversion inﬂuences
the fraction of agents that have wealth higher than $100 and thus affects the
participation levels. As can be seen from Figure 1.9b, the participation lev-
els change only slightly. The conditional stock allocations are plotted for a
risk aversion coefﬁcient of 2, 5, and 10 (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005)
use 10 for their benchmark case). The optimal fraction allocated to stocks,
conditional on stock market participation, is sensitive to the risk aversion co-
efﬁcient. There are two channels via which a higher risk aversion changes
the optimal fraction. First, a higher risk aversion results in a decline in the
optimal allocation to stocks directly since the agent is less risk tolerant and
shifts the position to more riskless assets. In addition, precautionary savings
increase if the risk aversion is higher to have a large buffer against labor mar-
ket risk. This inﬂates the relative fraction of ﬁnancial wealth to human capital
and thus depresses the optimal fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks.
Both channels work in the same direction and for this reason the more risk
averse the agent, the lower the optimal fraction invested in stocks. Note that
for all levels of risk aversion the effect of ambiguity and learning on the stockCHAPTER 1 33









































































risk aversion 5 (benchmark)
risk aversion 2
risk aversion 10
(a) Fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation
















































risk aversion 5 (benchmark)
risk aversion 2
risk aversion 10
(b) Stock market participation
Figure 1.9 – Stock market participation and conditional allocation to stocks for
varying levels of risk aversion
I display the optimal conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and
optimal participation in the stock market for agents who are (1) ambiguous about the
equity risk premium and learn about the parameters and who are (2) not ambiguous
about the equity premium. The upper panel shows the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allo-
cated to stocks, conditional on stock market participation. The lower panel shows the
optimal participation level, which is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth,
and thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial
wealth level (below $100), the optimal participation is set to zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. Maximin preferences are used and the parameters are as in
the benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.
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1.5.3 Labor income
In the benchmark calibration I assume that the agent receives a stochastic in-
come stream corresponding to a high school graduate. Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout (2005) estimate the parameters for the income process for high
school graduates, as well as individuals with no high school degree or with a
college degree. Figure 1.10a presents the optimal fraction allocated to stocks,
conditional on participation, for agents who have an income corresponding
to (1) no high school degree, (2) a high school degree (benchmark), (3) a col-
lege degree, and (4) a high school degree but no labor income risk, while the
other parameters are as in the benchmark case. The deviation in optimal stock
allocation between a high school graduate and an agent with no high school
degree stems from a combination of factors. The transitory income risk is
higher for an agent with no high school degree, but the permanent income
risk component is similar. This results in a decrease in the allocation to eq-
uity for an individual with no high school degree, since he faces more risk.
On the one hand, the no high school graduate saves more due to the higher
income risk, while on the other hand, he saves less since he has a higher re-
placement rate. So taking these effects together, an agent with no high school
diploma has a slightly lower level invested in equity before retirement (after
retirement there is no labor income risk). Similar reasoning holds for college
graduates. On the one hand, the replacement rate is higher and the transitory
income risk is lower, which induces less savings and thus a higher fraction
of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to equity. On the other hand, the permanent in-
come risk is higher compared to an agent with a high school degree, which
increases savings and a lower fraction allocated to stocks. Taking these three
effects together results in a slightly higher allocation to stocks.
If an agent faces no labor income risk, he does not need to create a buffer
against labor income shocks to smooth consumption. The only incentive to
save is due to the replacement rate for retirement income, which is 68%. So
the agent starts savings from age 29 onwards to smooth consumption. In the
graph it seems that the participation level is zero until age 36, but the optimal
participation is actually about 0.1%. The fraction of ﬁnancial wealth to human
capitalrisesuntil age65, hencethe optimal fraction allocated tostocks falls. As
before, the optimal fraction increases after age 65, since the ﬁnancial wealth is
depleted faster than human capital, due to the additional discount factor, sur-
vival probabilities. The effect of different labor income proﬁles on the optimal
participation levels (Panel 1.10b)stems from the difference in savings motives,
which induces a difference in the fraction of agents which has a wealth levelCHAPTER 1 35



























































hight school − no labor income risk
(a) Fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation



















































high school − no labor income risk
(b) Stock market participation
Figure 1.10 – Stock market participation and conditional allocation to stocks for
varying income levels.
I display the optimal conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and
optimal participation in the stock market for agents who are (1) ambiguous about the
equity risk premium and learn about the parameters and who are (2) not ambiguous
about the equity premium. The upper panel shows the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allo-
cated to stocks, conditional on stock market participation. The lower panel shows the
optimal participation level, which is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth,
and thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial
wealth level (below $100), the optimal participation is set to zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. The benchmark case is the income process for a high school
graduate(solid line). The dashed line is fora college graduate, the solid-crossed line for
an individual with no high school degree, and the solid-triangle line for a deterministic
income for a high school graduate. The parameters from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005) are used. For college graduates: σ2
u = 5.84%, σ2
ǫ = 1.69% and the replacement
rate is 94%. For individuals with no high school degree: σ2
u = 10.65%, σ2
ǫ = 1.05%
and the replacement rate is 89%. The agent who faces no labor income risk, receives a
similar deterministic income proﬁle as an agent with a high school degree, except that
the income is riskless. Maximin preferences are used and the parameters are as in the
benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.36 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
above $100. Overall, the results are robust for different stochastic labor in-
come processes. So when taking into account the heterogeneity of agents with
respect to labor income, the main ﬁnding hold: ambiguity about the equity
risk premium decreases the amount allocated to stocks substantially.
1.5.4 Can risk aversion substitute for ambiguity aversion?
This paper shows that ambiguity about the equity risk premium can help
solve the participation puzzle and explain the low fraction of ﬁnancial wealth
allocated to stocks over the life cycle. In this section I show that similar ﬁnd-
ings cannot be obtained by assuming higher risk aversion. The results are
presented in Figure 1.11. First of all, risk aversion has almost no inﬂuence on
optimal participation levels while ambiguity aversion has a large inﬂuence.
The participation levels are only inﬂuenced by the worst case belief about the
equity risk premium, and risk aversion has no inﬂuence on this. Higher risk
aversion actually increases participation, since it increases precautionary sav-
ings. When risk aversion is 15 and agents are not ambiguity averse, the opti-
mal fraction until age 65 is similar for the baseline risk aversion, γ = 5, and
ambiguity aversion. After age 65, the difference is substantial. Hence risk
aversion does not act as a substitute for ambiguity aversion and I do not ob-
tain the same results via increasing risk aversion compared to including am-
biguity aversion. The reason is that, unlike ambiguity aversion, risk aversion
increases the precautionary savings level to build up a buffer against labor in-
come risk, which decreases the optimal fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated
to equity.CHAPTER 1 37













































no ambiguity − risk aversion 15
ambiguity − risk aversion 5 (benchmark)
(a) Fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation
















































no ambiguity − risk aversion 15
ambiguity − risk aversion 5 (benchmark)
(b) Stock market participation
Figure 1.11 – Allocation to stocks; can risk aversion substitute for ambiguity
aversion
I display the optimal conditional fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to stocks and
optimal participation in the stock market for agents who are (1) ambiguous about the
equity risk premium and learn about the parameters and who are (2) not ambiguous
about the equity premium. The upper panel shows the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allo-
cated to stocks, conditional on stock market participation. The lower panel shows the
optimal participation level, which is unconditional on having positive ﬁnancial wealth,
and thus includes all the simulation paths. In case an agent has a near zero ﬁnancial
wealth level (below $100), the optimal participation is set to zero. Agents learn about
the equity risk premium. Maximin preferences are used and the parameters are as in
the benchmark case, unless stated otherwise.38 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a realistically calibrated life-cycle model with ambi-
guity aversion and learning to explore the impact of ambiguity about the eq-
uity risk premium on optimal portfolio allocations. I compare the model pre-
dictions with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Two important
empirical facts are matched, the low participation levels in the stock market
over the life cycle and the low fraction of ﬁnancial wealth allocated to equity,
conditional on participation. Furthermore, with this structural model I can
disentangle age, cohort, and time effects in the equity allocation over the life
cycle. Age effects arise due to ambiguity, learning, labor income, and a short-
ening horizon. I assume cohort effects can be identiﬁed via learning, because
agents of the same age born in different years have seen different stock returns
during their lifetime. Time effects are added to the model in the form of de-
creasing fees over the past decades. The empirical cross sectional allocation to
stocks in 2007, 1998, and 1989 are compared to the predictions from the life-
cycle model, which are calculated separately for 2007, 1998, and 1989, taking
into account age, cohort, and time effects. The match is very close if cohort ef-
fects are assumed to be zero. Both the participation level and the conditional
fraction in these three years differs maximally 25%, comparing the match for
all ages. The paper closest to this paper is Gomes and Michaelides (2005) who
ﬁndanoptimal fraction allocatedtostocks ofalmost100%whenyoung, which
is about 60% higher than the empirical fraction in stocks in 2007.
1.A Numericalmethodtosolvethelife-cyclemodel
with ambiguity aversion
1.A.1 Short summary life-cycle problem with smooth ambi-
guity preferences
The investor solves the following Bellman equation at time t  = T
Vt(Wt,Yt,λB

















where Ct is consumption. Agents employ an uncertainty aversion function
φ. The exogenous state variables are income (Yt) and the mean of the beliefCHAPTER 1 39
about the expected equity premium (λB
t ). Wealth (Wt) is an endogenous state
variable. At time T the investor consumes all wealth, hence the value function
equals:
VT(WT,YT,λB
T) = u(WT). (1.25)
The dynamics of ﬁnancial wealth are given by
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct +Yt)(1 + Rf + wt(Rt+1 − Rf)). (1.26)
I assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA) and a







φ(x) = −exp(−αx). (1.28)
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and in-
vestment decisions. First, I assume that the agent faces borrowing and short-
sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and ι′wt ≤ 1. (1.29)
Second, I impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (1.30)
which implies that the individual cannot borrow against future income to in-
crease consumption today.
The timing is as follows, ﬁrst an individual receives his income, after which
he consumes. Subsequently he invests the remaining wealth, either in equity
or a riskless asset.
1.A.2 Beliefs about the mean return on equity
The agent has beliefs about the equity risk premium and the mean of his be-
liefs is λB
t and the standard deviation of his belief about the equity risk pre-
mium is σB
t . I limit the set of beliefs that the agent thinks are viable to be
bounded by a 95% conﬁdence interval. Hence the beliefs on the possible mean




t ]. I make a grid for the
possible mean stock returns by dividing the conﬁdence interval in K equal
probability areas. Subsequently I calculate the average of the outer bound
of each area separately and the probability that the agent attaches to this ex-
pected stock return is 1/K.40 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
1.A.3 Theﬁrstorderconditions-smooth recursivepreferences
In period T the optimal policies are easily determined. Namely the agent
consumes the entire wealth level and no optimal investment strategy need
to be made. In all other time periods optimal decisions on consumption and
investment are calculated by setting the ﬁrst order conditions equal to zero.
The optimization problem is solved via dynamic programming and I proceed
backwards.
I deﬁne the portfolio return as:
RP
t+1 = 1+ Rf + (Rt+1 − Rf)wt. (1.31)
Furthermore I denote the wealth level after income and consumption as:
At = Wt + Yt − Ct. (1.32)
Consider that the agent is at time t, after having consumed Ct, and he/she
has to choose wt so as to maximize the bellman equation. The ﬁrst-order con-






























































(Wt + Yt − Ct)(Rt+1 − Rf)
￿￿
.





























(1 + Rf + wt(Rt+1 − Rf))
￿￿
.



























(1 + Rf + wt(Rt+1 − Rf))
￿￿
.











Substitute equation (1.39) into equation (2.32) to obtain the ﬁrst order condi-



























t+1 (Rt+1 − Rf)
oo
.
To solve for the optimal consumption, substitute equation (1.39) into equa-



























t+1 (1 + Rf + wt(Rt+1 − Rf))
oo
.









φ′ = αexp(−αx). (1.44)
1.A.4 Optimization procedure for the optimal asset weights -
smooth recursive preferences
Due to the complexity of the model it cannot be solved analytically. Instead I
use numerical optimization techniques to solve the problem. In this section I
will explain this procedure, which combines the methods of Brandt, Goyal,
Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) and Carroll (2006), with several extensions
added by Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010). Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and
Stroud (2005) propose to approximate the conditional expectations by regress-
ing the realizations of the Euler conditions on a polynomial expansion of the42 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
state variables. All state variables except for wealth can be simulated, since
only ﬁnancial wealth is endogenous. To deal with this endogenous state vari-
able I follow Carroll (2006) who proposes a grid for wealth after consumption,
At, instead of a grid for wealth, Wt. This choice allows us to solve the Eu-
ler conditions analytically instead of numerically and I form a M-dimensional
grid for wealth after consumption. Additionally, I use extensions by Koijen,
Nijman, and Werker (2010) to increase the optimization speed. I construct H
test portfolios and let the weight invested in the risky asset run from 0% to
+100%, with steps of 5%, hence H is 21. The return on the test portfolios is de-
ﬁned as Rtest
t+1. Furthermore we simulate N trajectories of T periods for every
state variable
The problem is solved via backwards recursion and to solve the optimal
policies at time t, I have available the endogenous wealth grid at time t + 1
and the optimal consumption at time t + 1.











The conditional expectation in equation (1.45) is straightforward to calculate.
I have the optimal consumption at period t + 1, since I solve via backwards
recursion. To obtain C∗
t+1 I interpolate linearly to make sure it is the optimal
consumption next period that belongs to the grid point for after consumption
wealth at time t, At. I approximate the conditional expectation with a polyno-










This is done for each simulation path and MxK grid points.
The second conditional expectation (1.46) requires some more steps. The
goal is to determine the realizations of Vt+1 regress these on the state variables
















A star ∗ denotes the optimal policies which I already calculated. Again I use
interpolation to obtain the intermediate consumption levels. Furthermore I
need Vt+2 which belongs to the grid points for after consumption wealth at
time t, and not the grid point at time t + 1, so similarly I use interpolation.CHAPTER 1 43
The value of the Bellman equation at time t + 2, Vt+2, is saved at the end of
every time period since I solve via backwards recursion. As before, to obtain
E
λt+1
t+1 (Vt+2) I regress Vt+2 on the state variables at time t + 1. Note that when
determining the optimal policies at time T − 1, VT+1 = 0 and VT = u(WT).
Agents are uncertain about the equity risk premium hence the optimization
problem requires several additional steps. Namely in this setup Et+1(Vt+2) is
random. The beliefs are distributed in such a way that there is a 1/K probabil-
itythat the true equity riskpremium liesbetween two ofthe grid points for the














I need to take the (weighted) average of φE
λt+1
t+1 (Vt+2) over the grid of beliefs
about the equity risk premium. Next I plug all these calculated numbers is
equation (1.48). Following Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) I
regress the realizations of the Euler condition (Vt+1(Wt+1)) on the state vari-
ables to obtain the conditional expectation, Eλ
t {Vt+1(Wt+1)}.



























t+1 (Rt+1 − Rf)
o￿
.
Note that the steps to calculate the underlined parts of the equations are al-
ready explained. Eλ
t {Vt+1(Wt+1)} is a NxMxKxH matrix and I plug these
numbers in the ambiguity aversion function φ. Subsequently the weighted
average is taken and the K-dimension falls out. Analogue the entire equa-
tion (1.49) is calculated.
Following Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010) the optimal asset weights are
determined in two steps. First I approximate the conditional expectation with




























Subsequentlytheprojection coefﬁcients, ρ, areparameterizedintheassetweights.
I let the projection coefﬁcients depend on the "test" asset weights (x), which I
previously made a H-dimensional grid over. Hence for every simulated path
I calculate H test portfolio returns. Since ρ is a smooth function of the asset44 LIFE-CYCLE ASSET ALLOCATION WITH AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND LEARNING
weights I can obtain:
ρ(x) ≃ Ψg(x), (1.51)
where g(x) is a polynomial expansion in the asset weights. This implies that




























A polynomial expansion of order one is sufﬁcient for this life-cycle problem,









which can be solved analytically, taking into account the portfolio constraints.
1.A.5 Optimization procedure for the optimal consumption -
smooth recursive preferences



























t+1 (1+ Rf + w∗
t (Rt+1 − Rf)
oo
.
The timing is as follows, ﬁrst the agent consumes and afterwards the invest-
ment is made, so because I solve this problem via backward recursion I al-
ready found the optimal asset weights at time t, hence I have RP∗
t+1. I proceed
as before, ﬁrst I calculate the inner conditional expectations, if necessary plug
them into the appropriate functions, take the weighted averages to get the K-
dimension out, and ﬁnally plug parts of the calculations into other functions.
The optimal consumption strategy then follows analytically.










bestrictly positive, otherwise theoptimal consumption willbenegative. Hence







t+1 (1 + Rf + w∗





After all these steps I obtain the optimal consumption and investment de-
cisions at all (N x M) grid points at each point in time. Finally I start from the
initial states and simulate forward. Depending on the realized wealth levels
at each time period (the endogenous state variable), I use the corresponding
optimal investment and consumption strategies. This results in the optimal
policies for every simulation path.
1.A.6 Short summary life-cycle problem with maximin pref-
erences
Investors preferences are described by maximin expected utility, which in ef-
fect means that the agent maximizes his utility with respect to the worst case


















As described above I restrict the domain of beliefs about the equity risk pre-




t ]. This is necessary to put a bound on
the worst case belief, which would else be minus inﬁnity since the beliefs are
normally distributed.
1.A.7 The ﬁrst order conditions - maximin preferences
In each period I ﬁnd the optimal asset weights by setting the ﬁrst order condi-






t+1 (Rt+1 − Rf)) = 0, (1.59)
where λmin
t is the lowest equity premium in Λt. C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal real
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1.A.8 Optimization procedure for the optimal asset weights
and consumption - maximin preferences
As described in Section 1.A.4 and 1.A.5, I calculate the realization of the Euler
condition andregress these on a polynomial expansion in the state variablesto










In addition I employ a further extension, introduced in Koijen, Nijman, and
Werker (2010). They found that the regression coefﬁcients ρ are smooth func-
tions of the asset weights and, consequently, I approximate the regression co-
efﬁcients ρ by projecting them further on polynomial expansion in the asset
weights:
ρ(x) ≃ Ψg(x). (1.62)
The Euler condition must be set to zero to ﬁnd the optimal asset weights:
f(Yt,λB
t )Ψg(w)′ = 0. (1.63)
Similarly, I approximate the Euler condition for optimal consumption via
regressing the realization of the Euler conditions on a polynomial expansion
in the state variables.
1.B Survey of Consumer Financesand allocation to
stocks
The Survey of Consumer Finances is a triennial survey on the ﬁnancial as-
sets of the household. It provides information on assets on the balance sheet,
pensions, income, and demographics of the household. Participation in the
survey in strictly voluntary and about 4500 families are interviewed. It is a re-
peated cross-section and only the years 1983 to 1989 are partly a panel study.
The median length of an interview is about 75 minutes, but an interview with
a family with complex ﬁnances can take up to several hours. High income
householdsare over-sampled tomeasure assetholdingsmore accurately, since
wealth in the US is highly concentrated among a relatively small number of
households. About two thirds of the sample, 3000 households, is drawn from
anational areaprobability sample which represents the entire population. The
remaining one third, 1500 households, is drawn from tax records to get theCHAPTER 1 47
list of high income households. Weights are used to account for both nonre-
sponse and the difference between the initial sample design and to the actual
distribution of population characteristics. In the case of missing data, multiple
imputation is used to solve this problem.
Financial wealth (FIN) isthe sum of liquid assets(checking, savings, money
market, and call accounts), certiﬁcates of deposit, directly held mutual funds,
stocks, bonds, quasi-liquidretirementaccountswhich consistsofIRAs/Keoghs,
thrift accounts, and future pensions, savings bonds, cash value of whole life
insurance, other managed assets (trusts, annuities, and managed investment
accounts), and other ﬁnancial assets (loans from the household to someone
else, future proceeds, royalties, futures, non-public stock, deferred compen-
sation, oil/gas/mineral investment). The part of ﬁnancial assets invested in
stocks (EQUITY) consists of directly held stock, stock mutual funds, and re-
tirement assets invested in stocks. I follow the Survey of Consumer Finances
in calculating this. The stock investment includes the entire directly held
stock, entire stock mutual funds, half of the value of the combination mu-
tual funds, and the fraction of the value of IRAs/Keoghs that is invested in
stocks. Similarly the fraction of the value of other managed assets invested in
stocks is added and the part of the value of the thrift account that is allocated
to stocks.
The fraction of agents participating in the stock market is determined by
calculating which weighted fraction in the total sample has a stock invest-
ment larger than zero. Furthermore the conditional allocation to equity is the
fraction allocated to stocks, conditional on participation in the stock market.
Note that I use weights to calculate the participation rate and the conditional
allocation to stocks to adjust for nonresponse and the non-equal probability
design of the survey.CHAPTER2
HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE
THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Abstract
We analyze the effect of means-tested beneﬁts on annuitization decisions. Most
industrialized countries provide a subsistence level consumption ﬂoor in old age,
usually in the form of means-tested beneﬁts or income supplements. The availability
of such means-tested payments creates an incentive to cash out (occupational)
pension wealth for low and middle income earners, instead of taking the annuity.
Agents trade-off the advantages from annuitization, receiving the wealth-enhancing
mortality credit, to the disadvantages, giving up “free” wealth in the form of
means-tested supplemental beneﬁts. We show that the availability of means-tested
beneﬁts can reduce the desired annuitization levels substantially. Moreover, the
model’s predicted annuitization rates as a function of the level of pension wealth are
roughly consistent with the cash-out patterns of occupational pension wealth
observed in Switzerland.
2.1 Introduction
Virtually all industrialized countries provide supplemental retirement bene-
ﬁts to prevent poverty in old age. These beneﬁts are typically means-tested
and eligibility is determined both on income from other sources and assets,
although in some countries only pension income is taken into account. Sup-
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plemental retirement beneﬁts are an important source of retirement provision.
In OECD countries means-tested retirement beneﬁts are worth almost 22% of
average earnings and approximately 17% of individuals above age 65 claim
such beneﬁts ((OECD 2011)).
While means-tested beneﬁts are important to reduce poverty in old age, in
this paper we show that the availability of these beneﬁts can substantially
reduce the propensity to annuitize pension wealth at retirement. Because
means-tested beneﬁts guarantee a minimum income in retirement, they pro-
videan implicitinsurance against the ﬁnancial consequencesoflongevity sim-
ilarto anannuity contract. Thisimplicit insurance generatesastrong incentive
to cash-out accumulated pension wealth at retirement even if full annuitiza-
tion were optimal in the absence of means-tested beneﬁts.
Yaari’s (1965) seminal paper demonstrated that a life-cycle consumer with-
out a bequest motive should choose to annuitize his entire wealth to insure
longevity risk. (Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005) show that positive, but
not necessarily complete annuitization remains optimal even with market in-
completeness and liquidity constraints. The case for annuitization remains
strong in the presence of bequest motives and under habit formations. How-
ever, when international numbers are analyzed, it is apparent that when given
a choice, only a minority annuitizes voluntarily even in countries in which
the pre-existing annuitization implied by the public pension system is small.
Given the size of means-tested social insurance programs in industrialized
countries, low annuitization rates may not be that surprising.
The Swiss case nicely illustrates the incentives generated by means-tested
beneﬁts to cash out pension wealth. Maximal ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts amount to
roughly CHF 2,000 per month. At the same time, there are also means-tested
supplements to ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts that lift the available income to roughly
CHF 3,000 a month. An individual with a monthly second pillar beneﬁt of
less than CHF 1,000 a month, which corresponds to accumulated occupational
pension wealth of approximately CHF 170,000, is always better off withdraw-
ing the money upon retirement, spending it quickly and then applying for
means-tested beneﬁts. While the incentives are clear for individuals with low
pension wealth and no other form of wealth, for middle-income individuals
there is a trade-off. The retiree weighs the beneﬁts from taking the lump sum,
"free" means-tested beneﬁts after withdrawal, against the disadvantages, not
receiving the wealth enhancing mortality credit and a non-ﬂat consumption
pattern.
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we analyze optimal annuity demand and consumption/savings decisions in a
realistic life-cycle model under a social security scheme in which means-tested
beneﬁts can be claimed if income and wealth fall below a certain level. The
model also includes inﬂation risk and equity risk, and allows for differential
tax treatments of annuity payments versus lump sum withdrawals.
The model iscalibrated to Switzerland, which isan interesting case to study
for anumber or reasons. First, it combines arelatively low level of pre-existing
annuitization by the ﬁrst pillar, with generous means-tested beneﬁts that ex-
ceed ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts by roughly 50%. Second, most individuals have ac-
cumulated a large capital stock at retirement through the mandatory occupa-
tional pension scheme. The average Swiss retiree has a capital stock of ap-
proximately CHF 300,000 to CHF 400,000 which translates into a second pillar
income that approximately equals ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts. By law, at least 25% can
be withdrawn as a lump sum, but most plans do not limit the fraction that
can be cashed out or apply a higher limit. Third, a relatively high fraction of
individuals voluntarily annuitize their pension wealth and there is a consider-
able variability of cash-out decisions against which the theoretical predictions
can be compared. (Bütler and Teppa 2007) and (Bütler, Staubli, and Zito 2011)
show with micro data from pension providers that the propensity to annuitize
increases in pension wealth, which is consistent with the incentives generated
by means-tested beneﬁts.
The main contributions of our paper are twofold. First, we ﬁnd that means-
tested beneﬁts have a sizeable impact on optimal annuitization levels. Espe-
cially for agents with a low income and wealth level, the effect is substantial.
If these retirees could not claim means-tested beneﬁts, they would annuitize
a large fraction of their second pillar pension wealth, while the optimal an-
nuity level is often zero when means-tested supplemental income is avail-
able to them. So in contrast to previous research, we ﬁnd that means-tested
beneﬁts can provide a potential explanation for the low voluntary annuiti-
zation of second pillar pension wealth and ﬁnancial wealth of individuals.
Second, when comparing the observed annuity decisions of individuals re-
garding their second pillar pension wealth to the optimal annuity levels, we
ﬁnd a close match. Using Swiss administrative data of occupational pension
providers we see a clear pattern: Agents with low pension wealth levels tend
to take the lump sum while agents with higher second pillar pension wealth
annuitize more often. Our life-cycle model matches this pattern closely and
we ﬁnd that means-tested beneﬁts provide an important explanation for the
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A great amount of literature has attempted to shed light on the “annuity
puzzle”. Adverse selection and administrative loads ((Mitchell, Poterba, War-
shawsky, and Brown 1999), (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002), and (Finkelstein
and Poterba 2004)) and the existence of ﬁrst-pillar annuities ((Brown, Mitchell,
Poterba, and Warshawsky 2001), (Dushi and Webb 2004)) can rationalize the
preference for a lump sum instead of an annuity income to some degree.
Further potential arguments against annuitization include intra-family risk-
sharing ((Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981) and (Brown and Poterba 2000)), bequest
motives ((Friedman and Warshawsky 1990), (Bernheim 1991), and (Brown
2001)), and a desire to insure against expenditure spikes ((Peijnenburg, Nij-
man, and Werker 2011b)).1 Nonetheless, the low observed annuitization rates
remain hard to reconcile with economic theory. Furthermore, some recent
work includes behavioral explanations of individuals cash-out behavior .2
Our paper relates to several studies that have examined the effect of means-
tested social insurance programs on savings and labor supply. Theoretical
work by (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995) and (Sefton, Van De Ven, and
Weale 2008) demonstrate that means-tested welfare programs discourage sav-
ings by households with low expected lifetime income. Empirical evidence
for this prediction is provided by (Neumark and Powers 1998) and (Powers
1998) using U.S. data. (Neumark and Powers 2000) demonstrate that means-
tested supplementary retirement beneﬁts reduce pre-retirement labor supply.
(Friedberg 2000) ﬁnds similar evidence by exploiting changes in the earnings
test rules for recipients of Social Security beneﬁts in the U.S. However, the ex-
isting literature has largely ignored the role of means-tested social insurance
programs on the decision to annuitize pension wealth. The only exception,
to our knowledge, is the paper by (Pashchenko 2010) who investigates dif-
ferent determinants of the annuitization decision using a simulation model
parameterized for the U.S. She demonstrates that a minimum consumption
ﬂoor reduces the participation rate in voluntary annuity markets, particularly
at the bottom of the income distribution.
Our analysis differs from the study by (Pashchenko 2010) in several re-
spects. First, we explore the impact of means-tested beneﬁts while (Pashchenko
2010) focuses on a consumption ﬂoor. Both are extra income provided by the
government given to agents, but they differ with respect to how wealth is
1See (Brown 2007), for an excellent review of this literature.
2See, for example, (Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel 2008b) who ﬁnd that people
aremorelikely toannuitizewhenthechoiceispresentedtothemin aconsumption framework
then when it is presented in an investment framework. Other behavioral explanations such
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treated and how generous the transfer is. With means-tested beneﬁts agents
are usually allowed to keep a certain level of wealth, and means-tested ben-
eﬁts are not reduced dollar for dollar with additional wealth. A minimum
consumption ﬂoor, on the other hand, is only paid out after all wealth has
been depleted. Equally important is that minimum annual consumption ben-
eﬁts generally are much lower than means-tested beneﬁts. (Pashchenko 2010),
for example uses $2663 as a consumption ﬂoor in the US, while means-tested
beneﬁts in countries with similar GDP levels guarantee an income through
means-tested beneﬁts a few times more generous (approximately $20’000 in
Australia, $36’000in Switzerland). More generous guaranteed income islikely
to affect annuitization decisions for a much larger fraction of the population.
In contrast to most other papers on the determinants of annuity demand,
our analysis concentrates on the decision to annuitize pension wealth in fully-
funded pension plans that are either mandated or strongly favored by govern-
ment regulation. These schemes already play a large role in some countries
and can be expected to provide a growing share in the provision of retirement
income in most industrialized countries. Annuitization in these plans is thus
a more pressing concern for public policy than in voluntary annuity markets,
which traditionally have a low annuitization rate due to adverse selection.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the life-cycle model
used for the simulations of annuitization decisions in the presence of means-
tested beneﬁts. Section 2.3 gives an overview of the Swiss pension system
to which the model is calibrated and which serves as an illustration for the
quantitative impact of means-tested beneﬁts. Section 2.4 summarizes the data
and presents descriptive statistics and Section 2.5 presents the results and dis-
cusses alternative interpretations of our results. Finally, Section 4.6 draws con-
clusions.
2.2 Alife-cyclemodelduringretirementwithmeans-
tested beneﬁts and optimal annuitization
Means-tested supplemental beneﬁts create an incentive to cash out accumu-
lated second pillar wealth. If pension income is fully taken into account when
calculating the amount of means-tested beneﬁts, an annuity, even small, is
detrimental to the eligibility for means-tested beneﬁts. If the combined in-
come from the ﬁrst and second pillar is below the consumption ﬂoor guaran-
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the lump sum, draw it down, and then apply for means-tested beneﬁts. While
the incentives for individuals with low pension wealth are mostly straightfor-
ward, for middle-income individuals there is a trade-off. The retiree weighs
the beneﬁts from taking the lump sum, “free” means-tested beneﬁts after
withdrawal, against the disadvantages, not receiving the welfare enhancing
mortality credit (longevity insurance) and a decrease in consumption once the
capital is depleted.
The effect of means-tested beneﬁts on annuitization decisions is further
complicated by a number of institutional details speciﬁc to a country. First,
the eligibility for means-tested beneﬁts depends on total wealth and not only
on pension wealth. Therefore, even for low levels of pension wealth, taking
the annuity may be optimal if non-pension wealth is high. Second, differences
in taxation may either favor one of the two polar options (100% annuitization
vs 100% lump sum) or induce a certain split between the two. In the Swiss
case, which will serve as an illustration for the calibration, the annuity is sub-
ject to normal income tax rates, while the lump sum is taxed only once (at
retirement). Third, since annuities are typically not indexed to inﬂation, un-
certainty about future prices reduces the demand for these annuities.
In the next section, we present a life-cycle model that incorporates several
important aspects of the annuitization decision, including means-tested bene-
ﬁts, non-pension wealth, differential taxation of the annuity income compared
to the lump sum, and a stochastic asset return process in the presence of inﬂa-
tion.
2.2.1 Individual’s preferences and constraints
The analysis is for the retirement phase of the life cycle and no active decision
with respect to the retirement timing is made. After retirement the agent faces
the decision whether to (partially) annuitize the pension wealth or take it as a
lump sum. Subsequently lump sum taxes are levied, which is only done once,
atretirement.3 For hisentire life the agentreceivesan annuity income from the
ﬁrst and second pillar and annual income taxes are levied on this. The agent
decides optimally how much to consume and, subsequently, the remaining
wealth (if any) is divided optimally between stocks and bonds. The optimal
consumption and investment decisions are made annually, while the optimal
3In Switzerland, not only lump sum taxes are levied but also annual wealth taxes. In the
analysis we abstract from wealth taxes because these tax rates are very low and for wealth
levels up to CHF 100’000 no taxes are paid.CHAPTER 2 55
choice about which fraction of the second pillar pension wealth to annuitize
takes place once, at retirement.
More formally, we examine an agent during retirement with age t = 1,...,T,
where t = 1 is the retirement age and T is the maximum age possible. Let pt
denote the probability of surviving to age t, conditional on having lived to
period t − 1. The individuals’ preferences are presented by a time-separable,
constant relative risk aversion utility function and the individual derives util-



















where β is the time preference discount factor, γ denotes the level of risk aver-
sion, and Ct is the level of date t real consumption. Nominal consumption is
given by Ct = CtΠt, where Πt is the price index at time t.
The second pillar wealth, Wpw, can be transformed into an annuity income,
taken as a lump sum, or a combination of both:
Wpw = Wls +Wa, (2.2)
whereWls isthe amounttaken asalump sumandWa isthepartofthe pension
wealth annuitized. The annuity income, YII
t , is given by
YII
t = Wac. (2.3)
The conversion rate c used to calculate the annuity income. The second pil-
lar annuity income provides a nominal income, while the ﬁrst pillar income
is inﬂation protected. A tax is levied once on the part of the second pillar
pension wealth that is taken as a lump sum, τls. The lump sum tax depends
on the amount withdrawn progressively, the marginal tax rate increases with
the lump sum amount. Total net wealth at time t = 1, W1, is the sum of net
non-annuitized pension wealth plus non-pension ﬁnancial wealth, Wnpw:
W1 = (1− τls)Wls + Wnpw. (2.4)
The income tax, τi, is progressive and levied over the sum of ﬁrst and second
pillar pension income.
The net means-tested beneﬁts Mt equal
Mt = max( ˜ Mt −YI
t − YII
t − rWt − gWt,0) (2.5)
where ˜ Mt is the net guaranteed income/consumption level. The applicable
income to base the amount of means-tested beneﬁts on consists of ﬁrst pil-
lar pension income YI
t , second pillar pension income YII
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(wealth times a ﬁctitious investment return r), and a fraction g of wealth. The
incomes YI
t and YII
t are net of taxes. No taxes are levied on means-tested ben-
eﬁts Mt.
Therearetwo assetsindividualscaninvestin, stocks andarisklessbond. wt
is the fraction invested in equity, which yields a gross nominal return of Rt+1.
The nominal return on the riskless bond is denoted by R
f
t . The intertemporal
budget constraint of the individual is, in nominal terms, equal to
Wt+1 = (Wt +YI
t + YII
t + Mt − Ct)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt), (2.6)
where Wt is the amount of ﬁnancial wealth at time t. If the agent receives
means-tested beneﬁts, his consumption is always at least as high as the guar-
anteed income level, ˜ Mt.
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and in-
vestment decisions. First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and
short-sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and wt ≤ 1. (2.7)
Second, we impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (2.8)
which implies that the individual can not borrow against future annuity in-
come to increase consumption today.
2.2.2 Financial market
Theassetmenuofaninvestor consists ofariskless one-yearnominal bondand
a risky stock. The return on the stock is normally distributed with an annual
mean nominal return  R and a standard deviation σR. The interest rate at time
t + 1 equals
rt+1 = rt + ar(rt −  r) + ǫr
t+1, (2.9)
where rt is the instantaneous short rate and ar indicates the mean reversion
coefﬁcient.  r is the long run mean of the instantaneous short rate, and ǫr
t is
normally distributed with a zero mean and standard deviation σr. The yield
on a risk-free bond with maturity h is a function of the instantaneous short
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where A(h) and B(h) are scalars and h is the maturity of the bond. The real
yield is equal to the nominal yield minus expected inﬂation and an inﬂation
risk premium.
We have to model inﬂation, because we examine optimal annuitization lev-
els in a world in which second pillar annuities are nominal. For the instanta-
neous expected inﬂation rate we assume
πt+1 = πt + aπ(πt −  π) + ǫπ
t+1, (2.11)
where aπ is the mean reversion parameter,  π is long run expected inﬂation,
and the error term ǫπ
t ∼ N(0,σ2
π). Subsequently the price index Π follows
from




Π) are the innovations to the price index. We assume there
is a positive relation between the expected inﬂation and the instantaneous
short interest rate, that is the correlation coefﬁcient between ǫr
t and ǫΠ
t is posi-
tive. The benchmark parameters are presented in Section 2.3.3.
2.2.3 Numerical method for solving the life-cycle problem
Due to the richness and complexity of the model it cannot be solved analyt-
ically hence we employ numerical techniques instead. We use the method
proposed by (Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud 2005) and (Carroll 2006)
with several extensions added by (Koijen, Nijman, and Werker 2010). (Brandt,
Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud 2005)adopt a simulation-based method which
can deal with many exogenous state variables. In our case Xt = (R
f
t ,πt) is the
relevant exogenous state variable. Wealth acts as an endogenous state vari-
able. For this reason, following (Carroll 2006), we specify a grid for wealth
after (annuity) income, and consumption. As a result, it is not required to
do numerical rootﬁnding to ﬁnd the optimal consumption decision. Further-
more, the level of means-tested beneﬁts is an endogenous state variable, hence
we also make a grid for this.
Theoptimization problem issolved via dynamicprogramming and wepro-
ceed backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In
the last period the individual consumes all wealth available. The value func-
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The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation at all other points in time,
Vt(Wt, R
f












In each period we ﬁnd the optimal asset weights by setting the ﬁrst order
condition equal to zero
Et(C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1) = 0, (2.15)
where C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal real consumption level. Because we solve the
optimization problem via backwards recursion we know C∗
t+1 at time t + 1.
Furthermore we simulate the exogenous state variables for N trajectories and
T time periods hence we can calculate the realizations of the Euler conditions,
C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1. We regress these realizations on a polynomial ex-
pansion in the state variables to obtain an approximation of the conditional











In addition we employ a further extension introduced in (Koijen, Nijman, and
Werker 2010). They found that the regression coefﬁcients θh are smooth func-
tions of the asset weights and consequently we approximate the regression
coefﬁcients θh by projecting them further on polynomial expansion in the as-
set weights:
θ′
h ≃ g(w)ψ. (2.17)
The Euler condition must be set to zero to ﬁnd the optimal asset weights
˜ X′
pψg(w)′ = 0. (2.18)
Due to the maximization function in the budget constraint, equation (2.6),
there are two euler conditions for the optimal consumption level. One for
when the agent does receive means-tested beneﬁts and a second for when the












if Mt = 0 (2.19)
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if Mt > 0. (2.20)
This complicates the optimization procedure for consumption and details de-
scribing the method are in Appendix 2.A.CHAPTER 2 59
2.3 Calibration: case study Switzerland
The availability of means-tested beneﬁts obviously reduces the demand for an
annuity. The more important question is the quantitative impact of this type
of re-insurance on the cash-out decision at retirement. To evaluate the impor-
tance of means-tested beneﬁts for retired individuals we calibrate the model
to the Swiss case. Switzerland is an interesting case as it combines a relatively
low level of pre-existing annuitization by the ﬁrst pillar with generous means-
tested beneﬁts that exceed ﬁrst pillarbeneﬁts by roughly 50%. Moreover, most
individuals have accumulated a large capital stock at retirement through the
mandatory occupational pension scheme. The average Swiss retiree can ex-
pect a second pillar income approximately equals ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts if he an-
nuitizes his pension wealth. At least 25% of the accumulated pension wealth
can be withdrawn as a lump sum, but most plans do not limit the fraction that
can be cashed out or apply a higher limit.
2.3.1 The Swisspension system: the ﬁrstand thesecond pillar
Switzerland’s pension system mainly consists of two pillars, the ﬁrst pillar
is a publicly ﬁnanced pay-as-you-go scheme and the second pillar is a fully
funded occupational pension scheme. The ﬁrst pillar aims at providing a basic
level of income to all retired residents in Switzerland. It is ﬁnanced by gov-
ernment revenues and a payroll tax which is proportional to labor income.
Beneﬁts are strongly dependent on the number of years contributed, but only
to a limited degree on the average working income. In particular, individuals
whose income is high enough to qualify for the second pillar usually get a
ﬁrst-pillar income between 90 and 100 percent of the maximal ﬁrst pillar ben-
eﬁts. The statutory retirement age is 64 for women and 65 for men. Working
beyond age 64/65 is possible, but most work contracts specify a retirement
age that coincides with the statutory retirement age.
The second pillar is an employer-based, fully funded occupational pension
scheme which not only provides retirement beneﬁts, but alsoinsurance in case
of disability and for survivors. The scheme is compulsory for all employees
with annual earnings above roughly CHF 20,000. Around 96 percent of work-
ing men and 83 percent of working women are covered by an occupational
pension plan. However, it does not cover non-working individuals. As a
consequence, the lowest income quartile — and thus the individuals with the
lowestlifeexpectancy—are notoronlymarginallyincludedin theseschemes.
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cally work as a deﬁned contribution system, far reaching income guarantees
are included. Introduced in 1985, the main goal of the second pillar is to main-
tain pre-retirement income. Including income from the ﬁrst pillar, the target
replacement rate of most pension funds is approximately 50-60 percent of in-
sured income, corresponding to a net replacement rate of 70-80 percent. In-
come above CHF 80,000 is covered by the so-called super-mandatory part of
the system. Although the employers are free to offer super-mandatory cover-
age, a large majority do as occupational pensions are viewed as an important
tool to attract qualiﬁed workers in a tight labor market.
Individuals are automatically enrolled in both the mandatory and super-
mandatory part of the plan and in most cases do not have any choice during
the accumulation phase with respect to how to invest the money. Contribu-
tions to the pension plan correspond to a certain fraction of the salary (usually
7-18 percent depending on age) of which the employer has to pay at least
half. The capital is fully portable; when an employee starts working at an-
other company, he receives all of the accumulated contributions (including
the employer’s part). The full sum has to be paid into the new fund.
The accrued retirement capital can be withdrawn either as a monthly life-
long annuity (including a 60 percent survivor beneﬁt), a lump sum or a mix of
the two options. In some plans the cash-out limit is equal to 50 or 25 percent
(the legal minimum) of accumulated capital. Depending on the regulation
of the pension the individual must declare his choice between three months
and three years prior to the effective withdrawal date depending on insurer
regulations. Many pension insurers deﬁne a default option for the case when
the beneﬁciary does not make an active choice.
Occupational pension annuities are strictly proportional to the accumu-
lated retirement assets. The capital is translated into a yearly nominal annuity
using the so-called conversion rate. The conversion rate is independent of
marital status, but depends on retirement age and gender. The law stipulates
aminimum conversion rate inthe mandatorypart, which iscurrently 7.05per-
cent but will be lowered continuously to 6.8 percent in 2015. Pension funds
are requested to index pension beneﬁts to inﬂation if the ﬁnancial situation of
the fund allows for this. At present, few funds are able to index pensions to
inﬂation mainly due to high liabilities created by a very high conversion factor
in the mandatory part.CHAPTER 2 61
2.3.2 Means-tested supplemental beneﬁts in Switzerland
If the total income does not cover basic needs in old age, means-tested supple-
mental beneﬁts may be claimed as part of the ﬁrst pillar. Like in most OECD
countries, these beneﬁts are means-tested so that only individuals whose in-
come and assets are below a certain threshold are eligible. In Switzerland,
the value of these beneﬁts corresponds to 25% of average earnings, which is
slightly above the average in OECD countries of 21% ((OECD 2011)).
Since the inception of means-tested beneﬁts in 1966, the fraction of the
population beyond the retirement age receiving means-tested beneﬁts has re-
mained relatively constant at 12%. The share of beneﬁt is increasing with age
which is consistent with our hypothesis of spending down assets. In OECD
countries around 17% of the population above age 65 receives means-tested
beneﬁts, although there is a considerable variation across countries depend-
ing on how low the eligibility threshold is set. For example, in Denmark and
Australia between 70 to 80% of all retirees claim means-tested beneﬁts, com-
pared to less than 2% in Germany and Japan ((OECD 2011)).
The annual means-tested beneﬁts in Switzerland are determined by sub-
tracting an individual’s income from the so-called applicable expenditures.
For married applicants expenditures and income of the spouse are taken into
account as well. In addition, a child allowance is granted for each child below
age 18 or until ﬁnishing schooling (at most age 25). The income used in the
calculations of means-tested supplemental beneﬁts is the sum of pension in-
come from ﬁrst and second pillars, investment income, and earnings plus one
tenth of the wealth exceeding a threshold level of CHF 25,000. The relevant
annual expenditures consist of a cost-of-living allowance, a health insurance
premium of up to an upper limit of CHF 4,500, and rent or interest payments
for the mortgage of up to a limit of 13,200 CHF. Summing up all the applicable
expenditures, means-tested supplemental beneﬁts guarantee a gross income
of approximately 36,000 CHF for singles.
As shown in Table 2.1, average annual means-tested supplemental beneﬁts,
conditional on claiming, for retired beneﬁciaries in 2008 were CHF 9,600 for
single beneﬁciaries. The cost-of-living allowance, the health insurance pre-
mium, and rent payments are the largest categories on the expenditure side,
while interest payments on mortgages are negligible. Because the value of a
home is taken into account in the calculation of means-tested beneﬁts, home
owners rarely qualify for means-tested beneﬁts. The main source of income,
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Table 2.1 – Maximum and average means-tested beneﬁts of single retired recip-
ients in 2008
Means-tested beneﬁts correspond to the difference between applicable expenditures
and income but cover at least the health insurance premium.
Components Maximum Average
Applicable expenditures
Cost-of-living allowance 18,144 18,144
Rent/Interest on mortgage 13,200 10,212
Health insurance premium 4,500 3,996
Other expenses - 84
Total 35,844 32,436
Applicable income
First pillar beneﬁts 26,520 19,944
Other pension beneﬁts - 1,524
Wage income - 84
Own rent - 504
Investment income - 288
Wealth consumption - 636
Other income - 180
Total - 23,160
Means-tested beneﬁts 35,844 9,612
Net wealth - 20,140
Wealth (after deduction) - 6,411CHAPTER 2 63
2.3.3 Benchmark parameters
In this section we set the parameter values for our speciﬁcation of the life-
cycle model, which are displayed in Table 2.2. Our aim is to be as close as
possible to the Swiss case to compare the results of the simulations with actual
choice. Following related literature ((Pang and Warshawsky 2010), and (Yogo
2009)) we set the time preference discount factor, β, equal to 0.96. The risk
aversion coefﬁcient γ is assumed to be 3, which is consistent with (Ameriks,
Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011). As we consider individuals
after retirement we set the time range from t = 1 to time T = 36, which
corresponds to age 65 and 100 respectively. The survival probabilities are the
current male survival probabilities in Switzerland and are obtained from the
Human Mortality Database.4 We assume a certain death at age 100.
The equity return is normally distributed with a mean annual nominal re-
turn,  R, of 6.5% (corresponding to a equity premium of 4%) and an annual
standard deviation, σR, of 20%, which is in accordance with historical stock
performance. The mean instantaneous short rate is set equal to 2.5%, the stan-
dard deviation to 1%, and the mean reversion parameter to 0.15. The corre-
lation between the instantaneous short rate with the expected inﬂation is 0.4.
The parameters for the inﬂation dynamics are estimated with data from the
Swiss National Bank. Mean inﬂation is equal to 1.79%, the standard deviation
of the instantaneous inﬂation rate is equal to 1.12%, the standard deviation of
the price index equals 1.11%, and the mean reversion coefﬁcient equals 0.165.
For old-age insurance we calibrate the model to the Swiss case. The I pillar
annuity income, YI
1 equals CHF 24,000 and is adjusted for inﬂation annually.
This number approximately corresponds to the average ﬁrst pillar income of
individuals covered by occupational pensions. The gross guaranteed income
level to determine the means-tested beneﬁts, ˜ Mt, is CHF 36,000 in real terms.
Under this assumption the maximum amount of means-tested beneﬁts, Mt is
CHF 12,000. The fraction of wealth g that is taken into account when calcu-
lating the means-tested beneﬁts is 0.1.5 The conversion rate c that is used to
translate the accumulated capital into a yearly annuity is set to 7.2% which
corresponds to the conversion rate applied to second pillar wealth for the pe-
riod of our data. The lump sum tax τls and the income tax τY are progressive;
the exact numbers are displayed in Appendix 2.B. The applicable tax rates on
4We refer for further information to the website, www.mortality.org.
5We abstract from the threshold for wealth over which the fraction g is calculated, because
this would add another maximization function into the budget constraint which would com-
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Table 2.2 – Benchmark parameters
Description parameter value
Time preference discount factor (β) 0.96
Risk aversion coefﬁcient (γ) 3
Mean return on stocks ( R) 6.5%
Standard deviation stock returns (σR) 20%
Mean interest rate ( r) 2.5%
Standard deviation interest rate (σr) 1%
Mean reversion parameter interest rate (at) 0.15
Mean inﬂation ( π) 1.79%
Standard deviation instantaneous inﬂation (σπ) 1.12%
Standard deviation price index (σΠ) 1.11%
Correlation interest rate and expected inﬂation 0.4
Mean reversion coefﬁcient expected inﬂation (aπ) 0.165
I pillar income at t = 1 (YI
1) CHF 24,000
Guaranteed consumption level at t = 1 ( ˜ M1) CHF 36,000
Fraction of wealth taking into account to calculate MTB (g) 0.1
Conversion rate (c) 7.2%
income and lump sum payments are taken from the largest Swiss city, Zurich.




Our analysis relies on administrative records at the individual level from several
Swiss companies with an autonomous pension funds and several large Swiss
insurance companies that provide occupational pension plans for small and
medium sized companies. For the companies in our sample, we were given
information about all employees who retired over the period 1996 to 2006.
Each individual isobserved only once at retirement. The main sample consists
of 23,637 men and 8,432 women. The data contains information on the date
of birth, the retirement date, annuitization decision, amount of accumulated
pension wealth, and conversion factor as well as company speciﬁc pension
scheme information such as default and cash-out options.
Since the amount of means-tested beneﬁts depends on total wealth, infor-
mation on non-pension wealth is important. This information is not recordedCHAPTER 2 65
in the data. Therefore, we utilize asset data from the ﬁrst wave of the Sur-
vey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 2003 to estimate a
discrete distribution of liquid an illiquid non-pension wealth (see Tables 2.7
and 2.8 in Appendix 2.C). In doing so, we assume that liquid and illiquid non-
pension wealth are independent of each other and independent of pension
wealth. These distributions will be used to calculate a weighted average of the
optimal annuitization levels as outlined in detail below. Liquid non-pension
wealth (NPW) corresponds to the sum of values of on the bank accounts, gov-
ernment and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds, individual retirement ac-
counts, contractual savings for housing, cars and life insurance policies minus
ﬁnancial liabilities. Illiquid NPW is deﬁned as the sum of the values of the
primary residence net of the mortgage, other real estate, and the owned share
of own business. Total NPW is the sum of liquid and illiquid NPW.
2.4.2 Data restrictions and limitations
Our administrative data does not always record marital status and there is no
information concerning the age or income of the spouse. Therefore, we per-
form the simulation exercise for a single person household, although many re-
tirees in our sample do not live in single person household. We are well aware
of the importance of both marital status per se and socio-economic character-
istics of the spouse (in particular age and income/wealth). However, even if
such data was available, we expect the qualitative effects to be similar for mar-
ried andsingle men. Ourdata spans a time in which wives did not work much
and thus the additional pension wealth for married men in the second pillar
can be expected to be small. Moreover, the additional income of the ﬁrst pillar
for the spouse just covers the additional expenditures that are credited against
means-tested beneﬁts. Hence, for a given second pillar income, a married cou-
ple faces a very similar trade-off as a single men. (Bütler and Teppa 2007) in
fact ﬁnd little difference in the annuitization rates between married and single
men for those pension funds that do provide information about marital sta-
tus. The higher money’s worth of the annuity for married individuals (due
to survivor beneﬁts and higher life expectancy) seems to be offset by a lower
demand for insurance of married couples and/or bequest motives.
We restrict the data on annuitization decisions to men only. Women are not
considered in the analysis as a number of important social security reforms
implemented in recent years primarily affected women (such as an increase
in the retirement age for women from 62 to 64 and the introduction of child66 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Table 2.3 – Summary statistics of pension funds data, men
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Age at retirement 63.9 65.0 1.8 55.0 70.7
Conversion rate
Mandatory Part 6.928 7.150 0.424 5.210 8.043
Supermandatory Part 6.740 6.863 0.523 4.816 8.043
Pension wealth 249,797 212,591 165,387 102 699,892
Share Annuity 44.3 0 49.7 0 100
Share Lump Sum 49.9 0 50.0 0 100
Share Mixed 5.8 0 23.4 0 100
Observations 22,261
care credits). We would also expect that neglecting the spousal income has
larger consequences for women than for men, thereby making the difference
in decisions across (unobserved) marital status more pronounced.
Because tax rates and tax schedules vary across Swiss cantons and munic-
ipalities, an individual’s residence is potentially important for the annuitiza-
tion decision. Unfortunately, this information is not recorded in the data. We
therefore use data on applicable tax rates on income and lump sum payments
from the largest city in Switzerland, Zurich. The tax rates are presented in
Appendix 2.B.
2.4.3 Summary statistics
Table 2.3 reports key statistics for the variables of interest. Early retirement,
starting at age 55, as well as working beyond planned retirement is possible.
However, the average retirement age is close to the statutory retirement age of
65 for men. Average total pension wealth is about CHF 250,000. Furthermore,
we can see from Table 2.3 that a large fraction of the beneﬁciaries chose a polar
option, either full lump sum or full annuity.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the pension wealth and the
annuitization level of pension wealth for wealth levels below 700,000 CHF.
The solid line represents the ﬁtted values from a non-parametric regression
of the fraction of pension wealth withdrawn as an annuity on pension wealthCHAPTER 2 67
Figure 2.1 – Empirical fraction annuitized of second pillar pension wealth
We show the annuity decisions regarding second pillar pension wealth of Swiss pen-
sion funds.











































using a locally weighted regression (the bandwidth is set to 0.8).6 The average
annuitization levelofpension wealthisverylowforlowlevelsofoccupational
pension wealth and increases continuously for higher levels of second pillar
wealth. This pattern can be viewed as informal evidence that means-tested
beneﬁts affect the annuitization decision.
Given that the annuity is a normal income subject to income taxes, this
additional income increases the effective marginal tax rate under the annuity
option. The lump sum, on the other hand, is taxed only once and treated
independently of other income. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, this differential
tax treatment implies that the present value of the lump sum’s total tax bill
is almost always smaller and increases at a lower rate that the annuity’s tax
burden, especially for larger capital stocks.
6The locally weighted regression runs a separate regression for each observation in the
data using observations in the neighborhood of that observation (and giving more weight
to observations close to the observation of interest). Based on the estimate a ﬁtted value
is calculated for each observation. The line in the graph is the line through all these ﬁtted
observations.68 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Figure 2.2 – Net present value of tax payments for the annuity and the lump
sum
The taxes are discounted with a 3% interest rate and taking into account survival prob-
abilities. Applicable tax rates are taken from the city of Zurich. All the parameters are
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2.5 Results: the effect of means-tested beneﬁts on
annuitization
First we show the optimal fraction of second pillar pension wealth taken out
as an annuity predicted by our life-cycle model and illustrate the trade-offs
that retirees face due to means-tested beneﬁts. In Section 2.5.3 we compare
these ﬁndings with the observed annuitization decisions concerning the sec-
ond pillar pension wealth of retirees. We ﬁnd that we can match the actual
pattern of annuitization well.
2.5.1 Optimal annuity demand: An illustrative example
In this section we illustrate, with a simpliﬁed model, the trade-offs that agents
face when deciding how much to annuitize. In this example we abstract from
inﬂation, equity, taxes, and non-pension wealth. Whether to take a lump sum
or an annuity (or a combination) depends on the consumption patterns that
both options generate. The optimal consumption levels if the entire pension
wealthisannuitizedortakenasalumpsumaredisplayedinFigure 2.3fortwoCHAPTER 2 69
Figure 2.3 – Optimal consumption patterns: Illustrative example
The ﬁgure displays the consumption pattern if an individual (1) annuitized his entire
pension wealth or took the (2) lump sum. Equity, inﬂation, non-pension wealth, and
taxes are excluded from the model, the only risk that agents face is longevity risk. If
the pension wealth level equals CHF 200,000 it is optimal to choose the consumption
stream corresponding to taking the lump sum while if the wealth level is CHF 350,000
the consumption stream from full annuitization is preferred. The guaranteed income
equals CHF 36,000.
(a) wealth CHF 200,000







































(b) wealth CHF 350,000







































different wealth levels.7 When focussing on the graph on the left-hand side
(pension wealth level of CHF 200,000), we see that the consumption stream
for the ﬁrst 10 years of retirement is much higher when the lump sum is taken
than if the pension wealth is annuitized. After that consumption is slightly
lower when the lump sum is taken compared to the full annuitization case,
about CHF 2,000 lower per year. As the annuity income that can be generated
via annuitizing all wealth (CHF 38,000), differs only to a small extent from the
guaranteed income (CHF 36,000), it is optimal to take the lump sum, consume
large amounts in the ﬁrst retirement years, and subsequently apply for means-
tested beneﬁts in case the individual is still alive.
Whencomparingtheconsumption patternsifthe wealthlevelisCHF350,000,
we see that, when the lump sum is taken, the consumption level is again
higher for the ﬁrst 10 years. However, after the lump sum is drawn down
the difference between the annuity income (CHF 49,000) and the guaranteed
level due to means-tested beneﬁts (CHF 36,000) is much higher for this wealth
level. Hence for this higher wealth level it is optimal to annuitize everything,
because beneﬁts from annuitization, a ﬂat consumption pattern and receiv-
ing the wealth enhancing mortality credit, outweigh the beneﬁts from a lump
7Note that the optimal consumption strategy is to consume the entire annuity income,
because in this illustrative example we assume that the only risk that individuals face is
longevity risk.70 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
sum, receiving "free" wealth in the form of means-tested beneﬁts.
2.5.2 Optimal annuity demand: The full model
Theillustrative exampleaboveignored inﬂation, equity, taxes, andnon-pension
wealth. In this section we include step by step these important factors for
annuity demand and determine the optimal annuitized fraction for individ-
uals with different levels of pension wealth. Figure 2.4 displays the optimal
fraction of second pillar pension wealth annuitized as a function of pension
wealth for different levels of means-tested beneﬁts. Inﬂation and equity risk
are included, but we assume taxes and non-pension wealth to be zero, both
assumptions will be relaxed below. The dashed-squared line is for the case
where agentscan not applyfor means-tested beneﬁts. When pension wealth is
CHF100,000, agentsoptimally annuitize50% oftheirpension wealth, whereas
if pension wealth amounts to CHF 600,000 the optimal fraction annuitized is
90%.
There are two other reasons why agents annuitize less than 100%.8 First,
they want to keep a certain amount liquid to invest in equity. Agents face
only inﬂation risk, but no background risk and income risk, hence the amount
of risk that they are willing to hold via the equity market is high. This gen-
erates incentives to take at least a small part as a lump sum to increase the
consumption levels in the future. Second, the annuity is a nominal annuity,
while agents face inﬂation risk and prefer a real annuity. 9
The optimal annuity demand decreases when the means-tested beneﬁts in-
crease. Comparing the dashed-squared line (no means-tested beneﬁts) with
the solid line (maximal means-tested beneﬁts CHF 12,000), we see that the op-
timal fraction annuitized is lower if the government provides means-tested
beneﬁts. Retirees with a pension wealth equal and below CHF 500,000 op-
timally do not annuitize at all when means-tested beneﬁts are equal to CHF
12,000. In that case agents should optimally take the lump sum, consume
considerable amounts during early retirement years to draw down the lump
sum, and subsequently apply for the generous means-tested beneﬁts of CHF
12,000. The optimal fraction annuitized increases with pension wealth, since
8Note that 50% annuitization seems low, but this is 50% annuitized of pension wealth, not
total wealth. Agents already have more than 75% of their total wealth annuitized in the form
of I pillar annuity income. The latter (CHF 24,000)is equivalent to a net present value of more
than CHF 300,000.
9As expected, when running the simulations and excluding inﬂation risk and the possibil-
ity to invest in equity results in optimal annuitization levels of 100%.CHAPTER 2 71
Figure 2.4 – Inﬂuence of means-tested beneﬁts on optimal annuitization levels
The ﬁgure displays the optimal annuitization levels for varying levels of means-tested
beneﬁts. We assume the agent has zero non-pension wealth and does not pay taxes.
The rest of the parameters are as in the benchmark case.














































(1) choosing the lump sum generates a less-smooth consumption pattern for
higher levels of pension wealth and (2) the difference between the guaranteed
income and the annuity income resulting from full annuitization increases
with the levelofpension wealth. Inmore detail: Ifpension wealthishigh, con-
sumption is really high during the ﬁrst retirement years while in later years
the consumption equals the ﬁrst pillar income plus the means-tested beneﬁts
(thus a very non-smooth consumption pattern for high pension wealth lev-
els). However, for individuals with such a high pension wealth, an annuity
income well above the means-tested beneﬁts can be generated. These retirees
optimally take the annuity as it generates a smooth and high consumption
level over the entire lifetime. At a certain threshold the beneﬁts from taking
the lump sum, receiving "free wealth", are thus outweighed by the advantage
of annuitizing, a smooth consumption pattern and receiving the wealth en-
hancing mortality credit.
In the previous results we abstracted from non-pension wealth assuming
that agents have zero non-pension wealth, neither liquid nor illiquid. Fig-
ure 2.5 shows the effect of liquid non-pension wealth on annuity demand.
Furthermore we also include taxes, which we previously abstracted from. By
comparing the solid line in Figure 2.5 and the solid line in Figure 2.4 we can
disentangle the effect of taxes. Both graphs display the optimal annuitization72 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Figure 2.5 – Inﬂuence of liquid non-pension wealth on optimal annuitization
levels
The ﬁgure displays the optimal annuitization levels for varying levels of liquid non-
pension wealth. Agents can apply for means-tested beneﬁts and taxes are included.
We assume the agent has zero illiquid non-pension wealth. The rest of the parameters
are as in the benchmark case
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levels if liquid non-pension wealth is zero and means-tested beneﬁts of CHF
12,000 can be claimed. The only difference is that in Figure 2.5 taxes are also
included. For all pension wealth levels, the optimal annuitization levels are
lower or equal for the case in which taxes are included. Progressive rates in
both the income tax (which is levied on the annuity) and the tax on the cash-
out, as well as the preferential tax treatment of the lump sum induce a shift
towards a higher cash-out rate for a given capital stock.
The main purpose of Figure 2.5 is to show the effect of liquid non-pension
wealth on optimal annuity demand. The distinction between liquid and illiq-
uid non-pension wealth is important, since liquid wealth can be drawn down
and subsequently agents can receive means-tested beneﬁts. While retirees can
not easily draw down illiquid non-pension wealth, such as a house. For this
reason almost no home owners can apply for means-tested beneﬁts. If agents
have large amounts of liquid non-pension wealth, they need to draw down
not only the lump sum but also, on top of this, the liquid non-pension wealth
tobeabletoapplyformeans-tested beneﬁts. InFigure 2.5wepresenttheeffect
of liquid non-pension wealth on the optimal fraction annuitized. We see that
for higher levelsof liquid non-pension wealth the optimal annuitization levels
fall. This is intuitive since higher amounts of liquid non-pension wealth gen-
erate a very non-smooth consumption path over the life cycle, since retireesCHAPTER 2 73
have to draw down also the liquid non-pension wealth to be able to apply for
means-tested beneﬁts. Hence, if the agent takes the lump sum, the consump-
tion pattern in expectation is extremely high in early years, and much lower
later in life, which generates a welfare loss.
2.5.3 Comparing optimal annuity demand with observed de-
cisions
We showed in Section 2.4.3 that when examining the data, the fraction of in-
dividuals who take an annuity depends positively on the amount of pension
wealth. Individuals with low pension wealth levels are more likely to take
the lump sum, while individuals with higher levels tend to annuitize (a part)
of their pension wealth. We hypothesize that means-tested beneﬁts reduce
the annuity demand in Switzerland and can explain the annuitization pat-
tern found in the data. In Figure 2.6 we compare the empirical annuitization
pattern with the optimal annuitization pattern determined via the calibrated
life-cycle model.
The solid line is the ﬁtted regression line of the empirically observed frac-
tion of accumulated pension wealth taken as an annuity. The non-parametric
regression line illustrates the relationship between pension wealth and the
fraction taken as an annuity.10 The dashed line are the ﬁndings from the full
life-cycle model including the eligibility of means-tested beneﬁts.
When calculating the graph for the predicted annuity levels, we take into
account that many factors, which are heterogenous among retirees, inﬂuence
the annuity decision, most importantly liquid pension wealth and illiquid
pension wealth. We use the empirical distribution of non-pension wealth,
both liquid and illiquid, from the SHARE data, to calculate the propensity
to annuitize for different pension wealth levels. More precise, the graphs in
Figure 2.6 show the weighted average of all the optimal annuitization levels
as a function of second pillar pension wealth levels, taking into account liquid
andilliquid pension wealth. The weights dependon the fraction of agentsthat
fall into a certain category regarding the amount of liquid and illiquid pension
wealth, assuming independency between second pillar pension wealth, liquid
pension wealth, and illiquid pension wealth.11 The distribution of liquid and
10The solid line shows the ﬁtted values from a locally weighted regression with the em-
pirically observed fraction of pension wealth annuitized as dependent variable and pension
wealth as independent variable. The bandwidth is set to 0.8.
11For instance, 58.1% of agents has illiquid non-pension wealth above CHF 96,000, which74 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Figure 2.6 – Comparison optimal fraction lump-sum and actual fraction taken
as a lump-sum
The ﬁgure displays the optimal and the empirical average fraction annuitized for vary-
ing wealth levels. The optimal fraction is displayed assuming agents can apply for
means-tested beneﬁts (MTB) and cannot apply for means-tested beneﬁts. The opti-
mal fraction is the weighted average of all the optimal annuitization levels for varying
liquid-non pension wealth and illiquid non-pension wealth. Weights derived from the
SHARE dataset are used, assuming independency between pension wealth, illiquid
non-pension wealth, and liquid non-pension wealth. All the parameters are as in the
benchmark case.











































Data − nonparametric regression
Simulation with MTB
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illiquid pension wealth which we used to calculate the optimal annuitization
pattern is displayed in Appendix 2.C.
Both in the data and the model predictions, the likelihood of individuals to
take the annuity increases with pension wealth. Note that the graphs do not
imply that an individual with for instance a pension wealth of CHF 400,000
optimally annuitizes about 30% of his pension wealth. The 30% should be in-
terpreted as a likelihood to annuitize averaged over all individuals with the
same pension wealth. When comparing the solid line (model prediction with
means-tested beneﬁts) to the dotted line (model prediction without means-
tested beneﬁts) it is obvious that the predicted annuitization rate drops dra-
matically when agents can claim means-tested beneﬁts. Comparing the opti-
mal annuitization levels with means-tested beneﬁts (solid line) with the data
(solid line with squares), we ﬁnde that both lines are remarkably close. Our
calibrated life-cycle model with means-tested beneﬁts can explain the empiri-
cally observed annuitization patterns in Switzerland well.
In the data we saw that almost all agents choose either for full annuitiza-
tion or full lump sum, only 6% chooses for a mix (see Table 2.3). Thus when
interpreting Figure 2.6 which displays, for instance, that for agents with CHF
200,000 the average fraction annuitized is 50%, this means that about 50% of
agents choose full annuitization and 50% choose the lump sum. We see a
similar pattern for the simulations, the number of 0/1 decisions is high, 65%.
Since the annuity is nominal and agents would like to invest in equity, slightly
less than 100% annuitization can be optimal. However, in practice individuals




While means-tested beneﬁts offer free insurance to the individual, they can
also be costly for the social insurance system. In this section we calculate the
means that they will not be eligible for means-tested beneﬁts. Hence to calculate the propen-
sity to annuitize (solid line), we use the optimal annuity demand corresponding to agents
that can not claim means-tested beneﬁts for this 58.1%. The independence assumption may
bequestioned, but it corresponds to the fact, thatthe SHARE datado not show any correlation
between non-pension wealth and pension wealth. A possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is
that individuals with low pension wealth may compensate by saving more outside the second
pillar. It could also be that individuals with high levels of non-pension wealth work less and
thus accumulate less pension wealth (income effect).76 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
average costs of the means-tested beneﬁts per person over a life time. We per-
form this analysis for varying levels of pension wealth and liquid non-pension
wealth. Table 2.4 shows the average of the net present value of means-tested
beneﬁts per person. We see that if an agents have a pension wealth of CHF
100,000, zero non-pension wealth, and annuitizes optimally, the average costs
of the means-tested beneﬁts are CHF 146,000. This is the average net present
value of the means-tested beneﬁts for one individual during his life-time. If
an agent with similar wealth levels would annuitize fully, due to for instance
mandatory annuitization, the costs would be substantially less, namely CHF
101,000. For higher pension wealth levels the average costs of the means-
tested beneﬁts are lower, because the agent needs to draw down more wealth
before being eligible for means-tested beneﬁts. Hence if the wealth level is
higher, agents apply for means-tested beneﬁts at a later age. Furthermore, for
very high wealth levels (CHF 600,000)almost full annuitization is optimal and
agents can not apply for supplemental income.
Table 2.4 – Costs of the means-tested beneﬁts in (CHF 1,000).
The graph displays the average net present value of the means-tested beneﬁts payed
out to agents. To calculate the net present value we use the Vasicek model for the term
structure of interest rates. The non-pension wealth is liquid non-pension wealth. We
show the costs of the means-tested beneﬁts both if agents (1) annuitize optimally and
if they (2) fully annuitize. The costs are presented in CHF 1,000.
non-pension wealth CHF 0 non-pension wealth CHF 200
pension optimal full optimal full
wealth annuitization annuitization annuitization annuitization
100 146 101 68 40
200 106 24 50 10
300 77 3 39 2
400 57 0 30 0
500 44 0 0 0
600 34 0 0 0
There are many policies available to alleviate old age poverty. A consump-
tion ﬂoor could be a good substitute for means-tested beneﬁts, the main differ-
ence being that to be eligible for the consumption ﬂoor an agent can not have
any wealth or income, while with means-tested beneﬁts an agent is allowed
to have a certain amount of wealth and income. Both programmes ensure that
a retiree will always consume an amount at least equal to the consumption
ﬂoor. Table 2.5 shows the average of the net present value of the consumption
ﬂoor beneﬁts per person. When comparing the costs of the consumption ﬂoorCHAPTER 2 77
and the means-tested beneﬁts, the difference is substantial. An agent with
a pension wealth of CHF 400,000 and no non-pension wealth, costs on aver-
age CHF 57,000 to the government to provide means-tested beneﬁts, while
the costs would be only CHF 12,000 to provide consumption ﬂoor beneﬁts.
Hence it is possible to provide a similar lower bound on consumption using
a consumption ﬂoor instead of means-tested beneﬁts, with substantially less
redistributions from the wealthy to the less wealthy and with generating less
negative externalities due to a reduction in annuity demand.
Table 2.5 – Costs of a consumption ﬂoor in (CHF 1,000).
The graph displays the average net present value of the transfers due to the consump-
tion ﬂoor payed out to agents. To calculate the net present value we use the Vasicek
model for the term structure of interest rates. The non-pension wealth is liquid non-
pension wealth. We show the costs of the means-tested beneﬁts both if agents (1) an-
nuitize optimally and if they (2) fully annuitize. The costs are presented in CHF 1,000.
non-pension wealth CHF 0 non-pension wealth CHF 200
pension optimal full optimal full
wealth annuitization annuitization annuitization annuitization
100 95 100 23 12
200 51 23 11 6
300 28 3 3 2
400 12 0 1 0
500 1 0 0 0
600 0 0 0 0
2.5.5 Alternative explanations and robustness tests
Although the data ﬁts the model’s prediction well, other explanations might
also be compatible with the observed annuitization pattern, most importantly
differential mortality. It has been documented in the literature that wealthy
people tend to live longer than less wealthy individuals ((De Nardi, French,
and Jones 2010a)). (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a) ﬁnd a difference of
4.6 years for a 70-year old when comparing the lowest income quintile with
the highest for the US. Since the wealthy live longer in expectation, the an-
nuity is relatively more attractive for them than the lump sum, compared to
the less wealthy retirees. This could in theory explain the observed annuiti-
zation pattern to some degree. Unfortunately there are no data on mortality
differences by pension wealth in Switzerland. However, it is very likely that
mortality difference do not sufﬁce to explain the cash-out pattern in Switzer-
land for the following reasons. First, differential mortality is far less prevalent78 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Figure 2.7 – Comparison empirical annuitization levels women and men
All the parameters are as in the benchmark case.













































in European countries than in the US. (Kalwij, Alessie, and Knoef 2009) ﬁnd
that the difference between 65-year old men with a low income (deﬁned as
minimum income or no income) and 65-year old men with a high income (de-
ﬁned as two times the median) is at most 3 years, which is substantially less
than in the US. (Kalwij, Alessie, and Knoef 2009) use data from the Nether-
lands, which is a country that resembles Switzerland in terms of income dis-
tribution and health care. In addition, (Kalwij, Alessie, and Knoef 2009) also
reference similar studies concerning other European countries which ﬁnd a
differential of only 2 years. Reasons for the divergence between the US and
Europe in mortality differences between income levels may be a more equal
income distribution and universal health care coverage in most continental
European countries. Another reasons why differential mortality most likely
can not explain the observed annuitization pattern in Switzerland is that our
data does not include the poorest individuals which usually account for most
of the mortality differential.
A crude test on the importance of differential mortality for the annuiti-
zation decision in Switzerland is to compare cash-out patterns for men and
women. Longevity differences between rich and poor individuals are much
lower for women than for men. As a consequence we should observe a much
steeper annuitization proﬁle for men than for women. Although the data onCHAPTER 2 79
Figure 2.8 – Comparison of means-tested beneﬁts and a consumption ﬂoor
The ﬁgure displays the optimal and the empirical average fraction annuitized for vary-
ing wealth levels. The optimal fraction is displayed assuming agents can receive (1)
means-tested beneﬁts or a (2) consumption ﬂoor. The optimal fraction is the weighted
average of all the optimal annuitization levels for varying liquid-non pension wealth
and illiquid non-pension wealth. Weights derived from the SHARE dataset are used,
assuming independency betweenpension wealth, illiquid non-pension wealth, and liq-
uid non-pension wealth. All the parameters are as in the benchmark case.











































Data − nonparametric regression
Simulation with MTB
Simulation without MTB
female cash-out decisions suffer from the mentioned shortcomings (changes
in pension law, importance of marital status). Figure 2.7 does not support this
interpretation.
(Pashchenko 2010) tests the implications of a consumption ﬂoor on optimal
annuity decisions, which is different from means-tested beneﬁts. A consump-
tion ﬂoor is a guaranteed income level, in case the agent has no sufﬁcient
income and no wealth to be able to consume the guaranteed level. Hence
the supplemental income from the government gets reduced one-for-one with
the wealth of the agent. In contrast, means-tested beneﬁts are more gener-
ous, since only a fraction of total wealth is taken into account when calculat-
ing the supplemental income (In Switzerland one-for-ten reduction, since the
factor is 0.1.). (Pashchenko 2010) ﬁnds that the participation level in the an-
nuity market decreases for higher levels of the consumption ﬂoor. Similarly,
(Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker 2011b) show that the level of annuitiza-
tion is a decreasing function of a minimum consumption level. In Figure 2.880 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
we compare the effect of means-tested beneﬁts (solid line) and a consumption
ﬂoor (dashed line). The propensity to annuitize is lower when agents are of-
fered means-tested beneﬁts compared to a consumption ﬂoor. This is intuitive
since means-tested beneﬁts are more generous than a consumption ﬂoor and
thus offer more protection against longevity risk. Hence modeling govern-
ment supplements as a consumption ﬂoor instead of means-tested beneﬁts,
the latter being prevalent in most western countries, understates the effect
that supplemental government income has on annuity demand.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the effect of means-tested beneﬁts on optimal annu-
itization decisions of individuals at retirement. Means-tested beneﬁts, which
are typically thought of as poverty protection in old age, act like an additional
insurance against the ﬁnancial consequences of longevity. They may thus in-
duce retirees to take the lump sum, draw it down and consume out of it, and
subsequently apply for means-tested beneﬁts when the lump sum is (largely)
depleted. To quantify the impact of the incentive on the cash-out decision of
individual, we construct a rich life-cycle model in which individuals can rely
on means-tested beneﬁts in case their income is below a certain level. The
model is then calibrated to Switzerland, a country for which the incentive is
particularly strong due to a combination of a high income ﬂoor and sizeable
levels of pension wealth that can be cashed out.
Theresultsfrom ourlife-cycle modelindeeddemonstrate thatmeans-tested
beneﬁts substantially decrease the optimal annuity demand. Not surprisingly
the effect is more pronounced for low wealth levels. If the pension wealth
level is low the annuity income generated does not differ much (or may even
be smaller) from the guaranteed income. Taking the lump sum, consuming
out of this, and then applying for means-tested beneﬁts generates a higher
consumption level. For high pension wealth levels, on the other hand, the
annuity income is much higher than the income guaranteed by means-tested
beneﬁts. In that case the value of the longevity insurance implied by the an-
nuity (also known as mortality credit) dominates the incentives of the supple-
mental income.
In a second step we compare the results from the model with observed
annuitization behavior. Our data consists of 22,000 individual retirement de-
cisions provided by a number of Swiss pension funds. The predictions from
the life-cycle model with means-tested beneﬁts are close to the empirically ob-CHAPTER 2 81
served annuitization pattern in Switzerland. The optimal annuity demandnot
only decreases due to means-tested beneﬁts, but also generates a pattern that
is remarkably close to the data both in terms of level and the correlation with
pension wealth.
Although we derived the quantitative impact of means-tested beneﬁts on
the decision to annuitize for a single country, our results have further-reaching
implications for the adequacy of income provided in old age. A partial shift
from ﬁrst to second pillar income provision in old age, as discussed in many
countries, has to be evaluated carefully with respect to incentives that are cre-
ated when allowing individuals to cash out second pillar wealth. A gener-
ous protection against poverty in old age may generate a strong tendency to
quickly deplete pension wealth and apply for means-tested beneﬁts — and




We want to optimize over consumption and asset allocation dynamically. The
exogenous state variables are the risk free rate and inﬂation. The endogenous
state variable is wealth. Agents receive means-tested beneﬁts and the amount
depends on wealth and income.
2.A.2 Life-cycle optimization problem



















where β is the time preference discount factor, γ denotes the level of risk aver-
sion and Ct is the real amount of wealth consumed at the beginning of period
t. The probability of surviving to age t, conditional on having lived to period
t − 1 is indicated by pt. We deﬁne the nominal consumption as Ct = CtΠt
and Πt is the price index. The gross equity returns are denoted by Rt and the
riskless bond yields a constant gross return of R
f
t .
The budget constraint of the individual is equal to
Wt+1 = (Wt +YI
t + YII
t + Mt − Ct)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt). (2.22)
wt denotes the weight invested in stocks and Mt are the means-tested beneﬁts
at the beginning of period t. The individuals nominal consumption by Ct and
YI
t is the after tax income from ﬁrst pillar pension wealth and YII
t from second
pillar pension wealth. means-tested beneﬁts equal:
Mt = ˜ Mt −YI
t −YII
t − rWt − gWt, (2.23)
where ˜ Mt is the amount of consumption/income guaranteed by the govern-
ment. If income plus return on wealth plus a fraction of wealth g is lower than
˜ Mt, agents receive means-tested beneﬁts. Rewriting the budget constraint:
Wt+1 = (Wt +Yt + max( ˜ Mt − YI
t − YII
t − rWt − gWt,0) − Ct)
(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt). (2.24)CHAPTER 2 83
The timing isasfollows, ﬁrst an individual receives hisincome and receives
means-tested beneﬁts, after which he consumes. Subsequently he invests the
remaining wealth. We assume that the investor is liquidity constraint and we
impose standard borrowing and short-sales constraints.
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and in-
vestment decisions. First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and
short-sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and ι′wt ≤ 1. (2.25)
Second, we impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (2.26)
which implies that the individual can not borrow against future annuity in-
come to increase consumption today. Furthermore, the agent can not save out
of its means-tested beneﬁts, but has to consume them:
Ct = min(C∗
t , ˜ Mt) if Mt > 0 (2.27)
Theoptimization problem issolved via dynamicprogramming and wepro-
ceed backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In
the last period the individual consumes all his remaining wealth, hence we





(WT + YT + MT)1−γ
1− γ
(2.28)
The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Vt(Wt, R
f












We deﬁne the portfolio return as:
RP
t+1 = 1+ R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt (2.30)
Furthermore we denote the wealth level after annuity income, consump-
tion, and medical expenses as:
At = Wt +YI
t + YII
t − Ct + max(0, Mt) (2.31)84 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
2.A.3 First order conditions of the life-cycle model
In order to ﬁnd the optimal consumption and investment decision we derive
the euler conditions.












































if max(....) = 0 (2.35)
∂Vt
∂Wt







if max(....) > 0 (2.36)
















t if max(....) > 0 (2.38)














To solve for the optimal consumption, substitute (2.37) and (2.38) into (2.34)












if max(....) = 0 (2.40)
C
∗−γ









if max(....) > 0 (2.41)
We have two exogenous state variables, namely R
f
t and πt and we have an
endogenous state variable, Wt. Furthermore we have two control variables,
wt and Ct.CHAPTER 2 85
Due to the complexity of the model it cannot be solved analytically. Instead
we use numerical optimization techniques to solve the problem. In this sec-
tion we will explain this procedure, which combines the methods of Brandt,
Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) and Carroll (2006), with several exten-
sions added by Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010). First we will present how
we modeled the interest rate term structure, the yield on the riskless bond, in-
ﬂation and the price index. Subsequently we construct the test portfolios and
the grid for the endogenous state variable. Furthermore the solution proce-
dure for the asset weights will be elaborated on. Finally the steps to obtain the
optimal consumption will be presented.
2.A.4 Simulate the exogenous state variables
We need the nominal and real term structure to determine the nominal and
real annuity income. Furthermore the asset menu consist of a riskless bond,
which is a 1-year nominal bond in our model. We employ the Vasicek model
to simulate term structures and the return on the riskless bond. The Vasicek
model is a one-factor model and the instantaneous interest rate follows the
stochastic differential equation
drt = −a(rt −  r)dt + σrdWt, (2.42)
where  r is the long run mean of the short rate and rt is the instantaneous
short rate. dWt is the brownian motion which drives the uncertainty in the
ﬁnancial market and σr is the standard deviation of the interest rate. Longer
term yields are a function of the instantaneous short rate. As stated above the
risk-free rate in our model is a 1-year nominal bond, which is a function of the























The maturity of the bond is 1 year, which is denoted by h.86 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Furthermore we need to simulate the inﬂation and the price index, which
follows a similar process as the interest rate
dπt = −a(πt −  π)dt + σπdZt, (2.46)
where  π) is the long run mean inﬂation rate, σπ is the volatility of the inﬂa-
tion rate and dZt is the brownian motion. Concerning the process for the price
index, Π, we postulate that
Πt+dt = Πt exp(πt+dt + σΠdBt), (2.47)
where σΠ is the standard deviation of the price index and dBt is the brownian
motion.
2.A.5 Optimization procedure for the optimal asset weights
We construct a grid for the endogenous state variable wealth, in particular
for wealth after consumption, expenses due to background risk and annuity
income instead of before. This is in line with Carroll (2006) and this choice
allows us to solve the Euler conditions analytically instead of numerically.
We form a M-dimensional grid and let the grid shrink during the backwards
recursion.














Later in the optimization procedure the optimal asset weight combined
with the optimal consumption choice which generates the highest expected
utility is picked. We solve the problem via backwards recursion and to solve
the optimal policies at time t, we have available the endogenous wealth grid
at time t + 1 and the optimal consumption at time t + 1. We construct H test
portfolios and let the weight invested in the risky assetrun from 0% to +100%,
with steps of 5%, hence H is 21. The return on the test portfolios is deﬁned
as Rtest
t+1. Furthermore we simulate N trajectories of T periods for every state
variable and medical expenses. We construct an M-dimensional grid for the
wealth level after annuity income, consumption, and medical expenses, At.
Step 1: Compute the interpolated consumption levels.
This is done because we need the optimal consumption level at time t + 1 but
we need them at the endogenous grid points. Hence we interpolate to ﬁnd










t+1 is the interpolated optimal consumption. We want to
compute Ci∗
t+1 for every simulated exogenous state variable, for each endoge-
nous wealth grid point and for every test portfolio. Hence Ci∗
t+1 is a three-
dimensional NxHxM matrix, where M is the number of wealth grid points.




t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t ), which is a three dimensional NxHxM matrix.
Step 3: Regress the realizations of the Euler conditions on a polynomial
expansion in the state variables.
Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) suggested to approximate the
conditional expectation of the Euler conditions via polynomial expansions in
the state variables. We employ a second order polynomial expansion in the
risk-free rate and a ﬁrst order polynomial expansion for the health status and
the inﬂation. The matrix of state variables, ˜ Xt
p, is N times p and we perform
















t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t ) is a NxH matrix, ˜ X′
p is a Nxp matrix, θh is a pxH
matrix.
Step 4: Parameterize the regression coefﬁcients, θh, in the asset weights, w.
Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010) propose this parametrization, since they
observed that the projections coefﬁcients, θh, are smooth functions in the port-
folio weights, wt. Hence we regress the projection coefﬁcients on a q-th order
polynomial expansion in the portfolio weights
θ(w)′ ≃ ψg(w), (2.50)
where Ψ is a (q+1)xp matrix and g(w) a Hx(q+1) matrix.
Step 5: Determine the optimal asset weights via setting the expectation of







t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f









where the matrix of state variables is dimension Nxp and Ψ a (q+1)xp matrix.
We solve for the optimal asset weights for every trajectory and grid point for
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2.A.6 Optimization procedure for the optimal consumption
We calculate two optimal consumption levels, so for both euler conditions,












if max(....) = 0 (2.52)
C
∗−γ













We have two potentially optimal consumption levels and we need to know
which one is actually optimal, which depends on whether the agent receives
means-tested beneﬁts in that period. We know that if the income level is
higher than the means-tested beneﬁts, than the agent will not receive means-
tested beneﬁts.
Yt ≥ ˜ Mt then C∗
t = C∗nomtb
t (2.54)




˜ Mt − Yt − (r + g)(At + Cmtb
t − Yt)
1− r − g
(2.55)
Mnomtb




t > 0∩ Mnomtb
t > 0 then C∗mtb
t (2.57)
If Mmtb
t > 0∩ Mnomtb
t < 0 then C∗mtb
t (2.58)
If Mmtb
t <= 0 ∩ Mnomtb
t < 0 then C∗nomtb
t (2.59)
If Mmtb
t <= 0 ∩ Mnomtb
t > 0 then choose the one (2.60)
where the means-tested beneﬁt is closest to zero
The timing is as follows, ﬁrst we consume and then we invest, so because
we solve this problem via backward recursion we already found the optimal
asset weights at time t, hence we have RP∗
t+1.
Step 1: Compute the interpolated consumption levels.
The reason why we do this is that if we would use the optimal consumption
foundattime t+1, thiswouldresultinanafterconsumption wealththatisnot
exactlyon the grid point. Ifwemultiply At+1 with theoptimal portfolio return
from time t to t + 1 and ﬁnd the consumption level, C∗
t+1i, that belongs to thisCHAPTER 2 89
wealth level, than this problem is solved. We linearly interpolate to ﬁnd the
consumption at time t + 1 that belongs to this wealth level. The interpolated
consumption, C∗i
t+1, is a NxM matrix.







This is done for each grid point and each simulation, hence it is a NxM matrix.











≃ exp(νz f( ˜ Xt
z)) (2.62)
where νz are the regression coefﬁcients and ˜ Xt
z is the N times z matrix of state
variables. Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010) propose to approximate the log-
arithm of the conditional expectation to ensure that the conditional expecta-
tion remains strictly positive. Else it is not ensured that the implied optimal
consumption strategy is positive. We perform these steps for every endoge-
nous grid point, hence we obtain optimal consumption levels for each trajec-
tory and for each grid point.
At each point in time we collect the optimal investment strategy and the
optimal consumption policy, hence we have NxM optimal strategies. Subse-
quently we start from period 1 and simulate forward. Each period we imple-
ment the optimal investment and consumption strategies, depending on the
realized wealth levels.
2.B Tax rates in Switzerland
We use the tax rates for singles, which are displayed in Table 2.6.
2.C Liquid on illiquid non-pension wealth
To calculate the optimal average fraction of pension wealth annuitized, the
distribution of liquid and illiquid non pension wealth is important. Because
such wealth data is not available in the our administrative data on occupa-
tional pension wealth, we use asset data from the Survey of Health, Age-
ing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Summary statistics characterizing90 HOW MUCH DO MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES
Table 2.6 – Tax rates for the lump-sum and income
The tax rates are for singles.
community and cantonal lump-sum tax federal lump sum tax
tax rate (in%) amount tax rate (in%) amount
4.66 up to 118500 0 up to 12600
6.99 next 41000 0.154 next 14800
9.32 next 67000 0.176 next 8500
11.65 next 82000 0.528 next 12000
13.98 next 95000 0.594 next 15000
16.31 next 109000 1.188 next 4800
18.64 next 149000 1.32 next 22100
20.97 next 286000 1.76 next 27000
23.3 next 285000 2.2 next 35900
25.63 next 449000 2.64 next 502300
27.96 next 584000 2.3 above 655000
30.29 above 2265500
community and cantonal income tax federal income tax
tax rate (in%) amount tax rate (in%) amount
0 up to 7750 0 up to 12600
4.66 next 4,100 0.77 next 14,800
6.99 next 4,100 0.88 next 8,500
9.32 next 6,700 2.64 next 12,000
11.65 next 8,200 2.97 next 15,000
13.98 next 9,500 5.94 next 4,800
16.31 next 10,900 6.6 next 22,100
18.64 next 14,900 8.8 next 27,000
20.97 next 28,600 11 next 35,900
23.3 next 28,500 13.2 next 502,300
25.63 next 44,900 11.5 above 655,000
27.96 next 58,400
30.29 above 226,550
the distribution of liquid and illiquid non-pension wealth are shown in tables
2.7 and 2.8, respectively.CHAPTER 2 91
Table 2.7 – Distribution of liquid non-pension wealth
The distribution is derived using SHARE-Swiss data from 2004. We use information
from all retired individuals with second pillar wealth below CHF 700,000.
liquid non-pension wealth % in wealth category
0 - 50,000 33.3
50,000 - 150,000 28.0
150,000 - 250,000 10.8
250,000 - 350,000 10.8
350,000 - 450,000 3.2
450,000 - 550,000 3.2
550,000 - 10.8
Table 2.8 – Distribution of illiquid non-pension wealth
The distribution is derived using SHARE-Swiss data from 2004, men only. We use
information from all retired individuals with second pillar wealth below 700,000 CHF.
illiquid non-pension wealth % in wealth category
0 38.7
1 - 96,000 3.2
96,000 - 58.1CHAPTER3
THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
Abstract
We examine incomplete annuity menus and background risk as possible drivers of
divergence from full annuitization. Contrary to what is often suggested in the
literature, we ﬁnd that full annuitization remains optimal if saving is possible. This
holds irrespective of whether real or only nominal annuities are available. Whenever
liquidity is desired, individuals save out of their annuity income to smooth
consumption shocks. Similarly, adding variable annuities to the menu does not
increase welfare signiﬁcantly. We calculate bounds on a bequest motive and default
risk of the annuity provider and ﬁnd that for realistic parameters full annuitization
remains optimal.
In this paper we model optimal decumulation of retirement wealth. Prior
research has shown that in simple stylized settings full annuitization of avail-
able wealth upon retirement is optimal for individuals who only face uncer-
tainty about their time of death. Yaari (1965) shows that risk averse agents
with intertemporally separable utility who are only exposed to longevity risk,
andwith nodesiretoleaveabequest, ﬁnditoptimaltohold theirentire wealth
in annuities if these are actuarially fair. This argument is extended by David-
off, Brown, and Diamond (2005) to cases with more risk factors and more gen-
eral utility functions. Full annuitization is optimal in these models since the
annuities generate a mortality credit that cannot be captured otherwise.
In the literature the policy recommendation that all pension wealth should
be annuitized has been challenged. These papers are partly motivated by the
9394 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
observation that very few individuals voluntarily purchase annuity products
when they reach the retirement age (Bütler and Teppa (2007) and Mitchell,
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999)). This empirical fact is often referred
to as the annuity puzzle. In this paper we focus on two of the main factors
that have been put forward to challenge the claim that full annuitization is
optimal. The ﬁrst factor in our analysis is that annuity menus are typically
incomplete. In many cases only nominal annuities are available rather than
annuities which hedge inﬂation risk or which give exposure to equity mar-
kets. So if only nominal annuities are sold, agents still incur inﬂation risk and,
on top of that, the nominal income in real terms is decreasing with age while
agents prefer a ﬂat consumption pattern. Such incomplete annuity menus
have been found to result in large welfare costs (Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell,
and Dus (2008) and Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010b)). The second factor
emphasizes that annuities are irreversible due to adverse selection and peo-
ple face borrowing constraints. This implies that annuities cannot be sold or
borrowed against if liquidity is needed, for instance in case of health costs or
breakdown of a durable consumption good. Such background risk has also
been claimed to reduce demand for annuities substantially below full annu-
itization (Turra and Mitchell (2008) and Pang and Warshawsky (2010)). In
contrast to these earlier results, we ﬁnd that the annuity puzzle is even deeper
than previously thought and incomplete annuity market and background risk
reduce annuity demand only slightly at most.
We analyze a comprehensive stochastic life cycle model from retirement
onwards. An individual optimally allocates a fraction of wealth to an annuity
at age 65. Every period an agent decides how much to consume and to save,
and how to allocate liquid wealth between stocks and a riskless bond. The
model includes the most important risks a retiree faces, namely longevity risk,
background risk, inﬂation risk, and capital market risk. Recently developed
numerical methods are used to solve the model.
We ﬁnd that almost full annuitization is optimal irrespective of whether
real or only nominal annuities are available. Neither incomplete annuity mar-
kets nor background risk lead to a sizeable reduction of optimal annuitiza-
tion levels. Individuals allocate approximately their entire wealth to annuities
and save out of their annuity income to insure against shocks. If background
risk hits them the saved liquid wealth is used as a buffer and consumption is
temporarily reduced to rebuild the buffer. So incomplete annuity markets do
reduce utility, but not the demand for annuities.
During retirement agents accumulate a sizeable amount of liquid wealth.CHAPTER 3 95
The median savings account is at its maximum (in real terms) around age 84
andamountstoapproximately 25%ofinitial wealth. Savingduringretirement
is driven by four factors: (1) redistribution of consumption to later periods
when the real value of the nominal annuity income is low. Furthermore peo-
ple save to hedge against (2) inﬂation risk and (3) background risk. Finally,
wealth accumulation allows people to beneﬁt from (4) the equity premium.
We disentangle these four reasons and ﬁnd that, the anticipatory motive to
save (1) is most important. Furthermore inﬂation risk induces a large amount
of precautionary savings; it increases the amount accumulated in the savings
account by 50%. Expenses due to background risk are a substantial reason for
saving, butlesser sothan inﬂation risk. The possibility to gain equityexposure
does not increase savings signiﬁcantly.
Similar to our paper Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) also examine
the effect of incomplete annuity markets on annuity demand. They ﬁnd that
the low annuity purchases in reality can only be reconciled by a large mis-
match between the desired consumption path and available annuity income
paths. In their paper they determine the optimal demand for a real annuity,
when the optimal real consumption pattern is not ﬂat. They assume a habit
formation utility function, which creates the mismatch between the desired
real consumption path (U-shaped or upward sloping) and available income
path (ﬂat). While incomplete annuity markets do explain the lack of full an-
nuitization, they cannot explain the low levels of annuitization found in real-
ity. Our paper examines a similar question but approaches it from a different
angle. We assume a desire for a smooth consumption path in real terms and
show that, even if only nominal annuities are available, full annuitization is
still optimal.
Another related paper, Pang and Warshawsky (2010), examines the effect of
healthrisk, butnot incomplete annuity markets, on the annuitization decision.
In their set up additional annuities can be bought every year and they restrict
their analysis to real annuities. They ﬁnd that early in retirement it is optimal
to annuitize nothing of your wealth and that from age seventy onwards the
optimal annuitization fraction increases with age. Full annuitization is only
reached for people in their early eighties. In contrast to their results, we ﬁnd
that full annuitization is optimal at retirement, allowing people to proﬁt from
the full mortality credit. The difference in results is due to their model setup,
namely that additional annuities can be bought every year. Pang and War-
shawsky (2010) state that annuities represent a speciﬁc asset class with its own
unique risk and return proﬁle. They model the annuitization decision essen-96 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
tially as a portfolio allocation decision between bonds, equity, and annuities.
Since the mortality credit increases with age, an annuity bought at a later age
earnsahigherreturn thananannuityboughtatage65. Inthatcaseindividuals
ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁrst invest in equity to receive the risk premium, but even-
tually annuities crowd out equity. Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008)
and Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008) also ﬁnd that the optimal annuitiza-
tion level increases with age. In contrast to these studies we ﬁnd that (almost)
full annuitization at retirement is optimal. The difference between our study
and those mentioned above is that we assume that annuitization can only take
place at retirement. Several arguments can be given to motivate this choice.
First of all in several countries the decision whether to annuitize your pen-
sion account or take a lump sum is, due to the tax legislation, to take place
at retirement. Furthermore mandatory annuitization of a fraction of wealth
at younger ages reduces adverse selection costs that are generated when the
annuity date can be chosen.1 Rothschild (2009) uses a long time series to test
for adverse selection in annuity markets and ﬁnds signiﬁcant selection effects.
These adverse selection costs are ignored in several papers. A third reason for
our assumption of a single conversion opportunity at retirement is that in re-
ality people make ﬁnancial decisions very infrequently rather than annually.
Finally Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009) show that the capabil-
ity of individuals to make ﬁnancial decisions declines dramatically at higher
ages, hence it seems optimal to make these decisions at younger ages when
a person is still able to do so. Adding to these reasons is the complexity of
solving such a life cycle model.
Even in case gradual annuitization is possible, the main conclusion of this
paper will not be affected. This conclusion is that background risk and incom-
plete annuity markets are generally not enough to explain less than full an-
nuitization. Clearly, restricting annuitization to take place at retirement only
reduces total annuitization over the life cycle. As a result, without this as-
sumption the annuity puzzle is even stronger.
In our model we treat the magnitude of background risk as independent of
age, which seems realistic for most European countries. As a robustness test
we assume that background risk follows an autoregressive process. A number
of papers have analyzed annuity demand from a US perspective where health
expensesare in general only partially covered by insurance policies (Turra and
Mitchell (2008) and Sinclair and Smetters (2004)). Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer,
1Direr (2010) examines how annuities should be taxed in face of adverse selection prob-
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andVanNieuwerburgh (2011)ﬁnd thatout ofpocket medicalexpensesreduce
the optimal annuity demand. In contrast, Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker
(2011b) conclude that in most cases health cost risk does not decrease optimal
annuity levels and whether full annuitization is optimal depends crucially on
the timing of the medical expenses. In case the health costs can already be
high early in retirement, then there is not enough time to build up a buffer to
insure against this health cost risk.
Furthermore we ﬁnd that adding variable annuities to the menu does not
increase welfare signiﬁcantly. This result contrasts the ﬁndings in Koijen, Ni-
jman, and Werker (2010b) and Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (1999), because
we assume that agents can invest in equity during retirement. In aforemen-
tioned papers, investment in equity, other than via the variable annuity, is not
allowed during the retirement period. Hence the only manner to get the eq-
uity premium is via the variable annuity, which results in higher welfare gains
from variable annuities, compared to our setup. Furthermore, Horneff, Mau-
rer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) also ﬁnds higher welfare gains, but as stated
before; they assume that additional annuities can be bought every year. Hence
agents invest partly in equity early in retirement, and gradually increase the
allocation to annuities.
In this paper we ignore a number of other potential drivers of annuity de-
mand. These include the presence of loads in annuity prices (see for instance
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999)), private information on
health status (Turra and Mitchell (2008)), high means tested beneﬁts (Bütler,
Peijnenburg, and Staubli (2011)), high pre-annuitized wealth levels (Dushi
and Webb (2004)), and family composition (Brown and Poterba (2000) and
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)). These extensions could be considered in sub-
sequent work. Furthermore, several behavioral explanations have been put
forward, for example framing of the annuity choice (Agnew, Anderson, Ger-
lach, and Szykman (2008), Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008a),
and Gazzale and Walker (2009)), mental accounting (Hu and Scott (2007)), and
complexity of the annuity product (Brown (2007)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
individual’s preferences, the setup of the ﬁnancial market, the benchmark pa-
rameters, and the numerical method to solve the dynamicprogramming prob-
lem. Section 3 contains detailed results for the benchmark case. Robustness
checks are subsequently performed in section 4 and in particular, we calculate
bounds on a possible bequest motive and default risk of the annuity provider
for which our results still hold. Section 5 concludes.98 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
3.1 The retirement phase life cycle model
3.1.1 Individual’s preferences and constraints
We consider a life cycle investor during retirement with age t ∈ 1,...,T, where
t = 1 is the retirement age and T is the maximum age possible. The indi-
vidual’s preferences are presented by a time-separable, constant relative risk
aversion utility function over real consumption, Ct. More formally, the objec-



















where β is the time preference discount factor, γ denotes the level of risk aver-
sion, and Ct is the real amount of wealth consumed at the beginning of period
t. The probability of surviving to age t, conditional on having lived to period
t − 1, is indicated by pt. We denote the nominal consumption as Ct = CtΠt,
where Πt is the price index at time t.
The individual invests a fraction wt in equity, which yields a gross nominal
return Rt+1 in year t + 1. The remainder of liquid wealth is invested in a
riskless bond and the return on this bond is denoted by R
f
t . The intertemporal
budget constraint of the individual is, in nominal terms, equal to
Wt+1 = (Wt + Yt − Bt − Ct)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt), (3.2)
where Wt is the amount of ﬁnancial wealth at time t, Yt is the annual nominal
annuity income, and the expenses due to background risk are indicated by Bt.
The timing of decisions is as follows. At retirement the agent decides which
fraction of wealth to invest in annuities.2 Subsequently, the individual re-
ceives annuity income and incurs expenses due to background risk. After this
exogenous shock, the agent decides how much to consume and subsequently
invests the remaining liquid wealth. In case the annuity income plus wealth at
the beginning of the period is insufﬁcient to pay the expenses and consume,
the individual receives a subsistence consumption level. In our benchmark
speciﬁcation this happens in 0.02% of the cases. The decision frequency for
the optimal consumption and asset allocation is annually.
2As discussed before, limiting the annuity decision to take place at retirement in effect
tests whether this additional constraint reduces optimal annuity demand. However, as we
will present later, even if agents arelimited to buy annuities at retirement, it is still optimal for
agentstofully annuitize. Ifwe wouldallow agentsto annuitizeatalaterage,this resultwould
not change and agents would annuitize 100%of wealth. The reason is that the mortality credit
is higher at more advanced ages, hence it is even more advantageous to buy annuities.CHAPTER 3 99
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and in-
vestment decisions. First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and
short-sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and ι′wt ≤ 1. (3.3)
Second, we impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (3.4)
which implies that the individual cannot borrow against future annuity in-
come to increase consumption today.
3.1.2 Financial market
Theassetmenuofaninvestor consists ofariskless one-yearnominal bondand
a risky stock. The return on the stock is normally distributed with an annual
mean nominal return  R and a standard deviation σR. The interest rate at time
t + 1 equals
rt+1 = rt + ar(rt −  r) + ǫr
t+1, (3.5)
where rt is the instantaneous short rate and ar indicates the mean reversion
coefﬁcient.  r is the long run mean of the instantaneous short rate, and ǫr
t is
normally distributed with a zero mean and standard deviation σr. The yield
on a risk-free bond with maturity h is a function of the instantaneous short










where A(h) and B(h) are scalars and h is the maturity of the bond. The real
yield is equal to the nominal yield minus expected inﬂation and an inﬂation
risk premium.
We model inﬂation, because in our analysis we want to examine optimal
annuitization levels in a world with inﬂation where only nominal annuities
are available. For the instantaneous expected inﬂation rate we assume
πt+1 = πt + aπ(πt −  π) + ǫπ
t+1, (3.7)
where aπ is the mean reversion parameter,  π is long run expected inﬂation,
and the error term ǫπ
t ∼ N(0,σ2
π). Subsequently the price index Π follows
from
Πt+1 = Πt exp(πt+1 + ǫΠ
t+1), (3.8)100 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
where ǫΠ
t ∼ N(0,σ2
Π) are the innovations to the price index. We assume there
is a positive relation between the expected inﬂation and the instantaneous
short interest rate, that is the correlation coefﬁcient between ǫr
t and ǫΠ
t is posi-
tive. The parameters we use are described in Section 2.3.
We consider single-premium immediate life-contingent annuities with real
or nominal payouts. Consequently, the annuity income is given by
Y = PR0A−1, (3.9)
where PR0 is the premium and A is the annuity factor. The single premium is
equal to the present value of expected beneﬁts paid to the annuitant and we














0 is the time zero yield on a zero coupon bond maturing at time
t. The interest rate term structure that is applied is either nominal or real
depending on the type of annuity. We study in Section 4 the effect of loads on
the annuitization decision.
The annuity factor for a variable annuity payout is similar to equation (4.9),
but R
(t)
0 is equal to the assumed interest rate (AIR), which is ﬁxed. The annual
annuity income depends on the return of the portfolio backing the annuity,
RA











The AIR determines whether, in expectation, the annuity payout stream in-
creases or decreases over time. The annuity income is constant over time in
case the AIR is equal to the return of the underlying portfolio, RA
t . If the AIR
is below RA
t , then the nominal income stream is upwards sloping over time.
In Figure 3.1 we display the mean annuity income in real terms for various
types of annuities. Naturally the real income stream from the real annuity
(solid line) is ﬂat, and throughout this paper we normalize this to unity. This
way of normalization allows for a simple comparison of various strategies.
Furthermore, we see that the real income stream from the nominal annuity
is decreasing over time, which is the dashed-dotted line. Early in retirement
the real income generated from the nominal annuity is higher than from the
real annuity. The income from the nominal annuity in real terms decreases
over time from about 1.4 to 0.5. In addition we see that the AIR has a largeCHAPTER 3 101
inﬂuence on the payout pattern of the variable annuity. When the AIR equals
the expected return on the portfolio backing the annuity minus the expected
inﬂation, the expected annuity income in real terms is ﬂat. If we look at the
dashed line which is the income pattern from a variable annuity with an AIR
of 2%, we see in expectation an increasing income in real terms.
Figure 3.1 – The annuity income levels in real terms for various types of annu-
ities
The ﬁgure displays the annuity income over the life cycle in real terms generated by
four types of annuities. We display the real income from a nominal, real and variable
annuity. In caseof the variableannuity we show the results for an assumed interest rate
of 2% and 4.52%. The latter AIR equals the expected nominal return on the portfolio
backing the annuity minus expected inﬂation.




























Variable annuity − AIR 2%  
Variable annuity − AIR 4.52% (expected real return )
Real annuity
Nominal annuity
We postulate that the expenses due to background risk are lognormally dis-
tributed with an annual mean  B and a standard deviation σB. Furthermore
we assume that these expenses do not exhibit autocorrelation.
3.1.3 Benchmark parameters
The previous sections present the speciﬁcation of the life cycle preferences and
the ﬁnancial market. In this section we set the parameter values for the bench-
mark case. In accordance with Pang and Warshawsky (2010) and Yogo (2009)
we set β, the time preference discount factor, equal to 0.96. The risk aver-
sion coefﬁcient γ is assumed equal to 5 for ease of comparison, since this is
equivalent to Pang and Warshawsky (2010) and close to the parameter choice
of Yogo (2009) and Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011).
Initial wealth is such that, if the individual would annuitize fully in real an-
nuities, the (real) income for the rest of the lifespan equals unity. We call this102 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity the Full Real Annu-
ity Income (FRAI). The mean expenses due to background risk are 10% of the
FRAI, with a standard deviation of 7%. Furthermore we choose a subsistence
consumption level of about 25% of the FRAI.3
The equity return is normally distributed with a mean annual nominal re-
turn of 8% and an annual standard deviation of 20%. The mean instantaneous
short rate is set equal to 4%, the standard deviation to 1%, and the mean re-
version parameter to -0.15. The inﬂation risk premium to determine the real
yield is 0.5%. The correlation between the instantaneous short rate with the
expected inﬂation is 0.40. The parameters on the inﬂation dynamics are taken
from Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010). They ﬁnd a mean inﬂation of 3.48%,
a standard deviation of the instantaneous inﬂation rate of 1.38%, a standard
deviation of the price index of 1.3%, and a mean reversion coefﬁcient equals
-0.165. The assumed interest rate is equal to 4%, which is similar to Horneff,
Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009)andKoijen, Nijman, and Werker(2010b).4
The portfolio linked to variable annuity consists 100% of equity. Furthermore
we will perform robustness checks to assess whether the results hold for dif-
ferent values for the individual preference parameters and ﬁnancial market
parameters. Time ranges from t = 1 to time T, which corresponds to age 65
and 100 respectively. The survival probabilities are the current male survival
probabilities in the US and are obtained from the Human Mortality Database.5
We assume a certain death at age 100.
3.1.4 Numerical method for solving the life cycle problem
Due to the richness and complexity of the model it cannot be solved analyt-
ically hence we employ numerical techniques instead. We use the method
3The dollar equivalents of these numbers are as follows. Median wealth at age 65 is
$335,000, which is the total of non-annuitized and annuitized wealth for a single, estimated
in Pang and Warshawsky (2010). We also perform the analysis for other wealth levels. The
annuity income if the entire wealth is invested in a real annuity is $22,645 (which is then
normalized to unity). The subsistence consumption level is $6000. Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer,
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) note that the payments under the government’s Supplemental
Security Income are about $7000 per year and they use $5000 as the minimum consumption
level. The mean expenses due to background risk are about $2250 and the standard deviation
is $1600.
4The US National Association of Insurance Commissionaires requires that the AIR may
not be higher than 5%. Furthermore Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) remark
that 4% is commonly used in the US insurance industry.
5We refer for further information to the website, www.mortality.org.CHAPTER 3 103
proposed by Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) and Carroll (2006)
with several extensions added by Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010). Brandt,
Goyal, Santa-Clara, andStroud (2005)adoptasimulation-based methodwhich
can deal with many exogenous state variables. In our case Xt = (R
f
t ,πt) is the
relevant exogenous state variable. Wealth acts as an endogenous state vari-
able. For this reason, following Carroll (2006), we specify a grid for wealth
after (annuity) income, expenses due to background risk, and consumption.
As a result, it is not required to do numerical rootﬁnding to ﬁnd the optimal
consumption decision.
Theoptimization problem issolved via dynamicprogramming and wepro-
ceed backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In
the last period the individual consumes all wealth available. The value func-









The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation at all other points in time,
Vt(Wt, R
f












In each period we ﬁnd the optimal asset weights by setting the ﬁrst order
condition equal to zero
Et(C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1) = 0, (3.14)
where C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal real consumption level. Because we solve the
optimization problem via backwards recursion we know C∗
t+1 at time t + 1.
Furthermore we simulate the exogenous state variables for N=1000 trajecto-
ries and T time periods hence we can calculate the realizations of the Euler
conditions, C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1. We regress these realizations on a poly-
nomial expansion in the state variables to obtain an approximation of the con-











In addition we employ a further extension introduced in Koijen, Nijman, and
Werker (2010). They found that the regression coefﬁcients θh are smooth func-
tions of the asset weights and consequently we approximate the regression
coefﬁcients θh by projecting them further on polynomial expansion in the as-
set weights:
θ′
h ≃ g(w)ψ. (3.16)104 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
The Euler condition must be set to zero to ﬁnd the optimal asset weights
˜ X′
pψg(w)′ = 0. (3.17)
3.2 Results for the benchmark case
In Section 3.2.1 to 3.2.5, we focus on the optimal allocation to nominal and
real annuities and in Section 3.2.6 we determine the welfare gains of adding
variable annuities to the annuity menu.
3.2.1 Optimal annuitization strategies at retirement
As shown by Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) full annuitization is opti-
mal if the annuity market is complete. However, the literature asserts that this
might not be the case if no annuity is available which offers equity exposure
or provides inﬂation protection and/or the agent is exposed to background
risk. Figure 3.2 presents the certainty equivalent consumption for various lev-
els of annuitization, conditional on optimal consumption and asset allocation
strategies. Inallcases(almost)fullannuitization isoptimal. Hencethe optimal
annuity demand is not lowered, even though annuity markets are incomplete
and agents face background risk.
The welfare gains over no annuitization are substantial. For instance, in
case real annuities are available, but there is no background risk, full annuiti-
zation leads to an increase in annual certainty equivalent consumption from
57% of the FRAI to 100% of the FRAI.6 If no annuities are available, welfare
is thus reduced by about 43%. The magnitude of these welfare gains are in
line with the ﬁndings in Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) and Mitchell,
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999). For many individuals part of their
wealth will be annuitized for institutional reasons, for example in the form of
social beneﬁt payments or Deﬁned Beneﬁt pensions. The results show that an
increase in the level of annuitization from say 50% to 100% also brings about
a very substantial welfare gain.
Markets may be considered to be even more incomplete when only nomi-
nal annuities are available. Individuals might be induced to decrease annuity
demandto protect against inﬂation risk and to shift income in early retirement
6As described in Section 2.3 we set, for ease of comparison, the initial wealth such that,
if the individual would annuitize fully in real annuities, the (real) income for the rest of the
lifespan equals unity. We call this annuity income, the Full Real Annuity Income (FRAI).CHAPTER 3 105
to later years when the real value of the annuity income is lower. The dotted
line displays the certainty equivalent consumption when an agent can only
buy a nominal annuity and does not face background risk. Again we ﬁnd that
full annuitization is optimal. This implies that the fact that the annuity mar-
ketis incomplete doesnot have a material impact on the optimal annuitization
level, given that we allow saving from annuity income.
Figure 3.2 – Optimal annuitization levels
The ﬁgure displays the certainty equivalent consumption for the life cycle model with
and without background risk and nominal or real annuity income. Equity investment
ofliquid wealthisincludedin themodel. Theoptimal annuitization strategyis thelevel
that generates the highest certainty equivalent consumption. All numbers are relative
to the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity.










































Real annuity − with background risk
Real annuity − without background risk
Nominal annuity − with background risk
Nominal annuity − without background risk
The results on the optimal annuity demand are also hardly affected by the
presence of background risk. The solid line in Figure 3.2 shows that (almost)
full annuitization is optimal in this case as well. Obviously, background risk
reduces the attainable utility levels, but the curves are still essentially increas-
ing: more annuitization leads to more utility. Later we will see that the main
difference with the case without background risk isthat the agentaccumulates
wealth out of annuity income to cover shocks in background risk and plans
consumption to rebuild these buffers when needed.
Pang and Warshawsky (2010) ﬁnd that in a life cycle model with health
costs as background risk, annuity demand increases due to background risk.
The reason for this contrasting result is that they do not model annuitization106 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
as a one-time decision that needs to be made at retirement age, but optimize
annually over the equity-bond-annuity portfolio. In effect, the annuitization
decision is modeled as a repeated portfolio allocation decision. Health costs
are an additional risk factor which drives households to shift demand from
risky to riskless assets, namely from equity to bonds and annuities. Then as
a consequence of the superiority of annuities over bonds, annuity demand in-
creases due to health costs. For the reasons outlined in the introduction, we
model annuitization as an irreversible decision at retirement and ﬁnd that it
is optimal to annuitize fully if agents save adequately out of the annuity in-
come. The beneﬁts of insurance against longevity risk and the mortality credit
outweigh the reduction in liquidity and less ability to get equity exposure at
short horizons.
Note that we examine the fraction of total wealth that optimally should be
annuitized, which consists of both pre-annuitized and non-annuitized wealth.
The pre-annuitized wealth level mostly consists of social security income and
private pensions. Given that (almost) full annuitization in real annuities is
optimal, this can consist of for instance 80% pre-annuitized wealth and 20%
liquid wealth but also of 50% pre-annuitized wealth and 50% liquid. But in
any case (almost) all liquid wealth should be annuitized. In Section 3.2.5 we
explore the optimal annuitization levels for varying pre-annuitized and liquid
wealth levels and we assume that the pre-annuitized wealth level consists of
inﬂation-indexed income. If in that case a real annuity is available the results
do not change, but just have to interpreted differently. If the pre-annuitized
fraction is 80% and the optimal total annuity level is 95%, than 75% of liquid
wealth should be annuitized. If 50% is pre-annuitized this fraction is 90% of
liquid wealth. However, this reasoning does not hold if on top of this pre-
annuitized income only nominal annuities can be bought. Furthermore, the
height of the total wealth level can have an effect on optimal annuity demand,
because then the background risk and minimum consumption level are rela-
tively higher or lower compared to total wealth.
3.2.2 Consumption, wealth, and asset allocation paths over
the life cycle
The optimal consumption and wealth trajectories including the asset alloca-
tion rules are illustrated in Figure 3.3. This ﬁgure presents the median con-
sumption, wealth, and asset allocation for three cases: (1) no annuitization, (2)
100% in nominal annuities, and (3) 100% in real annuities.CHAPTER 3 107
Figure 3.3 – Optimal real consumption, optimal real wealth, and optimal asset
allocation
Panel (a)displays the optimal realconsumption for the optimal realannuitization level,
optimal nominal annuitization level, and without annuities. Panel (b) displays the op-
timal liquid real wealth for the optimal real annuitization level, optimal nominal opti-
mization level, and without annuities. Panel (c) presents the optimal fraction invested
in the risky asset for the optimal real annuitization level, optimal nominal optimiza-
tion level, and without annuities. Expenses due to background risk are included in the
model. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100%
is invested in a real annuity.
(a) Real consumption





































median optimal consumption if 100% is invested in a real annuity
median optimal consumption if no wealth is invested in an annuity
median optimal consumption if 100% is invested in a nominal annuity
(b) Real liquid wealth
































median optimal real wealth if 100% is invested in a real annuity
median optimal real wealth if no wealth is annuitized
median optimal real wealth if 100% is invested in a nominal annuity
(c) Asset allocation



































median optimal fraction invested in equity if 100% is invested in a real annuity
median optimal fraction invested in equity if no wealth is annuitized
median optimal wealth fraction in equity if 100% is invested in a nominal annuity108 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
Figure 3.3a shows that in case (1) and (2) the optimal consumption path
is decreasing over time. This reﬂects the fact that if the longevity risk in the
real consumption level is not hedged, agents do not plan much consumption
at ages where the probability is high that one will have passed away. If real
annuities are used, inﬂation risk can be hedged and the planned consump-
tion path is approximately ﬂat (in real terms) because of the fact that the time
preference parameter and interest rates approximately coincide. Early in re-
tirement, consumption is reduced to build up a buffer against expenses due to
background risk.
Figure 3.3b displays that only a relatively small amount of liquid wealth
is accumulated if real annuities are available. That level of liquid wealth is
sufﬁcient to cover for unexpected shocks in background risk, but there are
no anticipatory savings due to inﬂation needed. The median liquid wealth
trajectory is very different if nominal annuities are used. In that case the in-
dividual saves substantially out of the nominal annuity income and a median
real wealth of 3.2 times the FRAI is attained at the age of 80. This liquid cap-
ital is needed to have sufﬁcient real consumption if the agent happens to get
very old. This is in accordance with Love and Perozek (2007), who ﬁnd that
background risk increases the optimal amount of liquid assets.
Panel C of Figure 3.3 shows that the optimal fraction of liquid wealth in-
vested in the risky asset, if a person has annuitized nothing, is about 26% and
is ﬁxed over time. Instead the optimal fraction is 100% if an individual has
invested optimally in a real annuity. We see that the optimal fraction depends
negatively on the fraction of liquid wealth compared to total wealth (liquid
wealth plus discounted value of annuity income). This result is in line with
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
3.2.3 Savings strategies out of the real annuity income
The main idea of this paper is that full annuitization remains optimal if agents
save optimally out of their annuity income. In this section we examine this
savings mechanism further. Figure 3.4 displays the optimal real savings for
varying real wealth levels, for the ages 70, 80, and 90. If an agent has a wealth
level of 1 times the FRAI and is 90 years old (crosses), savings are about 0.08
times the FRAI. Put differently, the individual saves 8% out of his real annuity
income to increase his buffer. So even if an agent is 90-years old, if the buffer
is insufﬁcient, savings are positive to increase it. Furthermore we see that the
amount of savings decreases with age, for a given wealth level. For a wealthCHAPTER 3 109
level of one FRAI, the real savings are 17% for a 70 year old, 11% for a 80-year
old, and 8% for a 90-year old.
From Figure 3.4 we can also derive the effect of background risk on the
amount of savings, which is illustrated by the arrows. Consider a 90-year
old agent with liquid wealth equal to one FRAI. If this agent is hit by back-
ground risk and needs to pay expenses equal to 0.2 times the FRAI, his wealth
drops from 1 to 0.8 (left horizontal arrow). As a reaction to this the individual
increases savings from 8% of his annuity income to 20%. This increase in sav-
ings is substantial, because the buffer that the retiree started with was not that
high. If the agent has more wealth, the reaction is less if the retiree is hit by
the same background risk expenses, because the buffer is already high. This
can be seen from the arrows on the right, the speed with which the buffer is
rebuild falls with the wealth level. As a side effect, the ﬁgures illustrate the
saving behavior of those with low wealth. A 90-year old with a real annu-
ity income and wealth less than 1.2 times the FRAI should still save to hedge
against background risk and inﬂation risk.
Figure 3.4 – Optimal savings for varying wealth levels when 100% is allocated
to a real annuity
This ﬁgure shows the optimal real savings for varying levels of liquid real wealth if an
agent invested his entire wealth in a real annuity. We show the real savings for the ages
70, 80, and 90. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI, which is the real annuity income
if 100% is invested in a real annuity.
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3.2.4 Savings strategies out of the nominal annuity income
Figure 3.5 analyzes in more detail the most striking result of Figure 3.3; the
capital accumulation in case of nominal annuitization. Individuals save out
of the nominal annuity income for four different reasons. A ﬁrst reason is
real consumption smoothing, because even deterministic inﬂation erodes the
real consumption that can be obtained from the nominal annuity income. A
second reason relates to inﬂation risk. Inﬂation risk generates precautionary
savings as inﬂation risk can be seen in this setting as a (partly) unhedgeable
background risk. The third reason is precautionary saving to hedge for the
background risk in our model. The ﬁnal motivation is to accumulate capital
to capture the equity risk premium.
Figure 3.5 – Optimal real wealth trajectories when 100% is allocated to a nomi-
nal annuity
Thisﬁgureshows theoptimal liquid realwealth trajectoriesforﬁvevariationsof thepa-
rameter values. These are the wealth paths for an agent who invested his entire wealth
at 65 in a nominal annuity. The liquid wealth trajectories are for the case where 100%
is invested in a nominal annuity. In the model setup where inﬂation risk is excluded,
the inﬂation level is ﬁxed at 3.48%. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI, which is the
real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity. We set this Full Real Annuity
Income equal to unity.




































Figure 3.5 presents the optimal median wealth path for ﬁve different spec-
iﬁcations of the model to disentangle the different reasons for capital accu-
mulation mentioned above. The solid line is the median wealth path for theCHAPTER 3 111
full model, which is the same as we displayed in Figure 3.3b. It’s maximum
value is about 3.2 FRAI at age 82. To disentangle the four effects we remove
each motive for savings separately. We examine the effect of the anticipatory
motive by reducing the nominal interest rate and the equity return by 3.48%
(the benchmark expected inﬂation rate) and setting the mean inﬂation equal
to zero while keeping the standard deviation of the instantaneous inﬂation
rate equal to 1.38%. If no deterministic inﬂation is incorporated (dashed line)
the maximum amount of wealth accumulated drops to 1.2 times the FRAI.7
Hence the largest part of the saving is due to the ﬁrst motive; agents want
to shift income from early in retirement to later. Furthermore we see that the
shape of the path of wealth differs substantially. The reason is that if the mean
inﬂation is zero, agents do not need to accumulate large amounts of wealth
in the beginning of retirement and dissave at later ages, to be able to have a
smooth consumption pattern over the life. They only need a buffer against
background risk and inﬂation risk, and to get equity exposure. This buffer
is accumulated gradually over time to get a smooth consumption pattern. It
is evident that hence the level of inﬂation explains a substantial part of the
results, but the other three factors also induce savings.
In order to examine the effect of inﬂation risk, we set the standard deviation
of the instantaneous inﬂation rate and the standard deviation of the price in-
dex to zero. The optimal maximum savings amount decreases with some 25%
if inﬂation risk is taken out (from 3.2 times the FRAI to 2.4 times the FRAI).
The level of precautionary savings is enhanced by the persistency in inﬂation.
The median savings is reduced from approximately 3.2 times the FRAI if
all risk factors are included to 2.7 times the full real annuity income, if agents
cannot invest in equity. We examine this effect by assuming that agents can
only invest in the 1-year nominal bond. Hence the savings are increased sub-
stantially to be able to obtain the equity risk premium.
If we assume agents do not face shocks due to background risk, the amount
of savings is slightly lower than 2.9 times the FRAI. Similarly, Palumbo (1999)
and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010a) ﬁnd that uncertain medical expenses
increases the amount of precautionary savings. In sum, an individual could
also simply annuitize less to keep wealth liquid and extract wealth from the
savings account to insure against inﬂation shocks. However, we ﬁnd that in-
stead it is optimal to annuitize fully to receive the mortality credit and subse-
7Note that this optimal wealth path is equal to the optimal wealth path when an agent
receives an annuity income which is increasing with the expected mean annual inﬂation. In
several countries these increasing annuities are available, but not sold that often.112 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
quently save out of the annuity income.
The previous paragraph shows different wealth paths for an agent who in-
vested everything in a nominal annuity, these where median wealth paths.
However, it is also interesting to consider consumption/savings strategies for
wealth levels above or below the median. Figure 3.6 displays the optimal con-
sumption for varying wealth levels at age 70, 80, and 90, depending on the
different risk factors that an agent faces. Note that in Figure 3.4, we display
the real savings on the y-axis, while in Figure 3.6 we display real consump-
tion. The dots are for the benchmark speciﬁcation, hence agents save due
to deterministic inﬂation, inﬂation risk, background risk, and to get equity
exposure. The real wealth level displayed on the horizontal axes is the re-
maining wealth after the agent payed his expenses due to background risk
and received the annuity income. If we look at the upper panel for a 70-year
old, we see that for the benchmark case if an agent has a wealth level of 1.5
times the FRAI, consumption is equal to 0.82 times the FRAI. Furthermore, we
see that the consumption increases in the wealth level. If an agent cannot in-
vest in equity, consumption is similar for wealth levels below twice the FRAI,
but less for higher wealth levels. The reason for the lower consumption level
is that the agent wants to have a larger amount of liquid wealth to invest in
equity. When we compare the real consumption levels when an agent does
not face background risk (crosses) with the benchmark case, we see that the
consumption level is lower due to the background risk. Furthermore we see
that the real consumption level is reduced less due to inﬂation risk. If there
is no inﬂation risk (squares), agents with a wealth level of 1.5 consume about
0.87, compared to 0.82 when individuals do face inﬂation risk. However if
agents do not have an anticipatory motive to save (circles), they increase con-
sumption levels substantially. Moreover these patterns of differences in real
consumption, for different speciﬁcations of the model is similar for a 70, 80, or
90 year-old. This can be seen by comparing the three panels of Figure 3.6.
The middle panel of Figure 3.6 shows the optimal real consumption for
80-year olds and the lower panel for a 90-year old. There are several things
apparent from these graphs. First of all, we see that if the real wealth level is
low, agents consume this entire amount. For instance, if the wealth level of
a 80-year old is about 0.5 times the FRAI, the individual consumes this entire
amount. Second, when comparing the three panels, we see that for a liquid
real wealth level of 1.5, the real consumption negatively depends on age. The
reason is that the nominal income in real terms decreases over time and the
desired real consumption level falls because agents discount the future moreCHAPTER 3 113
Figure 3.6 – Optimal consumption for varying wealth levels when 100% is allo-
cated to a nominal annuity
The above panel displays the optimal real consumption for a 70 year old for several
liquid real wealth levels. These consumption/wealth strategies for an agent who in-
vested is entire wealth at 65 in a nominal annuity. The liquid real wealth levels are after
annuity income and expenses due to background risk. Hence the real wealth level is
the disposable wealth level. The middle panel shows the optimal real consumption
levels per real wealth level for a 80 year old and the lower panel for 90 year old. The
parameters are that of the benchmark set up. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI,
which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity. We set this Full
Real Annuity Income equal to unity.
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heavily due to the probability of dying.
3.2.5 Optimalannuitylevelsforvaryingpre-annuitizedwealth
and liquid wealth levels
In the previous sections we showed the optimal annuitization, consumption,
and savings levels for the benchmark total wealth level which is 15 times the
FRAI (this is equivalent to $335,000). We displayed the optimal annuity de-
mand as a fraction of the total wealth level, because most papers present the
empirical annuity levels in this way (Dushi and Webb (2004) and Pang and
Warshawsky (2010)). We ﬁnd that (almost) full annuitization of total wealth
is optimal, where total wealth consists of pre-annuitized pension wealth (so-
cial security and deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth) and liquid ﬁnancial wealth.
However, wedidnotshowoptimal annuitization asafraction ofliquidwealth,
which off course is lower than that of total wealth if some wealth is already
pre-annuitized. In Table 3.1 we present the optimal annuitization fractions of
total and liquid wealth for varying liquid wealth and pre-annuitized wealth
levels. The pre-annuitized wealth is assumed to be an inﬂation-indexed (pen-
sion)incomeandtheagentoptimallychooseswhich partofhisﬁnancialwealth
to invest in a real annuity. So the optimal annuity levels are presented in two
different formats: the numbers without brackets display the (1) optimal per-
centage in annuities as a fraction of total wealth and the numbers between
brackets show the (2) optimal percentage in annuities as a fraction of liquid
ﬁnancial wealth. First of all, we see that the optimal annuitization level as a
fraction of total wealth is almost 100%. Naturally, when displayed as a per-
centage of liquid ﬁnancial wealth it is lower, but still the annuity levels are
much higher than found in reality. The empirical distribution of wealth for
the 2nd income decile is a bit more than 2 times the FRAI ($50,000) of ﬁnan-
cial wealth and 6.6 ($150,000) in pre-annuitized wealth.8 As we can see in
Table 3.1, these retirees optimally invest 72% of their liquid wealth in annu-
ities, on top of the 75% of wealth that is already annuitized. Hence the optimal
annuitization level as a percentage of total wealth is 93%. The liquid wealth
level and pre-annuitized wealth level for an agent with a median income is
6.6 ($150,000) and 8.8 ($200,000) respectively. This agent optimally annuitizes
88% of his liquid wealth.
In Table 3.2 we show the optimal annuity levels when agents can invest
8We use the numbers from Pang and Warshawsky (2010), who calculate these levels on a
household basis which we divide by the average household size.CHAPTER 3 115
Table 3.1 – Optimal real annuitization levels (%) for varying pre-annuitized and
liquid wealth levels
This table reports the optimal annuity levels (in %) in a real annuity. The pre-annuitized
wealth level is an inﬂation-indexed pension income. The number without brackets is
the optimal annuity demand as a fraction of total wealth and the number between
brackets is the optimal annuity demand as a fraction of liquid ﬁnancial wealth. For
instance, if the pre-annuitized wealth is 6.6 and liquid wealth is 2.2, then 75% of total
wealth is pre-annuitized. If then the optimal annuity level is 93%, this means that
the optimal annuity demand as a percentage of liquid wealth is 72%. All numbers
are relative to the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real
annuity. The rest of the parameters are as in the benchmark case.
Pre-annuitized Financial wealth
wealth 2.2($50k) 4.4($100k) 6.6($150k) 8.8($200k) 11($250k) 13.2($300k)
6.6 ($150k) 93 94 94 95 96 97
(72) (85) (88) (91) (94) (96)
8.8 ($200k) 94 94 95 96 97 97
(70) (82) (88) (92) (95) (95)
11 ($250k) 94 95 96 97 97 97
(65) (83) (89) (93) (94) (95)
13.2 ($300k) 95 96 97 97 97 97
(64) (84) (91) (93) (93) (94)
their liquid ﬁnancial wealth only in nominal annuities. Note that now the
optimal annuitization level of total wealth consists of both a real annuity (pre-
annuitized wealth) and a nominal annuity (liquid wealth). In this case we
ﬁnd similar results, the annuity levels are very high and incomplete annuity
markets and background risk cannot explain the annuity puzzle.
Furthermore we see that when the total wealth level is lower, the optimal
annuity demand is a bit lower. The reason is that an agent with a lower wealth
level needs to keep a larger fraction liquid at the beginning of retirement to
have the same absolute buffer against background risk. In addition, the opti-
mal annuity demand differs depending on whether the agent can invest in a
nominal or a real annuity, on top of his inﬂation-indexed pension income. The
optimal annuity level as a fraction of total wealth when an agent has 6.6 pre-
annuitized and 2.2 liquid wealth is 93% if he has a real annuity available and
97% if he can only invest in a nominal annuity. The nominal annuity is more
attractive, because it generates a higher real income early in retirement so that
the agent can save quicker to have a sufﬁcient buffer against background risk
shocks. Hence the agent needs to reduce the optimal annuity demand less
compared to the real annuity.116 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
Table 3.2 – Optimal nominal annuitization levels (%) for varying pre-annuitized
and liquid wealth levels
This table reports the optimal annuity levels (in %) in a nominal annuity. The pre-
annuitized wealth level is an inﬂation-indexed pension income. The number without
bracketsis the optimal annuity demandas a fraction of total wealth and the number be-
tween brackets is the optimal annuity demand as a fraction of liquid ﬁnancial wealth.
For instance, if the pre-annuitized wealth is 6.6 and liquid wealth is 2.2, then 75% of
total wealth is pre-annuitized. If then the optimal annuity level is 97%, this means that
the optimal annuity demand as a percentage of liquid wealth is 88%. Note that the
optimal annuity percentage as a fraction of total wealth is for the combination of both
the real annuity (pre-annuitized wealth) and the nominal annuity (liquid wealth). All
numbers are relative to the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested
in a real annuity. The rest of the parameters are as in the benchmark case.
Pre-annuitized Financial wealth
wealth 2.2($50k) 4.4($100k) 6.6($150k) 8.8($200k) 11($250k) 13.2($300k)
6.6 ($150k) 97 97 100 100 100 100
(88) (91) (100) (100) (100) (100)
8.8 ($200k) 97 99 100 100 100 100
(85) (97) (100) (100) (100) (100)
11 ($250k) 97 99 100 100 100 100
(82) (97) (100) (100) (100) (100)
13.2 ($300k) 97 99 100 100 100 100
(75) (93) (100) (100) (100) (100)
3.2.6 Welfare gains of variable annuities
The literature has examined welfare gains due to variable annuities (see, e.g.,
Koijen, Nijman, andWerker(2010b), and Horneff, Maurer, andStamos (2008)).
Thissection examineswhetheraddingvariableannuitiestothemenuincreases
welfare sizeably in our setup with post-retirement savings. Table 3.3 displays
the welfare gains from allocating the optimal amount to a variable and a real
annuity, compared to only a real annuity. We see that the welfare gains are at
most 1.5%. Hence adding a variable annuity to the menu does not lead to a
large increase of welfare if agents save out of their annuity income to invest in
equity. The combined optimal annuity portfolio for an individual who faces
background risk is only 10% in a variable annuity and the remaining wealth
in a real annuity. The reason is that individuals can save out of their annuity
income to get equity exposure and real annuities provide a much better hedge
against inﬂation risk than equity-linked annuities.
Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010b) ﬁnd an optimal allocation of 40% to
variable annuities. However, they do not include equity in the post-retirementCHAPTER 3 117
Table 3.3 – Welfare gains (in %) of investing the optimal amount in a combina-
tion of variable and real annuities compared to only real annuities
The assumed interest rate (AIR) is either 4% or 2%. The rest of the parameters are as in
the benchmark case.
AIR 4% AIR 2%
background risk included
welfare gain 1.2% 1.1%
optimal real/variable annuity 90/10 90/10
background risk excluded
welfare gain 1.5% 1.3%
optimal real/variable annuity 85/15 85/15
asset menu. Hence, the only way in which agents can get equity exposure, is
via a variable annuity. For this reason the welfare gains that they ﬁnd are
much higher than ours. Similar reasoning holds for the contrasting results
with Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (1999). Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Sta-
mos (2009) ﬁnd a welfare gain of 6% at age 80 and 30% at age 40 of investing in
variable annuities instead of nominal annuities. They, however, assume that
the asset allocation of the portfolio linked to the variable annuity can vary
over time and additional annuities can be bought every year. This strand of
literature includes annuities in the asset allocation menu, and agents decide
how much to invest in equity/bonds/annuities annually (Horneff, Maurer,
and Stamos (2008) and Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2006)). In that
case agents do not fully annuitize at age 65, to invest in equity. As agents get
older they gradually invest all their wealth in annuities, as they become more
attractive than equity due to the mortality credit.
3.3 Robustness tests on individual characteristics
and ﬁnancial market parameters
The evidence in the previous section suggests that background risk and an
incomplete annuity menu have at most only a small effect on optimal annuiti-
zation levels. Instead of annuitizing only partially to get equity exposure and
insure against background risk and inﬂation risk, it is found to be optimal to
allocate (almost) all your wealth to an annuity and save out of the annuity
income when desired. However, there are other factors that might inﬂuence
optimal annuitization behavior that we did not consider until now. Namely,118 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
retirees might want to leave a bequest for their heirs. However, if all wealth is
annuitized it can be more difﬁcult to leave a substantial bequest via saving out
of the annuity income. Another reason to decrease annuity demand can po-
tentially be default risk of the insurer. Especially due to the credit crisis, more
consumers are aware of the risks of the annuity provider defaulting. In this
section, we calculate bounds on a possible bequest motive and default risk of
the insurer, such that our results still hold. Furthermore, we test whether our
results are robust to alternative individual characteristics and ﬁnancial mar-
ket parameters. We present results for two benchmark cases: An individual
who can freely invest in a real annuity and someone who can freely invest
in a nominal annuity. In all cases the other assumptions, including those on
background risk, are as before, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
3.3.1 Model speciﬁcation: bounds on the bequest motive
We investigate the robustness of the results when agents have a bequest mo-
tive. The desire to leave a bequest might induce agents to decrease annuity
demand to have wealth liquid to leave as a bequest. However, the evidence
on whether agents indeed have a bequest motive is mixed (Ameriks, Caplin,
Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011), Brown (2001), and Love, Palumbo, and
Smith (2009)). Following Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2011) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010a), we model the bequest motive










where ¯ w is the strength of the bequest motive and φ is the prevalence in the
population of an bequest motive. φ determines the curvature of the bequest
motive and hence the extent to which bequests are a luxury good.9 A bequest
motive can give individuals incentives to annuitize less, because in case of
9The optimal bequest in a simpliﬁed version of the model provides a better understand-
ing of the meaning of the bequest parameters. In a riskless world the optimal solution
can be obtained analytically: Assume an agent starts with an amount of wealth W, does
not face longevity risk, and the time preference discount rate is zero. Each year the indi-
vidual consumes C for T years and derives utility equal to C1−γ/(1 − γ). At death, the
retiree leaves a bequest B equal to (W − CT) and derives utility from bequest equal to
( ¯ w/(1 − γ))(φ + Bt ¯ w)
1−γ. The agent chooses C optimally, to maximize total utility from
consumption and the bequest. When differentiating total utility with respect to consumption,
the resulting optimal consumption is C = (W + ¯ wφ)/( ¯ w + T) and the optimal bequest is
B = ¯ w(C − φ). Hence the agent leaves a bequest to cover ¯ w years of spending for the heir atCHAPTER 3 119
early death, the retiree may not have had sufﬁcient time to build up enough
wealth to bequeath. If an agent dies at more advanced ages, the individual
saves out of the annuity income to leave a bequest as before.
Figure 3.7 shows for which values of the two bequest parameters ( ¯ w and φ)
full annuitization is still optimal. The effect of both parameters on the optimal
annuity demand is in opposite directions. A higher strength of the bequest
motive ¯ w gives an incentive to annuitize less, while a higher luxury good pa-
rameter φ increases the incentives to fully annuitize. Panel (a) presents the
results in case that nominal annuities are available. Wee see that in almost all
cases full annuitization remains optimal. Only when the luxury parameter φ
is 0.09 times the FRAI ($2000) or lower and the strength of the bequest motive
φ is above 16, the optimal annuity demand falls. De Nardi, French, and Jones
(2010a) ﬁnd a ¯ w (strength of the bequest motive) equal to 2.5 and Ameriks,
Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) estimate a ¯ w of 16 and a luxury
parameters φ of 0.22 times the FRAI ($5000). For these parameters, full annu-
itization in a nominal annuity is optimal. It is optimal to annuitize your entire
wealth and save to build up a buffer and leave it is as a bequest.
Panel (b) in Figure 3.7 displays the bounds on the parameters for the be-
questmotive, when an agentcan buy real annuities. In thiscase we seethat for
more values of the bequest parameters, full annuitization is sub-optimal. The
reason is that the annuity income in the ﬁrst years of retirement is higher for
the nominal annuity than for the real annuity. The nominal annuity is front-
loaded in real terms. For this reason the agent can build up a sufﬁcient buffer
faster when receiving a nominal annuity income, to leave as a bequest in case
of death already early in retirement. When comparing the bounds to the esti-
mated parameters of Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011),
we ﬁnd that full annuitization is no longer optimal. In a riskless world with
these parameters, the optimal consumption is about 0.51 FRAI ($11,500) and
the optimal bequest is almost 4.6 times FRAI ($105,000). The agent reduces his
annual consumption from 0.74 FRAI ($16,750) to 0.51 FRAI ($11,500) to leave
this bequest.
an annual expenditure level (C−φ), the amount by which his own optimal annual consump-
tion exceeds the threshold φ. If W is too low to ensure an income stream for the heir higher
than φ for ¯ w years, no bequest is left.120 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
Figure 3.7 – Optimal annuitization for different parameters of the bequest mo-
tive
Panel (a) displays the bounds on the bequest motive parameters for which full annu-
itization holds, when an agent can invest in a nominal annuity. Panel (b) displays the
bounds on the bequest motive parameters for which full annuitization holds, when an
agent can invest in a real annuity. A higher strength of the bequest motive ¯ w gives in-
centives to annuitize less, while a higher luxury parameter φ gives incentives to annu-
itize more. The other parameters are those of the benchmark. All numbers are relative
to the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity.
(a) Bequest motive: nominal annuity
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3.3.2 Financial market parameter: bounds on default risk
In our benchmark case, we implicitly assumed that the probability of default
of the annuity provider iszero and thus the retiree always receives the annuity
income. However, there does exist the possibility that the annuity provider
defaults, which can be another reason why agents might not want to annuitize
fully, so that our results do not hold. We assume that in case the annuity
provider defaults, the agent recovers part of the present value of the annuity.
First of all, after a default, part of the liabilities of the company can be covered.
Second, if the amount recovered from the insurer is less than the guarantee of
the state, then this amount is supplemented up to the guaranteed amount. In
most states in the U.S. at least $100,000 is guaranteed and the maximum is
$500,000 (Babbel and Merril (2006)). So even if the insurer goes bankrupt and
the recovery value is low, the annuitant gets at least $100,000 of the present
value of the annuity back. We assume that the agent gets a guarantee from the
state of $100,000, which is 4.4 times the FRAI.
In Figure 3.8 we display the bounds on the default risk parameters for
which full annuitization holds. The vertical axes in Figure 3.8 speciﬁes which
fraction is recovered in case of default. If this recovery rate times the present
value of the annuity is less than 4.4 times the FRAI ($100,000) (and the present
value of the annuity is more than $100,000), we assume the state guarantee
supplements this amount up to 4.4 ($100,000). The horizontal axes displays
the default probability. First of all we see that the bounds differ substantially
depending on the type of annuity the agent has; nominal or real. If an agent
has a real annuity income, almost always full annuitization is optimal, while if
the individual can only invest in a nominal annuity, the optimal annuitization
can potentially fall if the default probability gets high. The reason is that the
nominal annuity is less welfare enhancing than the real annuity, hence there
are more incentives to decrease the annuity level when the default risk is high.
Second we see that the fraction of wealth recovered is important for the op-
timal annuity demand, which is similar to the ﬁndings of Babbel and Merril
(2006). In this paper we normalized all numbers in terms of the Full Real An-
nuity Income, but the wealth that was used as a basis is $335,000, which is the
median total wealth level at 65. Hence 33.5% of the value of the annuity at
65 is guaranteed by the state. Furthermore Moody’s reports that the default
probabilities for corporates up to a rating of Baa to be 16 bp.122 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
Figure 3.8 – Optimal annuitization with default risk
Panel (a) displays the bounds on the default risk parameters for which full annuiti-
zation holds, when an agent can invest in a nominal annuity. Panel (b) displays the
bounds on the default risk parameters for which full annuitization holds, when an
agent can invest in a real annuity. A higher default probability gives incentives to an-
nuitize less, while a higher guarantee gives incentives to annuitize more. The other
parameters are those of the benchmark.
(a) Default risk: nominal annuity
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3.3.3 Other robustness tests
As a ﬁrst robustness check we increase the equity premium to an expected
stock return of 10% rather than 8%. Not surprisingly this implies a reduction
in annuity demand, but the numerical effect is small. The optimal demand
for real annuities reduces from 96% to 93%. For the nominal annuity case,
full optimization always remains optimal. As a subsequent test we doubled
the subsistence consumption level to examine whether this alters the optimal
level, Table 3.4 shows that this is hardly the case.
The background risk in our benchmark case consists of i.i.d. shocks, while
as a robustness test we assume the risk follows an autoregressive process with
an AR(1) coefﬁcient of 0.9. The mean and standard deviation of the expenses
due to background risk are kept the same as in the benchmark case. We ﬁnd
that even if the process of the background risk is highly persistent, high annu-
ity levels are still optimal
Table 3.4 – Robustness tests
The table reports the optimal annuitization levels (in %) for several alternative parame-
ter choices. For every robustness check one parameter is changed and the rest remains
at their benchmark value.
Parameter setup Optimal level Optimal level
real annuities nominal annuities
Benchmark parameters 96 100
Mean gross equity return 10% instead of 8% 93 100
Background risk persistent 95 100
Subsistence consumption level 0.5 instead of 0.25 FRAI
instead of 0.25 FRAI 94 100
Mean expenses due to background risk 0.2
instead of 0.1 FRAI 91 100
Expense factor 7.3% instead of 0% 94 100
Risk aversion coefﬁcient 2 instead of 5 92 100
As another check for robustness the mean (real) expenses due to back-
ground risk have been doubled from 10% to 20% of the full real annuity in-
come. Moreover the standard deviation was doubled as well. The optimal
level allocated to a real annuity decreases from 96% to 91%. Again the direc-
tion of the effect is as expected, but the numerical differences are small.
In addition we consider the effect on optimal annuitization of including a
load factor on the annuity income. The load factor was set at 7.3% in line with
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999). The optimal annuitization124 THE ANNUITY PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
level falls by only 2%. Naturally the welfare loss of the load is large, 8.5%.10
Finally a less risk averse individual (γ = 2) invests 92% of his initial wealth
in real annuities. Thus the change in the optimal annuitization level is quan-
titatively small and the previous results are also robust for an alternative risk
preference.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether optimal annuity demand is affected by incom-
plete annuity markets and background risk. If no variable annuities are avail-
able and borrowing constraints are imposed, it can potentially be optimal to
annuitize only a part of your wealth. However, we ﬁnd that (almost) full an-
nuitization remains optimal, irrespective of whether nominal or real annuities
are available if agents save adequately out of their annuity income. In case of
nominal annuities, the agent will save considerably out of the annuity income
during retirement to gain equity exposure and hedge against background and
inﬂation risk. If an individual receives a real annuity income, the agent saves
a smaller amount as a buffer against (real) background risk. In all cases (close
to) full annuitization at age 65 remains optimal. As a side result, we ﬁnd that
access to variable annuities is less welfare enhancing than previously found
in the literature. The argument is similar: the buffer saved can be used to get
sufﬁcient equity exposure. These results are robust for realistic parameters of
a bequest motive and default risk of the annuity seller.
10This result is not presented in the paper. The percentage welfare loss is larger than the
load, because the amount of income after paying the expenses due to background risk falls by
a larger percentage than the load. The income available for consumption does not scale down
by the load percentage, due to the expenses for background risk.CHAPTER4
HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT
PROVISION
Abstract
We analyze the effect of health cost risk on optimal annuity levels and
consumption/savings decisions. Many retirees are exposed to sizeable out-of-pocket
medical expenses, while annuities potentially impair the ability to get liquidity to
cover these costs and smooth consumption. We ﬁnd that the timing of the health cost
risk is an important determinant of optimal annuity demand. If out-of-pocket
medical expenses can already be sizeable early in retirement, full annuitization is not
optimal. In the other case of low health cost risk early in retirement, individuals
should take advantage of the mortality credit that annuities provide and save out of
the annuity income to build a buffer for health cost shocks at later ages. Data shows
that health cost risk is indeed substantial early in retirement. When comparing
predicted annuity demand to empirically observed levels of annuitization, we ﬁnd
that high health cost risk early in retirement can resolve the annuity puzzle.
Moreover, we explain the observed pattern of annuitization as a function of initial
wealth at retirement. In addition, the predicted age-wealth proﬁle is similar to
empirically observed paths.
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4.1 Introduction
As a consequence of an ageing population in developed countries, much at-
tention (both by policymakers and academics) is directed towards providing
and optimizing ﬁnancial security during retirement. In this respect, the most
important risks the elderly face are longevity risk and health cost risk. These
health costs have increased substantially over the last decades, in all Western
countries. At the same time the variation in health costs (thus health risk) in-
creased as well. The main goal of pension policies, and social security in gen-
eral, is to provide ﬁnancial security to individuals. Thus health risk, as one of
the major ﬁnancial risks for the elderly, should be taken into account when de-
signing such a system. In spite of health risks being actively discussed in the
public policy debate, few papers examine what asset allocation policy is opti-
mal when retirees face health risk. In this paper we attempt to ﬁll this gap and
examine to what extent individuals can still annuitize their wealth when fac-
inghealthrisk, toobtain anoptimal trade-offbetweenlongevity riskinsurance
and saving for unexpected liquidity needs due to health costs. Furthermore,
we explore whether out-of-pocket medical expenses can explain empirically
observed annuitization levels.
Prior research has shown that full annuitization is optimal for individuals
who only face uncertainty about their time of death. (Yaari 1965) showed that
risk averse agents with no desire to leave a bequest ﬁnd it optimal to hold
their entire wealth in actuarially fair annuities, when longevity is the only risk
factor. However, in fact a relatively small amount of individuals voluntarily
purchases annuity products when they reach retirement age.
We build a life-cycle model for consumption and portfolio choice to ex-
amine whether health cost risk can explain the low empirical annuity levels.
That is, out-of-pocket medical expenses raise the need for liquidity and hence
give incentivesfor precautionary saving ((De Nardi, French, and Jones2010a),
(Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes 2004), and (Palumbo 1999)). As a consequence,
uncertain medical costs can reduce the attractiveness of annuities since they
impair the ability to smooth consumption in case of high and unexpected
health costs. In our model, retirees optimally choose the fraction of wealth
annuitized at retirement and follow optimal consumption and asset allocation
strategies afterwards, facing capital markets risk and inﬂation risk. In the lit-
erature, a variety of health cost models are proposed. We use out-of-pocket
medical costs from two prominent models for health costs and ﬁnd that op-
timal annuity demand decreases if health costs can already be high early inCHAPTER 4 127
retirement. If not, agents can save out of their annuity income to build a sufﬁ-
cient buffer against unexpected medical expenses at later ages. To what extent
full annuitization isoptimal thus dependscritically on the speciﬁc assumption
about health costs in early retirement years.
This papercontributes to the household ﬁnance literature in two ways. Our
ﬁrst contribution is that we ﬁnd that the optimal annuity demand depends
crucially on the health cost risk early in retirement. The amount of health
costs after about 5 years following the annuitization decision is mostly irrel-
evant for the optimal annuity demand. In case the health cost risk is mod-
erate early in retirement, it is optimal for agents to annuitize all wealth and
save out of the annuity income to build a sufﬁcient buffer for high out-of-
pocket medical expenses later in retirement. If instead out-of-pocket expenses
can be high early in retirement, agents keep a certain amount of wealth liq-
uid, because they do not have enough time to build a buffer to be able to
smooth consumption in case of a health cost shock. We explore this by exam-
ining the optimal annuity demand for two different speciﬁcations of health
costs estimated in (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011)
and (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a). The paper by (Ameriks, Caplin,
Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) examines a similar question as our pa-
per, while (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a) focus on precautionary savings
duetohealthexpenses. Asfarasthequestion raised inourpaperisconcerned,
(Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) calculate the willing-
ness to pay for an annuity which increases the fraction of total wealth annu-
itized from 55% to 70% for a fairly wealthy female. We expand on (Ameriks,
Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) by determining the optimal an-
nuity levels instead of willingness to participate in the annuity market. Fur-
thermore, we explore annuity demand for heterogenous investors, which is
particularly important since the empiricallyobserved annuitylevelsvary size-
ably depending on the wealth levels.
Second, we compare the empirically observed annuitization levels with the
predicted annuity levels and ﬁnd a close match. There is substantial empiri-
cal evidence of high health cost risk early in retirement and we show that this
can explain the annuity puzzle. Furthermore, in reality less wealthy agents
have a higher fraction of total wealth annuitized due to high pre-annuitized
wealth levels compared to individuals with high total wealth levels.1 So the
empirically observed fraction of total wealth annuitized is decreasing wealth,
which we ﬁnd to be equal to the optimal pattern of annuitization. Hence in
1Total wealth is equal to pre-annuitized wealth plus liquid ﬁnancial wealth.128 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
contrast to previous literature, we not only propose a conceivable solution for
the annuity puzzle, but ﬁnd that the empirically established annuity pattern
for varying total wealth levels, the annuity-wealth proﬁle, is close to the op-
timal pattern when taking into account that agents face high health cost risk
early in retirement.
Health costs can be viewed as either exogenous or endogenous.2 We as-
sume they are exogenous. Of course, part of out-of-pocket medical expenses
may be a choice, hence health costs are overstated to a certain degree. (Yogo
2009) examines the optimal allocation to health care and ﬁnancial assets, and
assumes (fully) endogenous investments in health capital. He ﬁnds that med-
ical expenses can partly explain the annuity puzzle. His setup, however, im-
plies that agents can inﬂuence their health status and survival probabilities
by increasing their health expenditures. This is contradicted by many empir-
ical studies that ﬁnd, at most, weak evidence that higher health care utiliza-
tion leads to an increase in survival probabilities (see for instance Brook et al.
(1983) or (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008)).
In order to reconcile this result with the empirical ﬁndings, a vast literature
has focussed on this "annuity puzzle". (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and
Brown 1999) examine actuarially unfair annuities as a potential driver of de-
viation from full annuitization, and (Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides 2011)
and (Lockwood 2010) look at bequest motives. We abstract from bequest
motives, because the evidence on the strength of bequest motives is mixed
((Brown 2001), (De Nardi 2004), and (Kopczuk and Lupton 2007)). In addi-
tion, some papersexplore the effect on annuity demand of incomplete annuity
markets ((Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker 2011a)), default risk ((Babbel and
Merril 2006)), means-tested beneﬁts ((Bütler, Peijnenburg, and Staubli 2011)),
systematic longevity risk ((Stevens 2009)), and family composition ((Kotlikoff
and Spivak 1981)). Furthermore, several behavioral explanations have been
posited, such as framing of the annuity choice ((Brown, Kling, Mullainathan,
andWrobel2008a),(GazzaleandWalker2009))andmentalaccounting((Brown
2Furthermore, we assume implicitly that health costs are (partly) uninsurable. If a perfect
market for health cost insurance would exist, then it is optimal for an agent to buy insurance
which fully covers medical costs. However since the market for private care insurance fails
to a certain degree, we take as a given that health care costs are only partially insured. See
(Brown and Finkelstein 2007) for an analysis of the supply-side and demand-side factors for
the lack of private insurance against long term care costs. Our approach of implicitly assum-
ing partly uninsurable health costs and agents facing out-of-pocket medical expenses is taken
in a number of papers. (For instance, (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011),
(De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a), (Palumbo 1999) and (Pang and Warshawsky 2010).CHAPTER 4 129
2007) and (Hu and Scott 2007)).
Closely related to our paper, (Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 2009),
(Feinstein and Lin 2006), (Huggonier, Pelgrin, and St-Amour 2009), (Love and
Perozek 2007), (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2010), and (Turra and Mitchell 2008)
show the effect of health cost risk on portfolio choice, while (Berkowitz and
Qiu 2006) and (Smith and Love 2007)focus on the inﬂuence of health status on
portfolio allocation decisions. Furthermore thereareseveralpapersthatexam-
inethe relation between health riskand retirement timing((Bound, Stinebrick-
ner, and Waidmann 2010) and (French 2005)). (Fonseca, Michaud, Galama,
and Kapteyn 2009) try to explain the rise in health cost over the past decades.
Several recent papers ((De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010b) and (Kopecky and
Koreshkova 2009)) analyze changes in savings behavior due to policy reforms
that alter out-of-pocket medical expenditures. In this paper we expand on
the previous literature by examining the effect of uninsured health costs on
annuity demand and savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the life-cycle model during the retirement phase. In Section 4.3, we present
the two health cost models that we use to determine and compare optimal
annuity demand. The main ﬁndings are given in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5
shows the results for several robustness tests. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The retirement phase life-cycle model
4.2.1 An individual’s maximization problem
We restrict our analysis to individuals during retirement.3 We consider a life-
cycle investor of age t ∈ 1,...,T, where t = 1 is the retirement date and T is
the maximum age possible. Individuals maximize utility over real consump-
tion andpreferences arerepresented by atime-separable, constant relative risk























3In (Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009) and (Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla 2010)
the pre-retirement period is included in the life-cycle model, but for our application this has
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where β is the time preference discount factor, γ the degree of risk aversion,
and Ct isthe real amountof wealthconsumed atthe beginning ofperiod t. The
probability of surviving to age t, conditional on having lived to period t − 1,
is indicated by pt. We denote nominal consumption as Ct = CtΠt, where Πt is
the price index at time t. In this speciﬁcation the marginal utility is not depen-
dent on the health status, although as a robustness test we consider a decline
in marginal utility when an agent is in a bad health status. Furthermore, the
utility speciﬁcation is for a single individual household.
The fraction wt invested in equity is chosen optimally, and yields a gross
nominal return Rt+1 in year t + 1. The remainder of liquid wealth is invested
in a riskless bond with return R
f
t . Next period’s wealth, in nominal terms, is
thus given by
Wt+1 = max(Wt + Yt − Ht − Ct,0)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt), (4.3)
where Wt is the amount of wealth at time t, Yt is the annual annuity income
in nominal terms, and out-of-pocket health costs are indicated by Ht. If the
agent can not pay his health expenses, he is left with zero next period wealth.
This reﬂects being bankrupt, and starting with zero wealth. The timing of de-
cisions is as follows. First the individual receives his annuity income and pays
health costs. After this exogenous shock, the agent decides how much to con-
sume and subsequently invests remaining liquid wealth, choosing optimally
the equity exposure wt. In case the annuity income plus wealth at the begin-
ning of the period is insufﬁcient to pay for health expenses and consumption,
the individual receives a low minimum consumption level, Cmin, since almost
all western countries have a minimum consumption ﬂoor. The decision fre-
quency is annually.
Consumption and asset allocation are chosen optimally subject to a number
of constraints. First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and short-
sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ wt. (4.4)
Second, we make the standard assumption that the investor is liquidity con-
strained
Ct ≤ Wt, (4.5)
which implies that the individual cannot borrow against future annuity in-
come to increase consumption today. The reason that we impose a borrowing
constraint is that in reality it is difﬁcult to get a loan, especially for an elderly
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4.2.2 Financial markets
We assume that the asset menu of an investor consists of two assets: a riskless
one-year nominal bond and a risky stock. The return on the stock is lognor-
mally distributed with an annual mean nominal return  R and a standard
deviation σR. We assume the nominal interest rate is generated by a Vasicek
model, to account for long term mean reversion. The real yield is equal to the
nominal yield minus expected inﬂation and an inﬂation risk premium.
In our market, the instantaneous expected inﬂation rate follows:
πt+1 = πt + aπ(πt −  π) + ǫπ
t+1, (4.6)
where aπ is the mean reversion parameter,  π is long run expected inﬂation,
and the error term ǫπ
t ∼ N(0,σ2
π). Subsequently, the price index Π follows
from




Π) are the innovations to the price index. We assume there
is a positive relation between the expected inﬂation and the instantaneous




t ) > 0. The parameters we use are described
in Section 4.2.3.
We consider single-premium immediate life-contingent annuities with real
payouts. Consequently, the annuity income is given by
Y = P0A−1, (4.8)
where P0 is the premium and A the annuity factor. The single premium is
equal to the present value of expected beneﬁts paid to the annuitant assuming














0 is the real time zero yield on a zero coupon bond maturing at
time t. The survival probabilities applied to calculate the annuity factor are
unconditional on the health status, but conditional on gender. The survival
probabilities pt are generated via the health cost models, and we assume a
certain death by age 100. The annuity decision is made once at retirement,
which we assume for various reasons. First of all, in several countries the de-
cision whether to annuitize your pension account or take a lump sum takes
place at retirement, due to tax legislation. A second reason for our assump-
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make ﬁnancial decisions very infrequently. Furthermore (Agarwal, Driscoll,
Gabaix, and Laibson 2009) show that the capability of individuals to make
ﬁnancial decisions declines dramatically at higher ages, hence it seems opti-
mal to make these decisions at younger ages when a person is still able to do
so. The method we use to solve our life-cycle problem is described in Ap-
pendix 4.A.
4.2.3 Parameter values
We do not estimate the parameters ourselves, but employ common parame-
ters used within the life-cycle literature. As in (Pang and Warshawsky 2010)
and (Yogo 2009), we set β, the time preference discount factor, equal to 0.96.
The risk aversion coefﬁcient γ is5. Wedetermine the optimal annuity demand
for a range of initial total wealth levels, but to illustrate the consumption and
savings decisions the wealth level is equal to $350,000. This is approximately
equal to the average total wealth level for a single person U.S. household
((Dushi andWebb2004)), where total wealth consists of pre-annuitized wealth
and liquid wealth. The minimum consumption level guaranteed by the gov-
ernment is set equal to $7000 annually, which is close to the consumption ﬂoor
identiﬁed by (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011).
The equity return is assumed to be lognormally distributed and in accor-
dance with historical stock returns we assume a mean annual nominal return
of8%andanannualstandard deviation of20%. Themeaninstantaneous short
rate is set equal to 4%, the standard deviation to 1%, and the mean reversion
parameter to -0.15. The inﬂation risk premium to determine the real yield is
0.5%. The correlation between the instantaneous short rate and the expected
inﬂation is 0.4. Mean inﬂation is equal to 2%, and the standard deviation of
the instantaneous inﬂation rate is equal to 1.3%, the standard deviation of the
price index equals 1.3%, and the mean reversion coefﬁcient equals 0.15. Time
ranges from t = 1 to time T, which corresponds to age 65 and 100 respectively.
4.3 Health cost models for out-of-pocket expendi-
tures
A large part of health costs in the U.S. is paid out-of-pocket. (Brown and
Finkelstein 2009) note that for the health sector as a whole 17% is paid out-of-
pocket. (Metlife 2010) ﬁnds that the costs for nursing homes in 2010 amountCHAPTER 4 133
to $75,000 per year for a semi-private room and $85,000 for a private room.
Furthermore, (Brown and Finkelstein 2008) estimate that about one-third of
current 65-year olds will enter a nursing home at some point in time. Insur-
ance policies for long term care do exist, but the contract typically purchased
covers only 34% of the expected present discounted value of long-term care
costs ((Brown and Finkelstein 2007)). In addition, Medicaid, the public health
insurance program, is a poor substitute for private care. (Ameriks, Caplin,
Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) ﬁnd that “public care aversion” is a sig-
niﬁcant driver for precautionary savings. Furthermore, Medicaid is means
tested and allows the individual to keep very little income or assets to ﬁnance
non-care consumption.
4.3.1 Speciﬁcation of both health cost models
Severalpapersintheliterature estimateout-of-pocket medicalexpenses, though
the estimated dynamics for health cost risk differs substantially. For this rea-
son we take the estimates for the process of health expenses from two promi-
nent papers in the literature and determine the optimal annuity demand. In
this manner we can, as a ﬁrst step, disentangle what characteristics of health
costs are the main determinant of optimal annuity demand. Furthermore, we
explore which assumptions about health costs can explain the annuity puzzle.
We examine two different models for health costs: (1) (De Nardi, French,
and Jones 2010a) and (2) (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh
2011).4 Both models vary according to how they specify the stochastic process
for health costs and the dataset and/or period employed.
(1) (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a):
(De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a) document that there exists substantial
heterogeneity in out-of-pocket health expenses among individuals, by gender,
health status, age, and permanent income. They use data from 1994 to 2006 of
the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset, which is
a part of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The individuals who are in
the AHEAD dataset in 1994 are 70 years or older and non-institutionalized,
which thus presents a relatively healthy subsample of the population and
health costs early in retirement are likely to be underestimated. Health costs
are the sum of what individuals spend out-of-pocket on insurance premia,
4The subsequent analysis is also performed for two additional health cost models esti-
mated by (Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 2006) and (French and Jones 2004). In case of
interest, these results can be requested from the authors.134 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
drug costs, costs for hospital, nursing home care, doctor visits, dental visits,
and outpatient care. Individuals face three sources of risk, which they treat as
exogenous:
• Health status uncertainty. A person can be in a good or bad health sta-
tus. The transition probabilities between health states depend on the
previous health status (h), gender (g), permanent income (I), and age
(a).
• Survival uncertainty. The probability that a person is alive the next pe-
riod depends on his health status, permanent income, age, and gender.
• Medical expense uncertainty. Health costs depend on gender, health sta-
tus, permanent income, age, and an idiosyncratic component, ψt.
Both the mean and the variance of the log medical expenses depend on
gender, health status, permanent income, and age:
lnmt = m(g,h, I,a) + σ(g,h, I,a)ψt. (4.10)
where ψt can be decomposed as
ψt = ςt + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,σ2
ξ), (4.11)
ςt = ρmςt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε ). (4.12)
where ξt and εt are serially and mutually independent. The setup allows for
empirically observed autocorrelation patterns in expenses. 5
A key feature of this model is that health costs and survival probabilities
are negatively correlated. Both the medical expenditures and survival prob-
abilities depend on the health status of the agent. So in case the agent is in
a bad health status, his expected medical expenses are higher and his life ex-
pectancy is lower. This is particularly important when examining the effect
of health costs on annuity demand. Namely the negative correlation between
survival probabilities and life expectancy can make annuities relatively more
attractive, because after having incurred large health expenses, the agent is
5(De Nardi,French, andJones 2010a)estimate their model using dataon elderlyof 70 years
and older, while our model ranges from age 65 to 100. We extrapolate their results to ﬁnd
health status transition probabilities, survival probabilities, and medical expenses between
age 65 and 69. Speciﬁcally, we estimate health status transition probabilities with a third
order polynomial in age, medical expenses with a ﬁrst order polynomial in age, and we apply
the survival probabilities at age 70 to ages 65 to 69.CHAPTER 4 135
more likely to die, which makes the depletion of wealth due to the medical
expenses less costly in utility terms.6
(2) (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011):
(Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) model four health
states: (1) good health, (2) medical problems but no long term care, (3) long
term care, and (4) death. They assume the health status follows a Markov
chain with an age-varying one-period state transition matrix. The values for
the parameters for the transition matrix are set to match four age-dependent
mortality rates and eight statistics on long term care utilization taken from
(Brown and Finkelstein 2008). Each state when the agent is alive is associated
with a necessary and deterministic health cost. The health costs if the agent
is in good health status (1) is $1000, in the intermediate health status (2) the
associated costs are $10,000, and if the agent is in need of long term care (3)
the annual costs are $50,000.7
4.3.2 Dynamics and distribution of the health costs
Figure 4.1 displays the mean and quantiles of medical expenses for the two
health cost speciﬁcations. Most importantly, we see that the pattern of health
costs over the life cycle differs substantially between the two models, as well
as the amount of health costs over the entire life. Panel 4.1a shows the mean,
and we see that the average health costs from the De Nardi et al. (2010a)
model increases substantially with age. This pattern also holds for the three
quantiles that are displayed in the other ﬁgures. The health costs according
to Ameriks et al. (2011) shows a very different shape compared to De Nardi
et al. (2010a). The reason is that the health costs in the model by Ameriks et
6A negative correlation between health costs and survival probabilities can also decrease
annuity demand. (Sinclair and Smetters 2004) ﬁnd that when agents can resell their annuity,
annuity demand decreases due to health risk. The present value of the annuity decreases just
as the need for liquidity increases. Hence at the moment the agent wants to sell his annuity to
get liquidity, the value of the annuity has decreased. In our paper we assume agents cannot
resell their annuities, because there is almost no market for this, since the adverse selection
costs are extremely large.
7The deterministic health costs in the ﬁrst two states are calibrated in such a way to match
estimates in (French and Jones 2004) with the health status transition matrix. To determine
the health costs in the long term care health status, they use Metlife’s estimates for costs for a
semi-private room in a LTC facility. The costs are $143 per day and medicare covered the full
cost of LTC for 20 days each year and the daily costs in excess of $109.50 for an additional 80
days. This amounts to a total of $46,700 for a year of long term care for an agent without long
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al. (2011) can only take on the values $1000, $10,000, and $50,000. Hence the
5% highest health costs (panel 4.1c) are equal to exactly $50,000, for most ages.
Furthermore, the average health costs, panel 4.1a, are higher according to the
speciﬁcation by Ameriks et al. (2011). Health costs for males are a bit lower
than for females, in both models.
For ease of exposition we label the two health cost models according to the
shape of their 99th percentile of health costs over the life cycle. We choose this
percentile, because in the next section we show that the tail of the health costs,
in particular in the ﬁrst years after retirement, is important for determining
the optimal annuity demand. We label the two models as follows:
• Exponential health costs = (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a)
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De Nardi et al. (2010) − female
De Nardi et al. (2010) − male
(d) 99th percentile
Figure 4.1 – Simulated annual out-of-pocket health costs from age 65 to 100
This graph displays the mean, the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentile of health costs for two
models; (1) Ameriks et al. (2011) and (2) De Nardi et al. (2010a).138 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
4.4 Annuity levels and health cost risk
Full annuitization is optimal in a world where individuals only face longevity
risk ((Yaari 1965)). However, this result might no longer hold if individuals
face substantial health cost risk which raises liquidity needs. In Section 4.4.1
we focus on optimal annuity demand and savings decision when agents face
piecewise constant health costs and the impact of exponential health costs will
be explored in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Optimalannuitydemandandsavingswithpiecewisecon-
stant health costs
In Figure 4.2 we present (for our benchmark speciﬁcation) the certainty equiv-
alent consumption for various annuitization levels, adopting optimal con-
sumption and asset allocation strategies. The dotted line presents the case
for a female who does not face out-of-pocket medical expenses. Not surpris-
inglyweﬁndthat(almost)fullannuitization isoptimal, whichisinaccordance
with (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown 1999) and (Peijnenburg, Ni-
jman, and Werker 2011a). The welfare gains from optimal annuitization com-
pared to no annuitization are substantial: the certainty equivalent consump-
tion increases from $15,000 to $22,000. (Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005)
and (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown 1999) also ﬁnd high wel-
fare gains. Our goal is to determine whether full annuitization remains op-
timal if individuals face substantial medical expense risk resulting from the
piecewise constant health cost speciﬁcation. The solid line shows the opti-
mal annuitization level in case the agent faces health costs; the optimal an-
nuity demand is decreased to 65% of total wealth. The beneﬁts of insurance
against longevity risk and receiving the mortality credit are outweighed by
the (initial) reduction in liquidity. We present the optimal annuity fraction as a
function of total wealth, where total wealth consists of liquid ﬁnancial wealth
and pre-annuitized wealth. In most instances, an agent has a certain amount
pre-annuitized in the form of social security and/or deﬁned beneﬁt pension
wealth. So if an individual already has 70% of total wealth pre-annuitized, he
or she should not buy additional annuities.8
The previous results also hold for males. The optimal annuity demand is
reduced substantially due to out-of-pocket medical expenses, but to a slightly
8Our benchmark total wealth equals $350,000 and we will present the optimal annuity
demand for different wealth levels in Section 4.4.6.CHAPTER 4 139

























































Male − health costs
Male − no health costs
Female − health costs
Female − no health costs
Figure 4.2 – Optimal annuitization levels with piecewise constant health costs
The ﬁgure displays the certainty equivalent consumption for the life-cycle model with
and without medical expenses for males and females. The case without medical ex-
penses does include health status uncertainty and longevity uncertainty. So the differ-
ence is whether or not the agent needs to pay medical costs out-of-pocket. The optimal
annuitization strategy is the level that generates the highest certainty equivalent con-
sumption. The health cost speciﬁcation employed is from Ameriks et al. (2011), which
we labeled the piecewise constant health cost model.
lesser extent than for females. This is not surprising since males face lower
out-of-pocket medical expenses, hence need less liquid wealth to cover health
expenses. Furthermore, we see in the ﬁgure that the certainty equivalent con-
sumption for males is substantially higher. The reason is that both health costs
are lower and the annuity income for males is larger than for females. The
income differs since both are actuarially fair for each group and calculated
separately. As male life expectancy is lower, the annuity is cheaper.
InFigure 4.3 we presentthe median optimal consumption and wealth paths
for three cases: (dotted line) no annuitization, (solid line) optimal annuitiza-
tion (=65%) with health costs, and (dashed line) optimal annuitization (=95%)
without health costs. Figure 4.3a shows that in case of no annuitization, the
optimal consumption path is decreasing over time. This reﬂects the fact that
if the longevity risk in the real consumption level is not hedged, agents do
not plan much consumption at ages where the probability is high that one
will have passed away. If agents face no health cost risk and buy real annu-
ities (dashed line), then inﬂation risk is hedged and the planned consumption
path is approximately ﬂat in real terms (in our speciﬁcation the time prefer-
ence parameter and interest rates coincide approximately). However, we see
that if an individual faces out-of-pocket medical expenses (solid line), the me-140 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION





































Optimal annuitization (=95%) without health costs
Optimal annuitization (=65%) with health costs
No annuitization with health costs
(a) Real consumption


































Optimal annuitization (=95%) without health costs
Optimal annuitization (=65%) with health costs
No annuitization with health costs
(b) Real liquid wealth
Figure 4.3 – Optimal consumption and wealth paths over the life cycle
Panel (a)displays the medianoptimal realconsumption when agents do not facehealth
costs and annuitize optimally (dashed line), when agents do face health costs and an-
nuitize optimally (solid line), and when agents face health costs but do not annuitize
(dotted line). Panel (b) displays the optimal liquid real wealth when agents do not face
health costs and annuitize optimally (dashed line), when agents do face health costs
and annuitize optimally (solid line), and when agents face health costs but do not an-
nuitize (dotted line). The optimal levels are for a female. The health cost speciﬁcation
employed is from Ameriks et al. (2011),which we labeledthe piecewise constant health
cost model.CHAPTER 4 141
dian consumption path is lower. This is because the individual has to pay the
medical expenses and wants to keep a certain amount of wealth liquid to be
able smooth consumption in case of high health costs. The consumption at
younger ages is slightly lower, because the agent saves to increase the buffer
further, while at later ages the individual starts dissaving, thus increasing con-
sumption.
The optimal liquid wealth trajectories are displayed in Figure 4.3b. If no
annuities are bought (dotted line), the median optimal wealth trajectory is
decreasing over time. Individuals slowly dissave out of their liquid wealth. If
the agentfaces health cost risk and invests optimally in a real annuity he keeps
a substantial amount of wealth liquid; about $120,000 until age 80. After that
age he slowly dissaves out of the wealth buffer. If the agent does not face
out-of-pocket medical expenses and annuitizes (almost) his entire wealth, the
wealth levels over the life cycle are low (dashed line).
Thesehigh levelsofprecautionarysavings areinaccordance with(Palumbo
1999), (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a), and (Love, Palumbo, and Smith
2009), who show that out-of-pocket medical expenses induce individuals to
hold large amounts of precautionary savings which is consistent with the
data. Furthermore, in reality many retirees die with large positive amounts
of wealth, which is conﬁrmed by our ﬁndings: agents keep a buffer for health
costs until late in life.
4.4.2 Optimal annuity demand and savings with exponential
health costs
Figure 4.4 displays the optimal annuity demand in case the agent faces ex-
ponential health cost risk. The solid line in Figure 4.4 depicts the certainty
equivalent consumption for a female who faces health cost risk; the certainty
equivalent consumption is increasing in the annuitization level. Thus, health
risk is not a reason to decrease annuity demand assuming this health cost
speciﬁcation.9 In addition, the dotted line in Figure 4.4 presents the case for
maleswhoface out-of-pocket medicalexpensesand, again, we seethat full an-
nuitization is optimal assuming exponential health costs. 10 These results are
9We also tested whether this result holds if individuals can only invest in a nominal annu-
ity. This does not change the results. The annuity income in real terms decreases over time
with a nominal annuity, hence individuals can easily save in the ﬁrst years of retirement to
build a high enough buffer for later in life.
10We also calculated whether our results hold if both males and females receive an annu-
ity income calculated via the average survival probability of males and females. In that case142 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
in sharp contrast to the sizeable decrease in optimal annuity demand found
in the previous section, when agents face piecewise constant health cost risk.
The main driver of the variation in results is the difference in timing of the
health cost risk, more speciﬁcally, the health cost risk early in retirement. For
the piecewise constant health cost speciﬁcation the health cost risk early in re-
tirement is high, while for the exponential speciﬁcation the risk is low. This
can be seen from Figure 4.1d: for the piecewise constant speciﬁcation there is
a 1% probability to incur health costs of $50,000 already at age 66. In contrast,
the health cost risk implied by the exponential speciﬁcation is low early in
retirement, but high at later ages.11 In case of low health cost risk early in re-
tirement, the retiree has enough time to build a large buffer out of the annuity
income to insure against health costs later in life. However, if out-of-pocket
medical expense risk is already high early in retirement, an individual cannot
save enough in the ﬁrst years of retirement to insure against almost immediate
high expense risk. Since the costs in utility terms of receiving the minimum
consumption level are high, an individual will annuitize only part of wealth
to be able to smooth consumption in case of high health costs.
full annuitization is still optimal. It is not optimal for a male to decrease demand, because
the mortality credit is still high enough to induce full annuitization. Furthermore we tested
whether our results hold when taking into account high end-of-life health costs. Among oth-
ers, (Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel 2007) ﬁnd that proximity to death is a more important
determinant of health costs than age. This strand of literature does not focus particularly on
estimating out-of-pocket medical expenses, but looks at the impact of population ageing on
insured health care expenditures ((Seshamani and Gray 2004), (Shang and Goldman 2008),
and (Weaver, Stearns, Norton, and Spector 2009)). In the health cost speciﬁcations we em-
ployed before, this proximity to death effect is not incorporated explicitly. Implicitly it is
included to a certain extent, since expected medical expenses increase if the health status de-
teriorates, and health status and survival probabilities are positively related. However, to test
for whether our results hold, we include a time-to-death effect according to the ﬁndings in
(Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel 2007). They ﬁnd a large time to death effect in health costs and
this difference in health costs between decedents and survivors decreases with age. At age
65, the medical expenses for decedents are about three times as high as for survivors, and this
factor decreases to about two for 90-year olds. To incorporate this, we alter the medical costs
of the exponential speciﬁcation, by increasing the expenses in the year before death with a
factor between 2 and 3, depending linearly on the age at death. The optimal annuity demand
when we added the end-of-life costs did not change, hence our results our robust. This is
intuitive since, the health costs have mostly only risen at advanced ages.
11The subsequent analysis is also performed for two additional health cost models esti-
mated by (Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 2006) and (French and Jones 2004). The results
conﬁrm that indeed if health cost risk is high early in retirement, optimal annuity demand is
reduced. In case of interest, these results can be requested from the authors.CHAPTER 4 143
























































Male − health costs
Male − no health costs
Female − health costs
Female − no health costs
Figure 4.4 – Optimal annuitization levels with exponential health costs
The ﬁgure displays the certainty equivalent consumption for the life-cycle model with
and without medical expenses for males and females. The case without medical ex-
penses does include health status uncertainty and longevity uncertainty. So the differ-
ence is whether or not the agent needs to pay medical costs out-of-pocket. The optimal
annuitization strategy is the level that generates the highest certainty equivalent con-
sumption. The health cost speciﬁcation employed is from De Nardi et al (2010a),which
we labeled the exponential health cost model.
(Pang and Warshawsky 2010) also use the health cost model of (De Nardi,
French, and Jones 2010a), but ﬁnd that annuity demand increases due to these
health costs. The reason for this contrasting result is that they do not model
annuitization as a one-time decision that is made at retirement, but instead,
they optimize annually over the equity-bond-annuity portfolio. (Pang and
Warshawsky 2010), in effect, modeled the annuitization decision as a portfo-
lio allocation decision. Health costs are an additional risk factor which drives
households to shift demand from risky to riskless assets, namely from equity
to bonds and annuities. As a consequence of the superiority of annuities over
bonds, annuity demand increases due to health costs. Similar modeling as-
sumptions and ﬁndings are presented in (Pashchenko 2010).
InFigure 4.5 we presentthe median optimal consumption and wealth paths
for three cases: no annuitization, full annuitization with health costs, and full
annuitization without health costs. We ﬁnd that if an individual invests opti-
mally in a real annuity and faces health costs (solid line), the individual saves
sizeable amounts out of the annuity income to build a buffer against health144 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION








































Optimal annuitization without health costs
Optimal annuitization with health costs
No annuitization with health costs
(a) Real consumption


































Optimal annuitization without health costs
Optimal annuitization with health costs
No annuitization with health costs
(b) Real liquid wealth
Figure 4.5 – Optimal consumption and wealth paths over the life cycle
Panel (a)displays the medianoptimal realconsumption when agents do not facehealth
costs and annuitize optimally (dashed line), when agents do face health costs and an-
nuitize optimally (solid line), and when agents face health costs but do not annuitize
(dotted line). Panel (b) displays the optimal liquid real wealth when agents do not face
health costs and annuitize optimally (dashed line), when agents do face health costs
and annuitize optimally (solid line), and when agents face health costs but do not an-
nuitize (dotted line). The optimal levels are for a female. The health cost speciﬁcation
employed is from De Nardi et al. (2010a), which we labeled the exponential health cost
model.CHAPTER 4 145
costs. Hence it is optimal for the agent to ﬁrst annuitize his or hers entire
wealth, and subsequently save out of the annuity income to build up a buffer
against health cost risk later in life. This savings buffer is not decumulated
at advanced ages, because the health risk that agents face are sizeable espe-
cially at these advanced ages. At age 100 the agent consumes the entire buffer,
because we assume a certain death at age 100.
The optimal savings behavior for different ages and wealth buffer levels is
displayed in Figure 4.6. The annual savings out of the annuity income if an
individuals has a wealth level of $50,000 is approximately $5000 per year for
a 70-year old female. However this savings level, for a given wealth level,
increases sharply with age. A 80-year old and a 90-year old save $8000 and
$12,000 respectively. The reason for this is that the expected health costs in the
coming years are much higher. If an agent is still alive at advanced ages, he
or she needs to build a buffer fast to be able to pay the expenses and smooth
consumption.
Whencomparingthepredictedwealthpathforthepiecewiseconstantspec-
iﬁcation (solid line in Figure 4.3b) and the predicted wealth path for the ex-
ponential speciﬁcation (solid line in Figure 4.5b), we see that the age-wealth
pattern in case agents face piecewise constant health costs is more in line








































































Figure 4.6 – Optimal annual savings for varying wealth levels for a 70, 80, and
90 year old
This graph displays the optimal simulated real savings for various real wealth levels.
The liquid real wealth level is the amount of wealth after the individual received the
annuity income and payed health costs. Hence it is disposable wealth, which the agent
allocates to either consumption or saving. The vertical axes displays the optimal real
savings out of the annuity income. The health cost speciﬁcation employed is from De
Nardi et al. (2010a), which we labeled the exponential health cost model.146 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
with empirically observed wealth paths. Two stylized facts about the age-
wealth trajectory in the data are matched: substantial precautionary savings
and slow dissaving at later ages ((De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a) and
(Palumbo 1999)). Hence, out-of-pocket medical expenses according to the
piecewise constant speciﬁcation can help to simultaneously explain the low
observed annuity levels as well as precautionary savings.
4.4.3 Importance of timing of health cost risk
In the previous sections we showed that in case the agent faces health cost risk
according to the piecewise constant speciﬁcation the optimal annuity demand
is reduced substantially, while if the agent faces exponential health cost risk,
full annuitization is still optimal. We claim that the main reason for lower
annuity levels stems from the timing of the health cost risk; if health cost risk
is high early in retirement, agents do not have enough time to save out of
their annuity income to build up a buffer, hence they reduce annuity demand
to have liquid wealth. To provide some additional proof for the importance
of the timing of health cost risk, we calculate the optimal annuity demand for
agents facing health cost risk according to the piecewise constant speciﬁcation
from age 70 onwards, but not from age 65 to 69. Hence, they do not face health
cost risk during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of retirement. We ﬁnd that in this case the
optimal annuity demand is increased from 65% to 90%, which is accordance
with the idea that the driver of annuity demand is health cost risk early in
retirement.
4.4.4 Summary statistics on high health cost risk early in re-
tirement
In this section we present summary statistics to show that indeed medical ex-
pense risk is high early in retirement. To that end we need to make a distinc-
tion between long term care costs and other health costs. The largest health
cost risk that agents face are long term care costs, since nursing home costs
are very high and “in need of long term care” is a highly persistent health
status. Therefore, when assessing the risk early in retirement, utilization rates
of nursing homes during those ages are particularly relevant. (Brown and
Finkelstein 2007) estimate that the probability that a 65-year old is in a nurs-
ing home or assisted living at age 70 is 0.7% and 0.5% for respectively females
and males, which is a very substantial risk. Furthermore, these numbers areCHAPTER 4 147
conditional on beingeligible forpurchasing longterm care insurance.12 Hence
therisk ofgoing to anursing home earlyin retirementismuch higherthan this
0.7%, because this number is based on the least risky 65-year olds. (Murtaugh,
Kemper,andSpillman1995)estimate thatabout12%to23%ofthe 65-yearolds
would be rejected for private long term care insurance. Furthermore, the costs
associated with living in a nursing home amount to about $75,000 a year for
a semi-private room. Only 4% of long term care costs are covered by private
insurance and 25% by medicare. Medicaid is available for elderly individuals
with no assets, but this is a poor substitute for private care ((Ameriks, Caplin,
Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) and (Brown and Finkelstein 2007)).
Health cost risk excluding long term care is also sizeable. The Medical Ex-
penditure Panel Survey (MEPS) contains data on out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses for the U.S. non-institutionalized population. Using MEPS data from
2006-2008, we ﬁnd that there is a 1% probability of having health costs (ex-
cluding long term care costs) higher than $9,000. Hence adding up the long
term care risk and other health cost risk, there is a 1% probability of hav-
ing substantial health costs early in retirement, which can explain the annuity
puzzle.
When comparing the health cost processes that we use, note that the piece-
wiseconstant healthcostmodel((Ameriks, Caplin,Laufer, andVanNieuwerburgh
2011)) matches the empirical utilization levels of long term care at different
ages and ﬁnd that health cost risk is already high early in retirement. On
the other hand, the exponential health cost model ((De Nardi, French, and
Jones 2010a)) ﬁnds low health cost risk early in retirement. However this can
be (partially) attributed to the dataset that is used to estimate the health cost
process of the exponential model. Namely the individuals in the AHEAD
dataset, which is a part of the HRS, are non-institutionalized and over 70 at
the start of the survey in 1994. Therefore the estimation of the health cost
process is based on a relatively healthy subsample of the population, namely
non-institutionalized, and understates the health cost risk early in retirement,
but not so much at later ages. In addition, (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010a)
note that their estimates potentially underestimate the out-of-pocket expenses
for another reason. The expenses reported in the HRS do not include pay-
ments made by medicaid when agents could not pay for the out-of-pocket
costs themselves. So when simulating the out-of-pocket expenses, a substan-
12The distinction on being eligible for purchasing long term care insurance is not relevant
for our paper. This is however the only estimate of transition probabilities into a nursing
home from age 65 to 70 that we could ﬁnd in the literature.148 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
tial part of these out-of-pocket costs is in the simulations not actually payed
"out-of-pocket", in case agents did not have enough wealth and received the
minimum consumption level. For this reason the out-of-pocket expenditure
risk is underestimated in the exponential health cost model.
4.4.5 Optimal annuitization for various wealth levels
In this section, we determine the optimal annuity demand for different wealth
levels using the piecewise constant health cost model. The results are displayed
in Figure 4.7. We see that annuitization levels exhibit a U-shaped pattern. If
total wealth level at retirement is low, optimal annuity levels are higher. For a
total wealth level of $200,000 at age 65, it is optimal to have more than 75% of
total wealth in annuities.13 This is because the difference between the normal
consumption level and the minimum consumption level is not that high. In
numbers; a wealth level of $200,000 can generate an annuity income of about
$12,000, which differs only $5000 from the minimum consumption level. If
an individual is hit by a large health cost shock and receives the government
guaranteed consumption level, this is not so costly in utility terms, because
the fall in consumption is not that high.
For intermediate wealth levels, the fall in utility is even larger if hit by a
health shock, because the difference between the normal (annuity) income
and the minimum consumption level is higher. For this reason it is optimal
to reduce annuity demand to be able to smooth consumption and prevent
consuming only the minimum level. For higher wealth levels, the optimal de-
mand rises again. If the wealth level is higher it is easier for agents to build
up a buffer fast to insure against health shocks. At a certain wealth level,
the annuity income is so high that an agent can always pay the health costs
and still have a consumption level above the minimum. The health costs in
the piecewise constant model are deterministic and the maximum is $50,000.
Hence if the wealth level is high enough, then the resulting annuity income
minus $50,000 is higher than the minimum level. In that case, full annuitiza-
tion is optimal and utility increases substantially, because the minimum level
of consumption ever hit (annuity income minus $50.000), increases. Analogue
to our ﬁnding of a non-linearity in optimal annuitization levels, (Ameriks,
13We present the annuitization levels as a fraction of total wealth, where total wealth is
pre-annuitized wealth plus liquid wealth. Assume an agent has a social security income and
deﬁned beneﬁt pension income, which amounts to a net present value of $150,000. If he or she
has in addition liquid wealth of $50,000 (so 75% pre-annuitized), then the retiree should not
annuitize the liquid wealth, since he or she has already 75% pre-annuitized of total wealth.CHAPTER 4 149












































Figure4.7 – Optimal annuity levels assuming the piecewise constanthealth cost
model for varying initial wealth levels at age 65
The ﬁgure displays the optimal annuity demand for a 65-year old for varying wealth
levels. The numbers are in thousands of dollars.
Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) ﬁnd a similar non-linearity in
savings motives. Comparable to our reasoning, they explain that agents with
high wealth and income levels have less incentives to save, because they have
enough income to pay their medical expenditures. While, on the other hand,
poor individuals can never save enough to be able to afford the high medi-
cal costs. However the incentives to save are especially high for intermediate
income and wealth levels. Summarizing, optimal annuity demand depends
critically on two factors: (1) the cumulative health costs in the ﬁrst retirement
years, and (2) the savings ability (wealth) in the ﬁrst years to cover these costs.
Notethatthehealthcostmodelwhichwelabeled"piecewiseconstant health
costs", is the speciﬁcation of (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh
2011). They estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for an annuity with a price
of $85,000 which generates an income of $5000 per year, for a healthy 62-
year old female who has about 55% of wealth pre-annuitized.14 They ﬁnd
a WTP for this annuity of 0.94. 15 We extend on (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer,
and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) by (1) estimating optimal annuity levels, (2)
performing this analysis for varying wealth levels, and (3) comparing these
results to the empirical annuity levels (which we will do in Section 4.4.6).
14The income from pre-annuitized wealth level corresponds to a wealth level of about
$375,000 and her liquid wealth is $300,000. Hence total wealth is $675,000. In effect the agent
is choosing between annuitizing 55% of wealth or annuitizing almost 70% of wealth.
15The willingness to pay reﬂects the load on top of the actuarially fair price that the individ-
ual is willing to pay for this product. Hence a WTP of 0.94 means that the individual would
even need a 6% bonus to hold the annuity.150 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
Table 4.1 – Optimal annuitization levels (%) for varying pre-annuitized and liq-
uid ﬁnancial wealth levels when agents face piecewise constant health costs
This tablereportsthe optimal annuity levels(in %)in arealannuity. The pre-annuitized
wealth level represents the net present value of social security income and/or DB pen-
sion income. The number without brackets is the optimal annuity demand as a fraction
of total wealth and the number between brackets is the optimal annuity demand as a
fraction of liquid wealth. For instance, if the pre-annuitized wealth is $250k and liquid
wealth is $250k, then 50% of total wealth is pre-annuitized. If then the optimal annu-
ity level is 58%, this means that the optimal annuity demand as a percentage of liquid
wealth is 16%. The rest of the parameters are as in the benchmark case.
Liquid ﬁnancial wealth
Pre-annuitized wealth $50k $150k $250k $350k $450k $550k
$200k 72 66 60 56 54 53
(0) (21) (28) (31) (34) (36)
$250k 69 63 58 55 53 53
(0) (1) (16) (23) (27) (32)
$300k 66 60 56 54 53 54
(0) (0) (3) (15) (22) (29)
$350k 63 58 55 53 53 54
(0) (0) (0) (6) (16) (25)
$400k 60 56 54 53 54 100
(0) (0) (0) (0) (13) (100)
$450k 58 55 53 53 54 100
(0) (0) (0) (0) (8) (100)CHAPTER 4 151
The optimal annuity demand for varying levels of liquid ﬁnancial wealth
and pre-annuitized wealth is displayed in Table 4.1. The optimal annuity lev-
els are presented in two different formats: the numbers without brackets dis-
play the (1) optimal percentage in annuities as a fraction of total wealth (total
wealth is pre-annuitized wealth plus liquid ﬁnancial wealth, which is how we
displayed the results in previous sections) and the numbers between brackets
show the (2) optimal percentage in annuities as a fraction of liquid ﬁnancial
wealth. First of all, we see that the optimal annuitization level as a fraction
of total wealth is in almost all cases below 100%. If an agent has $250,000
of wealth pre-annuitized in the form of social security and/or DB pension
wealth, and $250,000of liquidﬁnancial wealth, he optimallyannuitizes58% of
his total wealth. Naturally, when displayed as a percentage of liquid ﬁnancial
wealth it is lower, 16%. Hence the agent should annuitize 16% of his $250,000
of liquid ﬁnancial wealth. Note that if the level of pre-annuitized wealth com-
pared to liquid ﬁnancial wealth is high (lower/left corner of table), the agent
should optimally stay out of the voluntary annuity market. Furthermore, for
agents with high liquid ﬁnancial wealth levels, it is optimal to annuitize on a
voluntary basis (annuitization as a fraction of liquid ﬁnancial wealth) on top
of the pre-annuitized wealth levels. This is in accordance with the data pre-
sented in (Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides 2011), who ﬁnd that wealthier
individuals tend to participate more in the voluntary annuity market. For the
exponential health costs we ﬁnd that full annuitization remains optimal. The
corresponding graphs and tables are not presented in the paper.
4.4.6 Comparing the predicted annuity demand with empiri-
cal annuity levels
In previous sections we showed that high health cost risk early in retirement
decreases optimal annuity demand. In contrast to (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer,
and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011) we determine the optimal annuity demand for
varying wealth levels, and we show that the optimal demand depends highly
on the wealth level at retirement. In the literature a lot of attention is devoted
to explaining the low empirically observed annuity levels: the annuity puz-
zle. However, whetherthere isreallya "puzzle"dependson thewealth level of
the individual. The empirically established annuity levels as fraction of total
wealth for high wealth levels can be as low as 50%, compared to much higher
levels for less wealthy individuals. (Dushi and Webb 2004) determine the pre-
annuitized fraction of wealth at age 65 of a single female for various wealth152 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION
levels, which is displayed in Figure 4.8. When we compare these empirical an-
nuitization levels with the optimal levels, we detect a similar pattern. We see
that for the piecewise constant health cost speciﬁcation, the optimal annuity
demand is a bit below or equal to the observed annuity levels, for all wealth
levels. Hence medical expense risk, that is their subjective expectation, can
explain the annuity puzzle. Furthermore, the health costs cannot only explain
the annuity puzzle when all wealth levels are aggregated, but also the empir-
ical relationship between annuity levels and wealth. If agents face health cost
risk it is optimal for low wealth households to hold a large fraction of total
wealth in annuities, compared to high wealth households, who should opti-
mally annuitize less. Thus the annuity-wealth proﬁle empirically observed
can be explained by high health cost risk early in retirement.





































annuitized wealth as a fraction of total wealth
optimal annuity demand − piecewise constant health cost model
Figure 4.8 – Comparing empirical annuitization levels with optimal annuitiza-
tion levels.
We display the annuitization levels for a single female at age 65 estimated in Dushi and
Webb (2004). They use data from the HRS to estimate the fraction of wealth annuitized.
We present the fraction annuitized as percentage of the sum of liquid ﬁnancial wealth
andpre-annuitizedwealth. Liquid ﬁnancial wealthincludes ﬁnancial assets, IRA’s, and
DC pensions. Pre-annuitized wealth includes social security and DB pensions.
4.5 Robustnesstestsfortheeffectofhealthcostrisk
on annuity demand
In our baseline set up we ignored several factors which could have an effect
on optimal annuity demand; (1) housing as a potential source of liquidity,CHAPTER 4 153
and (2) a change in marginal utility due to a change in health status. In this
section, we examine the effect of these factors on optimal annuity demand
and check whether our main results still hold. Furthermore, the consumption
ﬂoor differs sizeably per country. In our benchmark case, we used the U.S.
consumption ﬂoor, but in Section 4.5.3 we show how a different consumption
ﬂoor inﬂuences annuity demand.
4.5.1 Housing as a source of liquidity
In our baseline case, we abstract from housing wealth as a way to get liquidity
for a number of reasons. First, it is extremely costly to get a reverse mortgage.
Closing costs are on average about 6.8% of the property value ((Davidoff and
Welke 2007)). (Davidoff and Welke 2007) note that these high closing costs
are cited as one of the major reasons for the relative small demand for reverse
mortgages. (Rodda, Herber, and Lam 2000) report that a Home Equity Con-
version Mortgage (HECM) borrower has a median adjusted property value of
about $102,000, median initial principal limit of $54,000, and median closing
costs of $3400. Given that the net of mortgage housing wealth of a single fe-
male with a median wealth level is about $30,000 and for a couple is about
$82,000 ((Dushi and Webb 2004)), the amount that the median agent can bor-
row is limited and thus provides only partial insurance against medical ex-
penses. Second, empirical evidence shows that retirees generally do not sell
their house, which is also a way to liquidate housing wealth. (Yang 2009) ﬁnds
that transaction costs are a major factor in the slow downsizing of the housing
stock later in life. This is further supported by (Davidoff 2010) and (Venti and
Wise 2000) who show that retirees typically only sell their house when they
move to a long term care facility. Individuals appear to attach a high value to
remaining in their home and not having to move.
Asa robustness test we assume that half of housing wealth can be made liq-
uid and the results are displayed in Figure 4.9. The wealth at age 65, displayed
on the horizontal axes, presents total wealth, which is the sum of ﬁnancial
wealth, retirement wealth, and half of housing wealth. Hence when compar-
ing Figure 4.8 and 4.9 the deﬁnition of total wealth has changed; in Figure 4.8
we abstracted from housing wealth while in Figure 4.9 we assume that half
of housing wealth can be made liquid and is thus included in the measure of
total wealth.16 We see that the empirically observed annuitization levels are
16Note that the empirically observed annuitized fraction of wealth, when we take half of
housing wealth into account, is of course lower than if we abstract from housing wealth.154 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION





































annuitized wealth as a fraction of total wealth and half of housing wealth
optimal annuity demand − piecewise constant health cost model
Figure 4.9 – Comparing empirical annuitization levels with optimal annuitiza-
tion levels; housing wealth included.
We display the annuitization levels for a single female at age 65 estimated in Dushi and
Webb (2004). They use data from the HRS to estimate the fraction of wealth annuitized.
We present the fraction annuitized as percentage of the sum of liquid ﬁnancial wealth,
pre-annuitized wealth, and half of housing wealth. Liquid ﬁnancial wealth includes ﬁ-
nancial assets, IRA’s, and DC pensions. Pre-annuitized wealth includes social security,
and DB pensions. Housing wealth is the wealth net of mortgage.
higher than the optimal levels for a wealth level lower than $300.000 and op-
posite for wealth levels above $300.000. However, for the relevant range of
wealth levels the difference between the optimal and observed annuity levels
is negligible; namely the median wealth level is about $200.000, 7th decile is
$270.000, and the 9th wealth decile is $500.000. In accordance with our results,
(Pashchenko 2010) ﬁnds that the effect of housing wealth on participation in
the annuity market is limited. Note that although in the optimization we im-
plicitly allow for liquidation of half of housing wealth and annuitization of
this, we ﬁnd that this is not optimal. We already saw in Figure 4.8 that people
do not want to annuitize their (entire) liquid ﬁnancial wealth, hence it is not
optimal to annuitize, on top of this, housing wealth.
4.5.2 State dependence of marginal utility
As a further robustness test we make the marginal utility of consumption de-
pendent on the health status of the agent. We did not include this in the base-
line case, because there is no consensus in the literature on the relative change
Furthermore the optimal annuity demand as a fraction of total wealth has not changed, only
the meaning of wealth on the horizontal axes is altered.CHAPTER 4 155





































annuitized wealth as a fraction of total wealth
optimal annuity demand − marginal utility independent of health status
optimal annuity demand − marginal utility falls 10% in bad health status
optimal annuity demand − marginal utility falls 20% in bad health status
Figure 4.10 – Comparing empirical annuitization levels with optimal annuiti-
zation levels; marginal utility health state dependent.
We display the annuitization levels for a single female at age 65 estimated in Dushi and
Webb (2004). They use data from the HRS to estimate the fraction of wealth annuitized.
We present the fraction annuitized as percentage of the sum of liquid ﬁnancial wealth
andpre-annuitizedwealth. Liquid ﬁnancial wealthincludes ﬁnancial assets, IRA’s, and
DC pensions. Pre-annuitized wealth includes social security and DB pensions.
inmarginal utility oreven onwhetherthe marginal utility ishigherorlowerin
a bad health status ((Edwards 2008) and (Viscusi and Evans 1990)).17 Recently
(Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo 2008) ﬁnd that the marginal utility
declines as the health state deteriorates and estimate that a one-standard devi-
ationincreaseinthenumberofchronicdiseasesleadstoadecreaseinmarginal
utility of 11 percent. In Figure 4.10 we display the optimal annuitization levels
when the marginal utility in the bad health state declines by 10% or 20%. The
optimal annuity demand is altered only slightly hence our results are robust
to health state dependence of the utility from consumption.
4.5.3 Minimum consumption level
Since the consumption ﬂoor varies per country, we show in Figure 4.11 how
that changes optimal annuity demand. We see that, for a given wealth level,
the optimal annuity demand is lower for lower minimum consumption levels.
The reason for this ﬁnding is that if an agent incurs large health costs, the
drop in utility is larger for lower minimum consumption levels. Under those
circumstances, an individual is induced to hold a larger amount liquid to be
17An overview of this literature is provided in (Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo
2009)156 HEALTH COST RISK AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT PROVISION













































Minimum consumption level 4,000
Minimum consumption level 7,000
Minimum consumption level 10,000
Figure 4.11 – Optimal annuity demand assuming the piecewise constant health
cost model for varying wealth levels and minimum consumption level
The ﬁgure displays the optimal annuity demand for a 65-year old for varying wealth
levels and minimum consumption levels. The numbers are in thousands of dollars.
able to smooth consumption and avoid receiving the minimum consumption
level.
4.6 Conclusion
We examine the effect of out-of-pocket medical expenses on optimal annuity
demand. Medical expenses increase the need for liquidity, which could in-
duce households to annuitize less and keep wealth liquid. In the literature,
several health cost speciﬁcations are estimated, which all imply a different
process for out-of-pocket medical expenses. We employ two health cost mod-
els to disentangle an important driver of annuity demand: health cost risk
early in retirement. We ﬁnd that whether full annuitization remains optimal
dependsmainly on the amount of health cost risk early in retirement. If health
costs can already be high in early retirement it is not optimal to annuitize all
wealth, since the retiree cannot save enough in a few years to cover these ex-
penses. The only way to have a buffer against these expenses in early years,
is to reduce the annuitization level. In contrast, if the medical expense risk is
only moderately high, it is optimal to fully annuitize and subsequently save
sizeable amounts out of the annuity income to build up a buffer. If in that
case the agent is hit by a health shock later in retirement, the savings are highCHAPTER 4 157
enough to pay the health expenses and smooth consumption. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd empirical evidence for high health cost risk early in retirement. Ex-
tending (Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2011), we show
that optimal annuity demand varies with initial wealth levels. When faced
with high health cost risk early in retirement, agents with a low wealth level
ﬁnd it optimal to annuitize a large fraction of total wealth while retirees with
higher wealth levels optimally annuitize less. We compare these optimal an-
nuity levels with the empirically observed annuitization levels for varying
wealth levels and ﬁnd a similar pattern. Both the empirically observed an-
nuity demand and the optimal annuity demand is decreasing in total wealth
if the health costs can be high early in retirement. Furthermore the optimal
demand is slightly lower or equal to the empirically established annuitiza-
tion level for all wealth levels, hence we can explain the annuity puzzle. The
optimal age-wealth proﬁle for an agent with median wealth is similar to em-
pirically observed paths: agents have sizeable precautionary savings due to
out-of-pocket medical expenses and they start dissaving late in retirement.
4.A Numericalmethodforsolvingthelifecycleprob-
lem
Due to the richness and complexity of this model it cannot be solved analyt-
ically, so we employ numerical techniques. We follow Brandt, Goyal, Santa-
Clara, and Stroud (2005) and Carroll (2006) with several extensions by Koijen,
Nijman, and Werker (2010). Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005)
adopt a simulation-based method which can deal with many exogenous state
variables. In ourcase Xt = (R
f
t ,πt,ht) isthe relevantexogenous state variable.
Wealth acts as an endogenous state variable. For this reason, following Car-
roll (2006), we specify a grid for wealth after (annuity) income, expenses due
to background risk, and consumption. As a result, we do not need numerical
rootﬁnding to ﬁnd the optimal consumption decision.
Theoptimization problem issolved via dynamicprogramming and wepro-
ceed backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In
the last period, the individual consumes all wealth available. The value func-
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The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation at all other points in time,
Vt(Wt, R
f













In each period we ﬁnd the optimal asset weights by setting the ﬁrst order
condition equal to zero
Et(C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1) = 0, (4.15)
where C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal real consumption level. Because we solve the
optimization problem via backwards recursion, we know C∗
t+1 at time t + 1.
Furthermore, we simulate the exogenous state variables for N trajectories and
T time periods hence we can calculate the realizations of the Euler conditions,
C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1. We regress these realizations on a polynomial ex-
pansion in the state variables to obtain an approximation of the conditional











In addition we employ a further extension, introduced in Koijen, Nijman, and
Werker (2010). They found that the regression coefﬁcients θh are smooth func-
tions of the asset weights and, consequently, we approximate the regression
coefﬁcients θh by projecting them further on polynomial expansion in the asset
weights:
θ′
h ≃ g(w)ψ. (4.17)
The Euler condition must be set to zero to ﬁnd the optimal asset weights:
˜ X′
pψg(w)′ = 0. (4.18)BIBLIOGRAPHY
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